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President Trump’s to end on shipping in the Red Sea highlights an issue every American grand strategist needs to focus on, in and out of the administration: which superpower will ultimately control the key strategic choke points for world maritime trade, the United States or China?

This issue was underlined a week earlier when President Trump began pressing for giving American ships free access to the as well as the Panama Canal—a move that infuriated the usual critics. They were quick to accuse him of arrogance and overreach, not to mention historical ignorance, since, unlike the Panama Canal, the United States played neither a role in building nor owning the Suez.

On the contrary, I would argue Trump’s Suez »åé³¾²¹°ù³¦³ó±ð reveals a shrewd grasp of grand strategic planning. The United States must have ready access to both maritime chokepoints for its commercial vessels and also its navy, both in order to protect U.S. trade and to stay ahead of our global competition with China. 

In fact, Trump’s thinking is reminiscent of British first sea lord John “Jackieâ€� Fisher’s list of â€�,â€� which he and the Royal Navy secured in the years before World War I, from the Dover Strait and Gibraltar to Suez, Singapore, and the Cape of Good Hope. 

Today, some of Fisher’s keys (e.g., Dover and Gibraltar) may be less valuable than others (e.g., Suez and Singapore). However, thinking strategically about who controls access to the world’s most important shipping passages is still crucial—especially since last month, the United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated for 80 percent of global trade by volume.

When one draws up a modern-day list of five “strategic keysâ€� for President Trump and the United States, it should begin with the . Right now, this transoceanic passageway handles of global import-export trade. For the United States, however, that number is of container traffic. At the same time, the canal’s has essentially created a brand-new modern Panama Canal alongside the original, doubling the canal’s capacity. 

That means the canal’s importance for the United States and its Latin American neighbors for supply chains and moving bulk cargoes will only grow. And since in the event of any conflict or disruption, it will be our armed forces, particularly the navy, that has to intervene, that’s all the more reason why free access—and exclusion of Chinese interests—is clearly a vital strategic goal for the United States.

The second key, the Suez Canal, handles of global trade and 30 percent of container traffic. Among its frequent users is the U.S. Navy, with approximately , including aircraft carriers, passing through annually. The canal sits in the middle of the volatile Middle East region, where the navy’s ability to support allies like Israel and conduct operations in the Mediterranean and Red Seas is highly dependent on unfettered access to the Suez Canal. 

On the other hand, there’s no point in having free and open access to the Suez Canal if there are disruptions at the other end of the passageway. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. The world has the hard way with the , which forced shipping traffic to circle the entire continent of Africa in order to bypass them. The passage is also uncomfortably close to China’s naval base at —its largest base outside of Chinese waters. 

American strategic interests demand a regular naval presence in this region, both to protect commercial access and to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the western end of the , as well as Iran’s. America has allies—Israel and Saudi Arabia as well as India—who can help to keep this vital waterway free and clear. But without American leadership, the Horn of Africa will be in danger of becoming a Chinese lake. 

China is also the strategic heavyweight in the fourth strategic key, which is the Malacca Strait connecting the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. An estimated of all global shipping, especially oil and LNG shipments to Asia, traverse this international waterway. It is also crucial to the economic health of both China and Japan, which depend on it for a significant portion of their trade.

The Obama and Biden administrations largely ignored the importance of the strait and all but ceded control of the to China. A Trump global strategy can use controlling access to the strait to restore the strategic balance in the South China Sea and prevent disputes like the one between China and the Philippines from threatening trade or triggering armed conflict. 

Running from Baffin Island to the Beaufort Sea, the is the fifth strategic key and the newest, thanks to climate change. At , it is also the longest (compared to 120 miles for Suez). With no less than seven different passage routes, which can take three to six weeks to traverse, using the Northwest Passage doesn’t make sense for time-sensitive cargo—nor is it ever entirely ice-free.

Its economic importance, however, is outweighed by its vital geopolitical position. With , and two NATO allies, , all jockeying for advantage along its shores—including installing ballistic missile defense systems—the Northwest Passage’s strategic importance begs for a strong U.S. naval and military forward presence: another reason why acquiring is a priority for the Trump team. 

Of course, the U.S. Navy is not the of old; it has no territorial empire to defend and no longer acts as the world’s policeman. However, ignoring the strategic importance of these passageways or ceding control to potential foes like will endanger not only but also the future of the global economy. 

Admiral Jackie Fisher has been dead for more than a century. But his ghost and spirit deserve a seat at the next national security meeting at the White House.