This week, the citizens of the Republic of China, also known as Taiwan, will vote for their next president. Like America, this exercise in democracy happens every four years. Presidential elections, in Taiwan and elsewhere, have a greater focus on foreign policy than just domestic politics. And just like America, Taiwan鈥檚 biggest foreign policy issue is the military and economic challenges created by the People鈥檚 Republic of China.
The next administration in Taipei will decide whether to embrace the policies of Taiwan鈥檚 current president, , which includes building deeper relationships with America, Europe, Japan, and others across the Indo-Pacific. The alternative presented by the opposition includes taking the spotlight off U.S.-Taiwan relations and restarting past economic and cultural exchanges between Taipei and Beijing.
Taiwanese voters will decide which future they want 鈥� one that continues to embrace an America-forward foreign policy or one that attempts to rekindle a relationship with China. But it鈥檚 important for Americans watching the election to not see this dichotomy as Taiwan moving either anti-China or anti-America. Both the U.S. and China will remain important in Taiwan politics. And whichever party wins, China will remain the greatest threat to Taiwan鈥檚 future.
Taiwan鈥檚 presidential candidates recognize that Beijing has not abandoned its plan to subjugate Taiwan, either through peaceful means or by force. China鈥檚 leader, Xi Jinping, this sentiment to President Biden recently. However, the difference between Taiwan鈥檚 presidential candidates is how they think Taiwan should respond to this threat.
The presidential race is currently between . Vice President Lai Ching-te, who also goes by his English name, William Lai, is the incumbent, running for the Democratic People鈥檚 Party (DPP). As vice president, his platform includes building on Taiwan鈥檚 relationship with its greatest democratic partner, America. It should come as no surprise that his choice for vice president has been Taiwan鈥檚 for the past several years.
The other candidates are Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT) Party and Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People鈥檚 Party (TPP). Their positions are not to abandon U.S.-Taiwan relations but that Taiwan鈥檚 foreign policy, and economic future, intersect through China. They believe that restarting economic and cultural dialogues with Beijing will offer opportunities for trade, job growth, and wage growth in Taiwan. But all three parties recognize the need to continue working with America to build up Taiwan鈥檚 military deterrence against China鈥檚 army.
The difficulty candidates will find in crafting their foreign policies is that diplomatic efforts mean little if the other party isn鈥檛 willing to negotiate. This means that if the DPP wins, Taiwan鈥檚 progress in with Washington is still limited by how much Washington is willing to budge. There is still hope among U.S.-Taiwan experts for a future bilateral trade agreement. But policymakers in Washington still have their limits and trade remains highly contentious inside the beltway.
Vice versa, the opposition parties鈥� efforts will go only as far as Beijing is willing to resume dialogues. Beijing may be desperate for Taiwanese trade, investment, and talent as its . But it is also likely that Beijing will continue down a path of belligerent diplomacy across the Indo-Pacific. Beijing may very well continue to send daily military aircraft, ships, and balloons around Taiwan.
Washington policymakers will have to adjust accordingly to whichever party wins. If either opposition candidate wins, we can expect to see far fewer U.S. lawmakers welcomed to Taipei. This is certainly true for the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Also expect to hear less from the various dialogues between the U.S. and Taiwan, such as those held either through the State Department, Commerce Department, or U.S. Trade Representative鈥檚 Office. These efforts will remain ongoing, but Taipei鈥檚 new leadership will want to minimize the publicity around their progress.
Meanwhile, if the incumbent DPP party wins, they鈥檒l continue with ongoing trade and investment efforts between Taipei and Washington. But they may even expect more, such as progress on a bilateral tax agreement or America鈥檚 support for Taiwan to join the 鈥� even though the U.S. is not a member of the trade agreement. Taipei will also look to expand dialogues with other partners around the world in an effort to combat years of Beijing鈥檚 efforts to internationally isolate Taiwan.
It is hard to predict exactly how China will respond to either a KMT or TPP victory. But it is expected that Beijing will respond poorly to a DPP victory 鈥� just as it did in 2016 and 2020 鈥� with a possible military show-of-force and trade restrictions. Ironically, it鈥檚 China鈥檚 impulsive reaction to Taiwan鈥檚 election that will further encourage American and international support for Taiwan.
Whoever wins, it is important to remember this is the will of the people of Taiwan. America should continue to offer its support to Taiwan, which remains an important beacon for democracy in Asia and a strong economic and technology partner of the U.S.