Perhaps one of the most influential living statesmen, Ahmet Davuto臒lu's combination of political pragmatism and political philosophy sets him apart from most senior diplomats. Despite a relatively recent split from President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an's Justice and Development Party (AKP [Adalet ve Kalk谋nma Partisi]), for which Davuto臒lu previously served as party leader in addition to T眉rkiye's prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Davuto臒lu's ideas have been central to AKP and the subsequent Davuto臒lu-formed Future Party (GP [Gelecek Partisi]). Davuto臒lu's first major work, Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory, was developed from his doctoral dissertation in political science and international relations and published in 1993.1 A decade later, Davuto臒lu's career as a writer and academic would transform into an active role in T眉rkiye's foreign affairs, as he advised prime ministers Abdullah G眉l and Recep Erdo臒an. While Davuto臒lu's later works, such as Stratejik derinlik (Strategic Depth, 2001), have been discussed extensively as demonstrating a "Neo-Ottoman" approach to T眉rkiye's foreign relations, his under-appreciated Alternative Paradigms presents a different image of Davuto臒lu's vision of politics. The alternative paradigm is not merely a different course of action in foreign policy, a change in political ideology, or an appeal to Islamic solidarity. Instead, Davuto臒lu offers an alternative paradigm for understanding the world.
In line with his claim that Western perspectives are incapable of considering other worldviews, many of the actions of Davuto臒lu, alongside his one-time advisees G眉l and Erdo臒an, appear opaque or less than earnest to a Western audience. I argue that, by taking the explanations of Davuto臒lu鈥攁nd by extension, much of the larger contemporary Turkish foreign policy apparatus鈥攁t face value, Davuto臒lu's alternative paradigm is seen more clearly. With 2023 marking the thirtieth anniversary of Alternative Paradigms and the hundredth anniversary of the Turkish republic, it is an opportune time to revisit his influential work.
This essay begins with an overview of Davuto臒lu鈥檚 understanding of the Western and Islamic paradigms for perceiving and understanding the world, which, he argues, are fundamentally distinct and incompatible. After briefly summarizing the (at points complex) philosophical underpinnings of Davuto臒lu鈥檚 worldview, this essay provides an assessment of some of the key implications that this philosophy has on Davuto臒lu鈥檚 political ideology, particularly regarding Muslim cooperation, Muslim and Western relations, and the responsibilities of Muslim states (namely T眉rkiye) in the world. In conclusion, I argue that Davuto臒lu鈥檚 Alternative Paradigms lays out a clear challenge for Western analysts and policymakers to better understand differing worldviews, regardless of whether or not they accept their premises. In this specific case, Davuto臒lu鈥檚 vision is for Muslims states to govern in line with Islamic values rather than seeking to acculturate Western political ideology.
The Core Argument of Alternative Paradigms
The core argument of Alternative Paradigms is that the West maintains a unique paradigm through which it understands and interacts with the world. Davuto臒lu develops this claim from empirical observation and a critical study of Western political analysis鈥攚ith threads of intellectual history weaving together his argument. He charges that the West can only see within its own horizons and cannot envision other ways of life or competing motivations. Most of all, Davuto臒lu argues that this Western paradigm is broken and leading to moral, social, and political degradation throughout the international community. This particularly marks disaster for countries like T眉rkiye that have attempted to overlay their Islamic beliefs and identity with the Western paradigm of thought鈥攊mporting notions of civil law, secularism, and Westphalian nation-states. Davuto臒lu insists that no Muslim can exist outside a Muslim society, and that Muslim society cannot exist outside the full prophetic vision of community life.
For Davuto臒lu, the revelation of Islam set the stage for a complete shift from preceding paradigms or schools of thought. Islam might employ the history, language, or ideas of past paradigms, but it fundamentally subverts and reorients them. Davuto臒lu argues that Quranic revelation turned all prior knowledge and concepts on their head, providing them with a semantic reformulation and new epistemological basis. The new paradigm brought by Islam was totalizing and incompatible with prior paradigms insofar as defection from an aspect of Islam represents complete defection from its sense of constructing a universalized whole. In this understanding, the metaphysical revelation and revolution brought about by the Prophet Mohammed provided the perfect political community. Not just civitas or res publica, the Prophetic community combines both hierarchical political order with common participation and welfare. This perfect polity continued to hold the same power and authority as the caliphate under the prophet鈥檚 successors, first under Abu Bakr and the three subsequent Rashidun Caliphs and then under later successors鈥攄espite these late caliphs straying from its theo-epistemological basis. In other words, their successors may have held the caliph鈥檚 office, but they did not properly understood Islam and, subsequently, the moral underpinnings of the world; they thus constituted an image of the Prophetic ideal within the world rather than Mohammed's uniquely constituted and ordained political community. After the Rashidun, the wholeness of the Islamic political community was degraded: each period of subsequent rule did not serve as a model of governance, though it still exemplifies elements of it. For Davuto臒lu, the historic realization of the community under Abu Bakr and the Rashidun makes the Islamic paradigm more feasible and real than the Christian or Western paradigm which, at best, seeks an ideal of government and justice that cannot be realized as man neither recognizes his limitation nor his role in the universe.
According to Davuto臒lu, successive caliphates and the Ottoman Empire eventually gave way to Muslim states鈥� attempts to modernize in line with the West, which inevitably compromised on Islamic values. Davuto臒lu describes the work of Kemal Ataturk and others to modernize and seek scientific progress as inherently and necessarily flawed because of its compromise between Islamic and Western traditions. Such an effort grafts foreign elements onto Islamic society; this both neglects what is natural or organic development and also cannot replace the wholeness of the Islamic vision. From this perspective, Ataturk's move away from Islamic traditions and values is nonsensical and ineffective because Western logic or ethics cannot be reconciled with Islamic ontology. This attempt makes Muslims party to the system of colonial imperialism and destroys their ability to spread Islamic ethical and legal ideas or expand their authority.
However, that 鈥渕odernization鈥� is impossible and destructive to the Islamic paradigm does not mean that Islamic governance cannot continue into the contemporary world. As will be shown, Davuto臒lu attempts a return to classical Islamic political theory, a resourcement to align Turkish and Islamic politics with the unique character and ontological unity of Islam. While Davuto臒lu鈥檚 vision is grand鈥攁nd his prose is dense鈥攊t serves as a useful framework for understanding shifts in Turkish policy and properly identifying the goals of statesmen like Davuto臒lu.
Davuto臒lu鈥檚 Oversimplified Western Paradigm
Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory is equal parts comparative political theory, comparative theology, and comparative metaphysics. Its greatest strength is serving as a rejoinder to common perceptions of the Islamicate world, pointing out the errors in the purportedly universal frameworks of Western scholarship and analysis, and building a positive case for what is unique about the Islamic worldview (weltanschauung). The unique qualities of the Islamic worldview are, as Davuto臒lu鈥檚 argues, totalizing and encompass all elements of human life and thought. Where I use worldview throughout this essay, Davuto臒lu uses weltanschauung, in part to emphasize the totality and unity of the worldview鈥攁lthough even weltanschauung is limited in comparison to the scope of Islamic imagination that Davuto臒lu presents.
Alternative Paradigms is weaker in its description of the Western worldview, painting an overbroad picture that elides disagreement or important nuances in Western thought, inverting his criticism of Orientalist scholars. From the introduction鈥檚 outset, Davuto臒lu outlines a few epistemological claims that he believes to be misguided when discussing Islamic thought or comparing the Islamic and Western worldviews. These lead him to conclude that attempts at Islamic modernism that seek to adapt Western political systems to Islamic societies or to imitate Western styles of life through industrialization and liberalization will lead to grafting failure. First, regarding Islam鈥檚 generalizability, Davuto臒lu claims that 鈥渢he relationship between '补辩补虃'颈诲, as the origin of the doctrinal antecedents, and fiqh, as the origin of the axiological normativeness and of the political formal structuralism, has not been considered to such a great extent.鈥�2 That is, the analysis of Islamic political thought tends to focus on the application of Islamic law (fiqh) rather than the creedal elements ('补辩补虃'颈诲) that undergird law. Davuto臒lu instead intends to concentrate more 鈥渙n the intellectual and doctrinal mechanisms of Muslim consciousness than on practical applications or institutional adaptations of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence.鈥�3
In a Heideggerian move, Davuto臒lu insists on the need for semantic analysis of the key terms of Islamic and Western worldviews, with words such as 鈥渉appiness,鈥� 鈥減rosperity,鈥� or 鈥減luralism鈥� entailing very different states or assumptions between different languages. These different nuances of meaning, Davuto臒lu argues, belie fundamentally distinct conceptions of life and constitute different frameworks of understanding prior to any political theory. This leads to his second claim for a new methodology of comparative analysis based upon the two novel concepts of 鈥渙ntological proximity鈥� and 鈥渆pistemological differentiation.鈥� 鈥淥ntological proximity鈥� is used to 鈥渄enominate the Western paradigm鈥� in a more comprehensive manner than comparative theology or comparative philosophy.4 The contrasts between the Islamic concept of tawhid (oneness or unity) and Western ontological proximity, Davuto臒lu argues, 鈥渟pecify socio-political imaginations, theories, and cultures.鈥�5
These differences amount to more than philosophical, political theoretical, or cultural distinctions鈥攊nstead, Davuto臒lu thinks that the 鈥渋nterrelationship of ontology, epistemology, axiology, and politics [points to their irreconcilability].鈥�6 The final contrast in terms that Davuto臒lu sets up in the introduction is that of the Islamic worldview maintaining an 鈥渙ntologically determined epistemology鈥� whereas the Western worldview holds an 鈥渆pistemologically defined ontology.鈥�7 This epistemological differentiation maintains that Islam鈥檚 understanding of all facets of knowledge is subsequent to the awareness of the being of divine unity while the West understands all forms of existence鈥攄ivine, intellectual, and material being鈥攖hrough reason.
The outline of the Western paradigm Davuto臒lu posits here elides a great deal of intellectual history. As he accuses Western scholars of Islam of oversimplification, Davuto臒lu exhibits a strong recency and selection bias in suggesting that Western ontological proximity entails panentheistic or materialist theologies; it is a cleaving of the history of ideas to posit that the perfectibility of man is Western civilization鈥檚 fundamental mission (厂别濒产蝉迟惫别谤蝉迟盲苍诲苍颈蝉).8 However, Davuto臒lu echoes and is well-versed in continental philosophy, especially the German phenomenological tradition. His diagnosis of the West is comfortably within contemporary criticism and representative of real鈥攑erhaps central鈥攁ssumptions that underlie Western thought and politics.
To prevent the core point of this introduction and the entirety of Alternative Paradigms from being lost either through the opacity of Davuto臒lu鈥檚 philosophical terms or the nuances of scholarly debate, it is important to underscore the claim that the Islamic and Western worldviews hold fundamental, necessary, and irreconcilable differences. Yet, his argument is not that of a 鈥淐lash of Civilizations,鈥� an incompatibility of democracy with Islam, or numerous other tensions that Western scholars have offered between the West and Islamic world.
Rather, Davuto臒lu鈥檚 argument is that the mode of being and knowing are so fundamentally different between Islam and the West that the same words, policies, or practices represent entirely distinct objects. If true, these differences would be nigh unbridgeable.
Importantly, this epistemological-ontological barrier between worldviews does not just complicate the capacity of Western influence or analysis; according to Davuto臒lu, it makes impossible the goal of 鈥淚slamic Modernism,鈥� Kemalism, and other Muslim-led attempts to reconcile Islamic thought with the contemporary West. The modernizers, Davuto臒lu claims, are 鈥渁ttached to ontological presuppositions and conjectural/material 厂别濒产蝉迟惫别谤蝉迟盲苍诲苍颈蝉 [self-perception],鈥� leading to divided personalities, official/secular dissimulation, and civilizational anxieties.9 Davuto臒lu raises T眉rkiye as a prime example, arguing that Atat眉rk鈥檚 open welcome to Western pedagogy and scholarship as a replacement for Islamic tradition transformed T眉rkiye鈥檚 value systems and made education superficial.10 Attempts to synthesize the traditions, to import Western thought or ideals with high fidelity, are doomed to fail.
Throughout the book, Davuto臒lu alternates between sections describing the Western and then Islamic paradigm in relation to theory, political justification, knowledge and belief, political legitimacy, and pluralism. This essay focuses on what Davuto臒lu presents as the Islamic paradigm, only making reference to the Western paradigm when it鈥檚 useful for comparison.
Tawhid: The Islamic Paradigm
According to Davuto臒lu, the core of the Islamic paradigm is its unity, with theological, ontological, and political senses of tawhid emanating throughout. In juxtaposition, the West is defined by a sense of individual atomism and thus requires multitudes or plurality in place of unity: Everything begins with the individual seeking knowledge and action, so all politics is the organization of disparate individuals who are coming to recognize one another.
Davuto臒lu explains:
The principle of tawhid is the main channel from theory to practice, from belief to life, and from ideal to reality in the holistic Islamic Weltanschauung [worldview]. This principle implies that Alla虃h is one in His essence (dha虃t), i.e., not composed of parts; one in His attributes (sifa虃t), i.e., not having two powers, two knowledges, etc.; one in His works (af鈥檃l), i.e., not being influenced in any way by anything other than Himself.11
The essential unity of God is the fundamental underpinning of Islamic cosmology and thus, Davuto臒lu argues, of Islamic life. It is the distinctive character of Islamic thought and one that Davuto臒lu does not believe is truly shared with any other faith or worldview, the other Abrahamic traditions included.12 God鈥檚 unity makes any ontological identification between human persons or created things as contingent or relative beings and the absolute, undivided being of God.
The unity between cosmology and ontology that follows from tawhid is not only demonstrated in the Quran but demonstrated through the Quran. Despite some pre-Islamic antecedents, Davuto臒lu explains that the Quran serves as a semantic reformulation that resystematizes existing words and concepts into a new, uniquely Islamic worldview. This is seen first and foremost through the name 鈥淎llah,鈥� which was used for the pre-Islamic high god of Mecca but with a wholly distinct imagination from the monotheistic conception. By completely flipping the understanding of even God鈥檚 name, Islam is thus seen as 鈥渁 comprehensive imaginative revolution establishing a new set of links between linguistics and mental imagination.鈥�13 Davuto臒lu underscores the uniqueness of the Islamic worldview with this shift: that in one sense, the Prophet Muhammad shared the same deity with pre-Islamic Arabs, while in another sense the similarity is merely virtual.
Davuto臒lu provides a fascinating overview of Islamic intellectual history, working to show how this epistemological revolution and unity is evinced in all of the Islamic sciences and across many different thinkers. That such diverse perspectives all return to the unity of being and knowledge demonstrates its realization in the eyes of Davuto臒lu. In turn, this influences 鈥渁xiological normativeness鈥濃€攁 unity of belief and creed with life and law. Succinctly, the creation of man entails duties of man. As Davuto臒lu writes:
The fundamental characteristic of Islamic axiological normativeness is its interpretation of man's responsibility on earth which forms the imagination of the unity of life and law by preventing any type of compartmentalization of the different sections of life. Islamic morality has been directly attached to the ontological antecedents via specification of man's place in the universe as the basic element for the divine responsibility. Man, who has not been created except to serve Alla虃h (Qur'a虃n, 51:56).14
The wholeness of God and His revelation brings about 鈥渁n ultimate unity of life鈥� where there is 鈥淸indivisibility of] this life and the next,鈥� where there is no division between political life and Islamic faith, where knowledge and right action are the same.15 It must be stressed that this is not a cultural, historical, or merely normative claim that Davuto臒lu makes. Rather, he claims that the imagination of the world is fundamentally different. While 鈥淲estern ways of life ... [understand] divisibility of the sectors of life,鈥� the Islamic worldview is one in which all being and ideation is unified.16 Thus, Islamic law is not to be understood merely as just and faithful, but that it is unified with and indicates the unity of all other domains of life. Crucially, human happiness and perfection can only be attained within the 鈥減rotection of a comprehensive law鈥� realized through its Quranic basis.
Davuto臒lu uses the example of the 12th century Andalusian scholar Ibn Rushd鈥檚 commentary on Plato鈥檚 Republic to again highlight the ontological-epistemological revolution. While the Greeks may utilize myth to understand law (nomos) and guide some men toward justice, virtue, and happiness, the Islamic worldview is built upon God鈥檚 revelation and offers perfection to all men. Where the Greek philosophers and Islamic thinkers overlap is primarily in methodology. Where truth and right thinking are found, they gesture toward and are most fully expressed within the worldview of Islamic tawhid.
Political Consequences of the Islamic Worldview
The first political consequence of the divergent Western and Islamic worldviews lies in how the two systems justify the state. Davuto臒lu aims to explain both 鈥渢he origin of the state as a socio-political system鈥� and 鈥渢he aims of the state as a socio-political institution鈥� in order to delineate justifications.17 Bolstering his past claims about ontologies, Davuto臒lu discusses the shared epistemological and methodological tools between Aristotle鈥檚 metaphysics and political theory. Tracing back their Aristotelian roots, Western political sciences thus depend on prior sciences: many political theories are dependent on a state of nature and all on the study of nature. Using a classification on the origin of states as emerging from 鈥�(i) the state of nature, (ii) the state as a divine institution, (III) the theory of force, (iv) the theory of contract, and (v) the natural sociability and political consciousness of man,鈥� Davuto臒lu concludes that these are all ultimately dependent on the study of nature and being.18 Despite superficial similarities, Davuto臒lu argues that the state as a divine institution is not the Islamic origin.
The Islamic way of justifying the state instead refers to the absolute sovereignty of God. As Davuto臒lu explains, 鈥淭he ontological hierarchy as 鈥楢lla虃h-human being-nature鈥� implies a socio-political hierarchy as 鈥楢lla虃h-human being-political system鈥� in the Islamic way of thinking.鈥�19 That is, the state鈥檚 origins lie in man鈥檚 trusteeship over nature, the state comes from a 鈥渕eta-historical covenant,鈥� and its aim is to fulfill the God-given responsibilities of flourishing as creation and caring for creation. As with the earlier discussion of Greek philosophy, one can describe a social contract or other elements of Western political theory within the Islamic state, but their meaning is entirely different: Islamic society has a social contract, but it itself is not a social contract. With some quibbles, Davuto臒lu quotes an attempt at this analysis: 鈥渋nterpreted in terms of social contract theory, a covenant between a prophet and his followers created a millah [religion as community], and a covenant between God and His devotees laid the foundation-stone of a moral order (din [religion as way of life]) among human beings, but a social contract among different religious communities gave birth to the ummah.鈥�20
Focusing on the etymology of caliphate, Davuto臒lu describes how the Quran transforms a pre-Islamic title and unites it with Islamic cosmology. He notes that the first Quranic usage relates to Adam鈥檚 creation, 鈥淸specifying] the ontological status of man on earth.鈥�21 Second, it is used for the socio-political status of King David. The other uses of caliph pertain to the role of a new nation succeeding the prior nations that have failed to maintain their divine duties. While Davuto臒lu admits it is not possible to definitively determine whether Abu Bakr was given the title of caliph because of pre-Islamic usage or Quranic use, it represents the blending and transformative effect Islam has for human life.
In a similar vein, Davuto臒lu compares how the West and Islam legitimate their political orders. Legitimacy in the West is presented as harmonization between a value and the 鈥渆pistemologico-axiological imagination of a society.鈥� Though obtuse, this is an insightful observation that the manner in which something is believed and the belief itself are self-reinforcing: proposals to different manners of justifying belief are doubted, and beliefs that cannot be justified by Western academic methods are rejected. This tends to take the form of a conflation between legitimacy and legality, as the West assumes that actions within political norms and laws are broadly perceived as legitimate. This legal prescriptivism gains strong support from Thomas Hobbes, but Davuto臒lu sees it even earlier in Scholastic legal thought and antecedents in Augustine. Setting aside positive law, even natural law falls within this paradigm as the West seeks to discover law through reason. Such an endeavor is, of course, dependent on the paradigm鈥檚 epistemological-ontological mode.
For Davuto臒lu, the Islamic manner of legitimation then appears simple: How well do political acts fit within the normative character of epistemology and ontology, and do they cohere with the eternal values that have continuously been upheld by Islamic history? Rather than judging political form or institutional constitution, Davuto臒lu sees Islam as censuring the evils that stem from the nature of politics. Pre-Islamic laws, monarchy, democracy, or other 鈥渁ccidental鈥� elements of the state are unimportant so long as they promote trusteeship and prevent evil.
The contrast Davuto臒lu builds is therefore between a Western paradigm where political mechanisms inform values and an Islamic paradigm where the value structure determines mechanisms. The fundamental difference, he claims, of Muslim political society is the responsibility of man in maintaining the ummah鈥檚 socio-political and religious unity. Within this constraint, Islamic society 鈥渋s an open society for any human being, regardless of his origin, race, or color, who accepts this responsibility which is the basis of the identification and political socialization process of a Muslim in an Islamic socio-political environment.鈥�22
Power and Pluralism
The most concrete political question that Davuto臒lu considers in light of his thesis pertains to the perception and basis of pluralism in the Western and Islamic worldviews. The distinct understandings of what pluralism entails shows most clearly how the worldviews differ in their fundamental understanding of terms, alongside the political and normative possibilities that worldviews allow for. Davuto臒lu highlights the relationship between pluralism and how power is manifested in a society. He traces the history of power as a concept from the common ancient Greek understanding as the ability to do what one wants, with the Platonic correction of power as a morally directed power informed by knowledge and the Aristotelian emendation that power is a movement toward an object鈥檚 natural end.23 With the Romans, Davuto臒lu sketches an evolution toward a solely political understanding of power that is morally neutral, only represented in a public sphere cleaved from private life, and chiefly concerned with legal boundaries. Importantly, the Roman concept became what Davuto臒lu terms 鈥渙ntologically impenetrable鈥� in its segmentation from other spheres of life and removal of a natural origin. In essence, the Greek concept of power was concerned with ends while the Roman concept was concerned with legal sources. While the Middle Ages, Davuto臒lu argues, was closer to the Hellenic understanding鈥攚ith a great degree of Christian syncretism鈥攖he modern period has reembraced the Roman understanding. Davuto臒lu attributes Machiavelli as the case of this shift, with 鈥淸Machiavelli] assuming the notion of political power as an autonomous process categorically divorced from any non-political justification or legitimacy but related to its origin and purpose.鈥�24 Davuto臒lu traces Machiavelli鈥檚 influence on modern theories of power, arguing that each conceptual evolution from Hobbes to Bentham, Smith, and Arendt is increasingly mechanistic but essentially the same.
An important corollary to political power for the Western worldview is a commitment to what Davuto臒lu describes as social change and dynamism or the 鈥渋magination of unilinear progress.鈥� A development from the Aristotelian understanding of power that Davuto臒lu attributes to Newton and the Renaissance and Marx and the Enlightenment, power comes to be seen as a motion toward an end that is always being developed, refined, or perfected. This entails an assumption that all change progresses in one direction toward progressive perfection, whether historical, political, or social鈥攁n end of history that Davuto臒lu is weary of.
Thus, Davuto臒lu summarizes the Western institutional form and its motivations:
The consequences of this Western phenomenon related to the institutionalization of power might be summarized thus: (i) the assumption of unilinear progress; (ii) dynamic pluralistic adventure of social change; (iji) the determinative supremacy of economics over politics; (iv) socio-economic pluralism, in the sense of economic stratification, as the basic parameter of socio-political differentiation; and (v) institutionalization of power as a reflection of socio-political autonomous institutional pluralism based on the socio-economic dispersion of material power, namely the formation of interest groups.
These tendencies give rise to the extreme importance of pluralism in the Western paradigm, which Davuto臒lu divides between European and American forms of political pluralism. The distinction roughly lies in the European pluralism with the agreement of guilds or group interests versus the American pluralism where economic interest or the dispersion of power is more common. Each represents a different accommodation in the tension of the 鈥渢wo swords鈥� that Davuto臒lu identifies between Sts. Paul and Augustine, where the former holds that power resides solely in God while the latter presents the manifestation of power in the world as divinely ordained. In contrast, Davuto臒lu claims that Islam鈥檚 ontological-political unity is the complete synthesis of the Pauline and Augustinian accounts of power.
While there is de facto pluralism within the Islamic worldview, Davuto臒lu argues that there is 鈥渁lmost no attempt in the Islamic political accumulation to justify political power without appealing to its ontological dimension.鈥�25 Quoting Ibn Rushd鈥檚 commentary on Plato鈥檚 Republic to this effect, the comparison is drawn between Western states as chaotic without a single identity and Islamic states as a unified body composed of many parts. As Ibn Rushd writes:
The bad states are in reality many states, even though their area may be in one locality, because in them the political administration in only for the sake of the economy, and not economics for the sake of the politics. So, if a state is called one, it is by accident. For the Ideal State with its parts is like the body as a whole; before speaking of the whole body, the hand or the foot, for example, exists only for the sake of the limbs which are parts of it. But with those States the situation is exactly opposite; for their political community exists in general only by a sort of compulsion in order to preserve the economy.鈥�26
Davuto臒lu further highlights Ibn Rushd鈥檚 arguments that, 鈥渢here is nothing which brings more evil and confusion to the State than when its citizens say of something 'this is mine' and 'this is not mine' and that the whole body feels pain when one finger is in pain, so that through this pain the condition of the whole body is determined.鈥�27 As a properly body politic, the Islamic state serves as 鈥渃onfederation of several socio-cultural groups (millets) under the patronage of the political center where power is concentrated. The political center gives a socio-political identity to every religious-cultural group according to its ontological approach which is bound to the system with a specific act of citizenship (dhimmiship).鈥�28 Relying heavily on the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, Davuto臒lu further explains that the unified Islamic state is protective and inclusive of non-Muslim religious-cultural groups. Christian and Jewish religious society is described as extra-political or beyond the state, with the communities sovereign in their extra-legal obligations to their own religious customs and codes. This does not make them equal citizens, however. While excepted in matters of their religions, the other Abrahamic faiths are still subjected to Islamic political requirements such as jizya (tax for non-Muslims), which Davuto臒lu attempts to frame not as a debt but as a special payment for protection as dhimmi and the reclamation of Jewish and Christian prisoners.29
The Nation-State versus Dar al-Islam
Providing an etymological, historical, and evolutionary account of nation-states, Davuto臒lu shows how this 鈥渕ulti-compartmentalization鈥� fits within the Western worldview. His ultimate conclusion is that, despite the existence of universally valid moral laws (i.e., natural law or Islamic law), each state develops its own system of moral thought and action. The state and nation become the center of life, defining identity and serving as a material representation of every citizen鈥檚 worldview. Whereas there is a break in consciousness between an individual and their neighbor across a border, the 鈥淚slamic idea of belief-oriented socio-political unity assum[es] a unitary aspect of life.鈥�30 While the West compartmentalizes every state, unit, and individual as a discrete entity, Davuto臒lu argues that Islam maintains only two divisions: Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. Loosely, these translate as 鈥渢he territory of peace鈥� and 鈥渢he territory of war,鈥� and were legal categories employed during the early Islamic conquests to distinguish political obligations and relations. In a simple, classical formation, these categories distinguish between supra-national Dar al-Islam territories that are ruled by, safe for, and united within the Muslim community and Dar al-Harb territories which are not.31
Davuto臒lu is critical of what he considers to be Western misperception of these concepts, singling out the late Orientalist Bernard Lewis, whose presentation of the division 鈥淸inevitably causes a] consciousness of fear and hostility by the non-Muslims in Dar al-Harb.鈥�32 That the misperception exists points to the mismatch of worldviews according to Davuto臒lu, as Westerners view the two communities as nation-states wherein Dar al-Islam must conquer Dar al-Harb through jihad. Instead, Davuto臒lu argues that the division between the two worlds is not a political boundary such as an international border, but a wider gulf entailing two veins: a paradigmatic division between modes of being, thinking, and acting politically; a political division between those accept the caliph鈥檚 authority and those who do not.
To understand this division within the Islamic worldview, Davuto臒lu first addresses the ummah (community of believers) as the basis of socio-political unity. Despite the rise and fall of many nations, empires, and civilizations, the ummah persists with Islam as a universal tie through the progression of politics and time. Davuto臒lu writes that, 鈥淪ocio-political identification in Islamic political thought and practice is an extension of the belief in the unity of human responsibility and in the unity of life.鈥�33 Thus, the strict dichotomy between believer and unbeliever is whether they accept this responsibility as a way of life and socio-political identity. The community of believers is an open and dynamic society, united in their commitment to the unity and oneness of God. Davuto臒lu argues that this is a wholly different dichotomy than, e.g., Jew and Gentile, barbarian and citizen, or 鈥渕odern nationalist hierarchical stratifications鈥� that depend on innate, immutable characteristics. Rather than a restricted membership, participation in the Muslim community is more of a 鈥渇eeling鈥� that one fits within it as well as acceptance of some baseline credal and religious practice qualifications. Rather than representing territorial or physical union, the bond of the ummah is metaphysical. Thus, members of the ummah maintain obligations toward and responsibility for other members who live as minorities outside Islamic lands. For Davuto臒lu, that the ummah persists as a core consciousness in Islamic political thought despite the absence of a contemporary caliphate further demarcates the ummah from Dar al-Islam.
Similarly, that multiple Muslim nation-states have emerged further demarcates the realm of a Muslim country and Dar al-Islam. While a state is an administrative unit, an individual political authority, Dar al-Islam is a universal political system, 鈥渁 consistent world-system within which there is a common base of 厂别濒产蝉迟惫别谤蝉迟盲苍诲苍颈蝉 [self-understanding], a possibility for the realization of the divine responsibility, and a common axiological framework for the application of the prescriptivist legal system.鈥�34 Dar al-Harb is the counter-system to Dar al-Islam. Davuto臒lu concludes on the difference:
Da虃r al-Islam could not be imagined like a nation-state which is in a continuous state of war for its expansion. Rather it is a de facto reality in the sense of judicial application and a consistent world-system in the sense of axiological prerequisites which shape political imagination and culture.35
Davuto臒lu further rejects that there exists permanent war between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. Instead, as Davuto臒lu sees it, the normal, permanent state of international affairs would be that of peace. He insists that the common translation of jihad as warfare is misleading, and that jihad should be properly understood as an 鈥渆xertion鈥� or 鈥渆ndeavor鈥� to fulfill divine responsibility for the world鈥攙iolent action therefore being only a specific form of jihad. Davuto臒lu claims, drawing more on moral theology than historical example, that peace is the natural state of the world and more useful for the expansion of Islam than perpetual warfare. The equality between the suffering of Muslims and non-Muslims, the legal possibility that Muslims may only declare war on Jews and Christians in response to invasion, the legal framing of war as 鈥減ermi[ssible] only to protect right and justice against the attacks of enemies and of tyrants,鈥� and the historical example set by Abu Bakr that absolute war is permitted, is the basis of Davuto臒lu鈥檚 belief that peace is normative.36 Unless treaties are broken, Davuto臒lu insists that normative restrictions on Muslims require strict observance to treaty terms and just, proportionate military conduct even if conflict does occur.37
Davuto臒lu also argues that for that which is not prescriptive in sharia, the ummah provides normative guidance. So, it stands to reason, that cultural, technological, or other change within the ummah changes the manifestation of the Islamic state. Islamic political community can therefore change with the times, but only insofar as ummah appropriately evolves within sharia allowance. In other words, the Caliphate of today can share in the advancements of political and other science that have appeared since the Rashidun, but it cannot change its essential theological and ethical character. For Davuto臒lu, the ummah is expansive and has no limits in terms of race, nationality, or otherwise insofar as constituent members are Muslims. Striving to imitate the example of the Rashidun looks different in different eras or contexts because of the normativity of ummah. The will of the ummah is democratic and the ummah can exist within democratic context but not in the way the West conceives of it. Yet, Davuto臒lu鈥檚 concern is theoretical and so he remains opaque in articulating the content or limits of the organic development of the Islamic political community, thereby avoiding staking any position that might elicit a response from one Islamic political faction or another. His argument is nonetheless important if one wishes to understand 21st century Islamism of the sort seen in modern T眉rkiye.
Davuto臒lu continues to explain that the Caliphate is a form of popular government insofar as it is necessarily supported by the ummah, and it is also a unifying entity. The Caliphate is nationalism well-understood: it maintains a strong power center but allows for smaller regional power centers to coexist and govern as is appropriate in their context. In this way, tension between madhabs (schools of thought), sects, or other divisions need not be so extreme, boil into conflict, or exist at all. Islam, and the caliphate, also creates a division into two: Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. Dar al-Islam is expansive and includes all with the sole criterion that they accept rule of the caliph鈥攔egardless of their beliefs or other factors. Jihad as an oppositional endeavor ought to be taken against Dar al-Harb, those who do not accept the rule of the caliph, in addition to, or perhaps synonymously with, all tyrants and enemies of justice. However, Davuto臒lu again claims that jihad need not necessarily be violent but can also take the form of diplomatic or cultural opposition鈥攚hatever seems prudential amid other moral constraints鈥攁lthough he is characteristically vague about what non-violent opposition might entail and the circumstances under which it might be acceptable to embrace a violent strategy. Despite Davuto臒lu鈥檚 repeated emphasis that jihad need not take the form of military engagement, he similarly avoids discussion of violent jihad beyond limiting it to the rather open-ended rules of war.
Davuto臒lu briefly offers an interesting possibility worthy of further reflection. Although some scholars in the past have taken a hard line that all non-Muslim states鈥攊.e., any political entity not ruled by the caliph鈥攁re within Dar al-Harb, states and rulers that sign treaties with Islamic states inherently recognize the political authority and legitimacy of the Islamic rulers. Within the Western paradigm, Davuto臒lu has identified the core positivist notion that legal reality entails all reality. Perhaps, Davuto臒lu seems to almost suggest, non-Muslim states allied to the ummah and Islamic rulers through treaties are within Dar al-Islam themselves.
The Political Implication of the Davuto臒lu Paradigm
The influence of Alternative Paradigms and Davuto臒lu鈥檚 theoretical framework can be seen throughout Turkish politics, particularly in foreign diplomacy and across Erdo臒an鈥檚 speeches. Though the political centrality of tawhid is not unique to Davuto臒lu鈥攊t is central to the beliefs of varied Islamist thinkers such as Abul A'la al-Maududi, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and others鈥攖he Turkish emphasis draws heavily on Davuto臒lu鈥檚 theological understanding.
Especially since the 2010 reorganization of the Diyanet (the government鈥檚 Directorate of Religious Affairs), T眉rkiye has increasingly relied on religious-inflected soft power.38 Though previously neglected, religious diplomacy transformed T眉rkiye鈥檚 approach to foreign relations from Davuto臒lu鈥檚 鈥渮ero problems with neighbors鈥� mantra across the 2000s to a great expansion in outreach across the globe.39 As of 2016, Diyanet-drafted sermons were delivered not just at T眉rkiye鈥檚 85,000 mosques, but across over 2,000 foreign mosques serviced by T眉rkiye鈥檚 imams-cum-diplomats.40
In addition to diplomacy through religion, Davuto臒lu repeatedly spoke in his role as Minister of Foreign Affairs about the importance of T眉rkiye as 鈥渁 bridge country between East and West鈥� guided by a value- or vision-based foreign policy.41 The notion of T眉rkiye as a bridge between East and West, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, has been a key focus across crises in Iraq, Syria, and now Gaza, with T眉rkiye often presenting itself as the only actor capable of engaging all parties.42 In so doing, T眉rkiye frequently presents itself to Western leaders as the authoritative spokesman for the ummah.
While readers are left to judge Davuto臒lu鈥檚 claim to a virtuous, value-driven foreign policy, this moral rhetoric has been extensively employed in Turkish-led treaties and agreements. One prime example of moral focus and Davuto臒lu鈥檚 claim that there is a unique Islamic understanding of concepts is the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation. A key goal of Davuto臒lu鈥檚 predecessor, former prime minister Necmettin Erbakan, Davuto臒lu cheered its formation at the time in his influential Yeni 艦afak column.43 The D-8, or Developing-8, is a policy representation of both Erbakan鈥檚 Mill卯 G枚r眉艧 (National View) and Davuto臒lu鈥檚 Alternative Paradigms. All of the member states of the organization are Muslim-majority countries: Bangladesh, Egypt, Nigeria, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, and T眉rkiye. The founding documents, particularly the 1997 Istanbul Declaration, sought to promote a moral vision alongside economic development among like-minded countries:
[T]he main objective of D-8 is stated to be socio-economic development in accordance with following principles: Peace instead of conflict. Dialogue instead of confrontation. Cooperation instead of exploitation. Justice instead of double standard. Equality instead of discrimination. Democracy instead of oppression.44
This statement exemplifies the notion that policy ought to aim for specific moral ends. This economic pact does not call for market liberalization or freedom of trade鈥攊ndeed, not even growth for its own sake or for poverty alleviation. Instead, it calls for justice. One does not need to consider all or any of the signatory states to be exemplars of justice, equality, or democracy to recognize an intention to be framed as an alternative to the Western paradigm.
In his speeches, policies, and outlook, Erdo臒an has frequently relied on the principles Davuto臒lu set forth in Alternative Paradigms. The repudiation of Kemalism and the secularism of Turkish politics is not a novelty of Davuto臒lu, but he does present perhaps the best intellectual case for secular failings and most thoroughly reimagines a different course. When looking at the odd ideology that is frequently, though perhaps for the wrong reasons, termed 鈥淣eo-Ottomanism,鈥� the ideas of Davuto臒lu are seen throughout.
In a prime example of the semantic reformulation Davuto臒lu鈥檚 credits to Islam, Erdo臒an evinces a sort of nationalism while frequently criticizing Kemalist nationalism as a source of moral weakness in T眉rkiye, particularly with regard to minority groups. Erdo臒an鈥檚 repeated tenets of 鈥淥ne Nation, One Flag, One Homeland, One State,鈥� are a rhetorical demonstration of Turkish unity, but have been paired with meaningful attempts to bring Christian, Jewish, and minority communities into the political fold. Granted, there is a notable exception: Erdo臒an鈥檚 actions do not live up to his ecumenical language in regard to the Kurdish community especially. Despite the territorial demarcations of the phrase, it has likewise been accompanied by increasing efforts in the past decades to expand Turkish influence among its neighbors and the Muslim world as a whole. Erdo臒an praised the reestablishment as a mosque of the Hagia Sophia鈥檚 as a herald for the liberation of al-Aqsa, and frames T眉rkiye as a protector of Muslims globally鈥攊n Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Europe.
Erdogan may have a greater appreciation for democracy鈥攁t least rhetorically鈥攖han is commonly ascribed, but it is certainly a particular, idiosyncratic concept of the term. He justifies the jailing of political opponents or excessive counterterrorism policies on the grounds that they are seen by his supporters as concrete steps to prevent overthrow of the democratic government and the popular will that undergirds it. While frequently framed abroad as extra-territorial Neo-Ottomanism, Erdo臒an appears to view his mandate to govern T眉rkiye as coextensive with obligations to Libya, Syria, and beyond. Regardless of terminology, Erdo臒an presents the nation as a collective that expands beyond T眉rkiye and includes all Muslims, oppressed peoples, and鈥攊mportantly鈥攕upporters of his own political project. The balancing of these apparent contradictions in Erdo臒an鈥檚 foreign policy may be best understood through the framework Alternative Paradigms provides. That said, taking a more cynical view, one might also consider that semantic reformulation of the sort Erdo臒an employs can be useful when one鈥檚 polls are disappointing and the economy is plummeting, or in the aftermath of an attempted coup. As is often the case with judging a leader鈥檚 motivations, it can be difficult to determine where genuine conviction ends and opportunism begins.
Conclusion
T眉rkiye has long perplexed Western analysts, not the least because of the occasionally awkward relations between T眉rkiye and its Western allies. As Davuto臒lu demonstrates, misestimation of policy goals or actions betray a deeper miscomprehension of the Turkish political order and its intellectual foundations. A soft version of Alternative Paradigm鈥檚 argument demonstrates that policymakers and academics have not fully accounted for the blinders of their own worldviews when studying and interacting with foreign polities. A more forceful version of the book鈥檚 thesis is that the West is incapable of understanding the world beyond its own compartmentalization. If Davuto臒lu鈥檚 particular claims about Islamic intellectual history and its uniqueness are correct, then ignorance of the Islamic paradigm leaves Western leaders and analysts incapable of grasping the motivations, goals, and beliefs of partners, allies, and opponents in the international arena. However, even if one concedes Davuto臒lu鈥檚 claim that the paradigms are mutually unintelligible, political Islam 脿 la Davuto臒lu need not be the only manifestation of Islamic ontological, epistemological, and political unity. Alternative Paradigms presents important insight into the 厂别濒产蝉迟惫别谤蝉迟盲苍诲苍颈蝉 (self-understanding) of AKP, Erdo臒an, and their intellectual heirs, but we need not presume it to explain contemporary Islamism in toto given the significant variation within the ideological movement.
Beyond T眉rkiye, Islamic political thought, and Davuto臒lu, the challenge of understanding other societies鈥� intellectual paradigms appears ever more pressing. As the United States begins to be challenged in new theaters of conflict and diplomacy, it may be disastrous to assume the analytical and ideological framework of Western government is universally held. Davuto臒lu goes to great lengths to demonstrate the historical and philosophical particularity of European and American thought while contrasting it with what he sees as the Islamic intellectual tradition. While the current government of T眉rkiye and other states are increasingly convinced of the inadequacy of the Western paradigm and its failure to encompass their reality, the West must examine alternative paradigms to understand how other states鈥攂oth friendly and hostile鈥攙iew their Western relationships.
Three decades after its publication, Alternative Paradigms still appears prescient in its articulation of a new ambition for Turkish power. A hundred years into the Turkish Republic, with Erdo臒an announcing his retirement at the current presidential term鈥檚 end, Davuto臒lu鈥檚 vision of Islamic governance appears to have caught hold and will likely continue to guide Turkish policymaking to at least some extent. Despite its density and relative opaqueness, Alternative Paradigms is the rare book of political theory that has strategic implications, with Davuto臒lu serving as the rare philosopher-statesman. Whether one welcomes or is worried by the book鈥檚 revelation, its core assertion that politics is downstream of fundamental beliefs about the world should be deeply considered by analysts and policymakers globally. The extent to which those beliefs significantly impact a nation鈥檚 diplomacy varies鈥攁nd it is important to recognize, whether in T眉rkiye or elsewhere, that the ideology of the regime is not always embraced fully by the body politic or even all members of the ruling elite鈥攂ut to assume such beliefs are merely lip service would be mistaken.
A foundational work for contemporary Turkish politics and an ambitious work of comparative intellectual history, Alternative Paradigms issues a challenge to the West that must still be heeded: There are other modes of thinking and being in the world. Will they be sufficiently studied and considered?