The transatlantic relationship is in turmoil. With the United States and Europe at odds over Western strategy toward Ukraine and Russia, a chorus of European leaders has questioned the reliability of the United States and sought to breathe new life into the concept of European strategic autonomy.
For many, this concept resembles Charles de Gaulle鈥檚 famous description of Brazil: it is the idea of the future and always will be. Yet, whatever the long-term prospects of may be, in the near term there is no way to help Ukraine fend off Russian aggression without an abundant supply of American arms, strategic enablers, and intelligence support. Unless it is prepared to give up the fight for Ukraine altogether, Europe and the United States will have no choice but to forge a sustainable way to cooperate in the weeks and months ahead.
Three Ways Forward
Three ideas can help to overcome the current impasse and resume support for Ukraine.
The first is the establishment of a European fund to purchase U.S. weapons and equipment for Ukraine. The resources to make this idea a reality already exist in spades. Norway, for example, is sitting on a sovereign wealth fund, yet it has less than 鈧�4 billion in support of Ukraine. Moreover, some 鈧�200 billion in Russian assets are in multiple European jurisdictions, principally Belgium. Each day brings a new headline of Europeans pushing for more defense outlays.
This European money could purchase American weapons for Ukrainian use that cannot be procured elsewhere at scale. For example, no European nation except T眉rkiye produces indigenous multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) like the American-made and . Similarly, Europe is Russian artillery shell production, or even that of Moscow鈥檚 ally, .
U.S. air and missile defense interceptors mark another crucial area in which Europe has no available substitute for American systems. To be sure, such support must be weighed against U.S. readiness in other theaters. However, it is hard to imagine a business-savvy U.S. president like Donald Trump, who has already latched onto a deal for Ukraine鈥檚 , objecting to an injection of euros into the U.S. defense industrial base.
The second idea that can solidify cooperation between Washington and its European partners and allies is to continue Ukraine鈥檚 transition away from a vintage Soviet defense industrial base toward one that reflects Western standards. The example of Denmark鈥檚 155mm-class NATO-standard Bohdana howitzer points the way. Instead of transferring off-the-shelf artillery, Copenhagen granted production rights to Ukraine鈥檚 defense industry. Now, each month Ukraine produces around twenty Bohdana guns. Denmark then buys these weapons from Kyiv and donates them to the Ukrainian military.
This model can be applied to various weapons systems and joint ventures. Ukraine鈥檚 Western partners can provide Kyiv with an initial infusion of supplies or grant production rights to Ukraine, which can then develop its capabilities for battle. This idea minimizes some of the burden on the United States and Europe while simultaneously boosting Kyiv鈥檚 own capacity to provide for its own defense.
Third, Ukraine can strengthen its ties to NATO鈥攅ven if membership in the alliance is not in the cards for the foreseeable future. Kyiv has already enjoyed Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP) status since June 2020. EOP status supports with NATO and helps Kyiv fight more efficiently. To intensify and accelerate this effort, NATO and Ukraine also agreed on an in 2023.
The Finnish Model
The West can take these arrangements as a point of departure. When it was an EOP nation, Finland, for example, participated in the enhanced NATO Response Force in supplementary roles. a with NATO well before Finland became a member state, allowing allied forces to station in or transit Finnish territory during exercises or in the event of a crisis.
At a time when the Kremlin has essentially annexed and announced the of tactical nuclear weapons there, NATO should consider an 鈥渁s-if-member鈥� partner role and Host Nation Support memorandum for Ukraine within the new NATO Force Model. Russia may object to such moves, but its own policy toward Belarus provides the West with a strong reason to proceed. Such a step would also help assuage some of the disappointment in Kyiv over Ukraine鈥檚 short-term prospects for NATO membership.
The path forward for the United States and Europe demands pragmatic cooperation and innovative financial mechanisms. By establishing a European fund to purchase American weapons, facilitating technology transfers, and deepening NATO partnerships, the West can demonstrate sustained commitment to Ukraine鈥檚 sovereignty and reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship at a critical geopolitical moment.
The alternative鈥攁llowing Russian aggression to succeed鈥攚ould undermine European security. For all the differences, the United States should recognize that its strategic interests are fundamentally aligned with Europe: backing Ukraine is not just about supporting one nation, but about preserving the European order and the fruits of cooperation it has long produced.