Xi Jinping鈥檚 July 1 speech to commemorate the Chinese Communist Party鈥檚 centenary has received much fanfare. Accompanied by great pageantry, the speech was the CCP鈥檚 most significant public event in the past decade. All authoritarian states attach significant importance to public gatherings. These events give a visual demonstration of the faux solidarity between leadership and the people.
But events like this also reveal a great deal about an authoritarian regime鈥檚 self-perception. In a society like China鈥檚, where a single party holds absolute political power, public pronouncements are a chance to signal to domestic and international audiences precisely how the regime defines itself, what it prioritizes, and which threats it thinks deserve a response.
This is particularly true in China, the world鈥檚 literary society par excellence. From the 3rd century Han dynasty to the Qing dynasty鈥檚 collapse in 1912, Chinese emperors relied upon a class of scholar-bureaucrats, termed mandarins by the Portuguese, to govern their territories. Selected through competitive intellectual examination, the members of this unique class were steeped in philosophical and historical literature. They attached overwhelming importance to speechcraft and the art of writing. The CCP carries forward this mandarin heritage, and as such, Xi鈥檚 directs several subtle signals toward the careful listener.
These signals convey a clear message: Xi Jinping鈥檚 Chinese Communist Party intends to direct the Chinese nation in a titanic struggle for global dominance. To this end, the Party and nation must prepare for conflict. And China鈥檚 first blow will fall on Taiwan.
Xi asserted that modern China is a continuation of five thousand years of Chinese history and is therefore the expression of a rich civilization and culture. But unmistakably, he views the CCP鈥檚 rule as the highest point of Chinese historical development. Hence his boast that 鈥渢he socialist revolution鈥� overturned 鈥渢he exploitative and repressive feudal system that had persisted for thousands of years,鈥� and Xi鈥檚 equivalence between China鈥檚 5,000-year history and the Party鈥檚 70 years of governance. Even more striking was the way Xi invoked China鈥檚 founding revolutionaries, foremost among them Mao Zedong. Naturally, Xi must profess loyalty to the CCP鈥檚 historical leaders and publicly advocate the maintenance of their ideologies. However, Xi indicates that the 鈥渟ocialist revolution鈥� had one primary purpose 鈥� it 鈥渓aid down the fundamental political conditions and the institutional foundations necessary for national rejuvenation鈥�.
If the end or purpose of the socialist revolution is this 鈥渘ational rejuvenation鈥�, then it follows that the individuals who execute this rejuvenation 鈥� that is, Xi Jinping鈥檚 CCP 鈥� have a unique role in this end. The CCP鈥檚 primary historical relevance is preparing the conditions for the present Party to achieve national rejuvenation, a theme reinforced by Xi鈥檚 refusal to speak of the Party鈥檚 history in more than generalities, outside of his broad historical overview. Moreover, the modern Party came into existence in 2012, when 鈥渟ocialism with Chinese characteristics entered a new era鈥� with Xi鈥檚 accession to paramount leadership. Xi framed this in effect as almost a new founding of the Chinese nation.
Xi does not define national rejuvenation. The closest he comes is in his opening remarks, when he invokes the Party鈥檚 second centenary goal, 鈥渂uilding China into a great modern socialist country in all respects.鈥� One may, however, infer the objective of 鈥渘ational rejuvenation鈥� from Xi鈥檚 discussion of China鈥檚 future, which he portrayed as lessons from its history. Three themes are apparent. First, the Party and the country are identical, an outgrowth of his previous remarks that Chinese history functionally began in 1921, with the CCP鈥檚 founding. Second, the Party must be unified. It must 鈥渒eep in alignment with central Party leadership鈥�, that is, with Xi鈥檚 vision. And third, the Party and nation must prepare for conflict. The Party must 鈥渁ccelerate the modernization of national defense鈥� because of the 鈥渋rrefutable truth that it must command the gun鈥�.
Why does China need a 鈥渨orld-class鈥� military? To protect, as Xi delineates, Chinese 鈥渟overeignty, security, and development interests.鈥� This is not boilerplate. Xi mentions only one international organization in his entire speech, China鈥檚 neocolonial One Belt, One Road initiative. And after praising international cooperation, he pivots immediately to identifying the need for 鈥渢he courage to fight鈥� for China鈥檚 national dream, a dream that will require a greater struggle than ever before to achieve.
It is here that the Taiwan question comes to the fore. It is the last substantive remark in his speech, the denouement of his vision for Party and nation. Xi identifies only three specific territories in his speech 鈥� Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan 鈥� and the last receives particular attention. Notably, COVID-19 is never mentioned. Behind the advocacy for peaceful reunification is Xi鈥檚 true message. 鈥淭aiwan independence鈥� is deemed a threat to Chinese national sovereignty and 鈥渢erritorial integrity.鈥� And, the People鈥檚 Liberation Army is meant to secure this sovereignty.
Xi is correct to state that the future does belong to China鈥檚 youth. But he makes a specific demand of the Chinese people 鈥� that its young become, like China, 鈥減roud, confident, and assured鈥� to 鈥渓ive up to...the expectations of our times, our Party, and our people.鈥� For what trials does the Party expect the Chinese people to prepare? There is only one answer: the conflict necessary to achieve national rejuvenation, beginning over Taiwan, and securing for China global dominance.
Xi Jinping has made the use of force an integral element of Chinese foreign policy. That use of force is not limited to the 鈥済rey zone鈥� 鈥渂elow threshold,鈥� using the 鈥渟alami-slicing鈥� tactics that the U.S. foreign policy establishment insists are China鈥檚 modus operandi. The centenary speech objective is conquest: China will absorb Taiwan by military means if necessary and will accept the confrontation this will trigger between it and the United States. Xi said it. That he means it is beyond issue.
Read in