As the initial shock of Great Britain鈥檚 vote to withdraw from the EU recedes, another withdrawal has been taking place. This withdrawal, albeit more gradual and undertaken with greater stealth, has far deeper consequences. It is the exit of the United States from global leadership and the alliance structure that it built and nurtured over nearly seven decades.
This 鈥淎mexit鈥� is not simply defined by the Obama administration鈥檚 retreat from Afghanistan and Iraq, or its unwillingness to enforce the 鈥渞ed line鈥� in Syria, to arm Ukraine, or to confront Chinese and North Korean aggressions. Nor is it only America鈥檚 diminished engagement with longstanding allies.
The administration is also expending considerable resources to ease tensions and 鈥渘ormalize鈥� relations with longtime adversaries such as Iran and Cuba. Ahead of the NATO summit opening in Warsaw on July 8, the White House is floating a plan in which the U.S. would partner with Russia in Syria. This comes as NATO is preparing to approve the deployment of four multinational battalions to Poland and the Baltic states as a signal of unity and strength to an increasingly aggressive Moscow.
Many of America鈥檚 closest allies are so unnerved by Washington鈥檚 realignments that they are now pursuing bilateral and multilateral arrangements on their own. In the Middle East, Israel is enhancing its ties with Asian countries like India, Japan and South Korea and extending its outreach to Africa and Latin America.
It is also building relationships in Sunni Arab capitals, which share Israel鈥檚 profound concern over President Obama鈥檚 tilt toward Iran. Frustrated by Washington鈥檚 tepid response to Islamist extremism, a Saudi-led military coalition, including Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, has already taken unprecedented joint military action against ISIS in Yemen and Libya. It is expanding its membership to include more than two dozen other Muslim countries.
Japan, unsettled by President Obama鈥檚 faltering 鈥渞ebalance to Asia,鈥� is reforming its pacifist constitution and adopting a policy of collective self-defense.
Shinz艒 Abe鈥檚 government has launched bilateral initiatives to deepen ties with India, the Philippines and Australia, and to improve its fractured relations with South Korea to address Kim Jong Un's bellicose Pyongyang regime in the North.
In Europe, the British vote to leave the EU lays bare the risks of U.S. disengagement. The EU began as an American-inspired creation, and supporting the EU has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy. But when President Obama directly intervened in the referendum, direly proclaiming that Britain would be forced 鈥渢o the back of the queue,鈥� a majority of British voters were either offended by or unmoved by his words.
Beyond Britain, other European governments are now adopting what Daniel Keohane of the Carnegie Endowment a newly renationalized, 鈥渂ottom up鈥� approach focused on regional security鈥攐utside of a U.S.-European alliance. Concerned over terrorism and Russian aggression in Ukraine, they are reinvigorating their own defenses. France, which is already conducting counterterrorism operations in Central and North Africa, is boosting its defense budget by more than 8%. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the three Baltic nations together will their defense spending almost 20% this year over 2015 levels, according to the European Defense Agency.
It is certainly preferable for these nations not to be completely dependent on American military largess for all their defense needs. In the modern security sphere, however, effectiveness requires more than localized, 鈥渂ottom up鈥� planning. The world still needs leadership. But will it continue to be American leadership? And, if so, what kind?
Here, President Obama鈥檚 foreign-policy reset has produced a critical dilemma for his successor, in part because Mr. Obama often defines international engagement in narrow, military terms. A great many Americans鈥攚eary after two wars and a protracted economic malaise鈥攚elcome a reduced U.S. military footprint. But America鈥檚 role in regional and global security and stability is much broader than the direct exercise of military might. In the same way, mutual alliances among like-minded friendly nations are about far more than military pairings.
In crises, past American presidents鈥攎ost notably Truman, Kennedy, Carter and Reagan鈥攈ave marshaled the country鈥檚 immense economic, diplomatic and strategic resources to promote regional and global security. Those same tactics could have put a , an Iran, or an ISIS on clear notice that they would or will pay a high price for reckless actions.
Many threats today are not conventional military risks but complex challenges affecting cybersecurity, communications, civilian security and trade. But as Professor Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University鈥檚 School of Advanced International Studies , America鈥檚 deterrent power, once sufficient to prevent even the development of nuclear weapons, has been seriously degraded.
We don鈥檛 know if a future president will seek to regain the international high ground, or if the Obama model will become the new norm. But there needs to be a national debate about whether America still has a special and indispensable role in the world. Those who believe that it does must make this case with less emphasis on military hardware and more on our standing as the world鈥檚 most successful democracy. Those who don鈥檛 believe in American indispensability need to recognize that a 鈥減ost-Amexit鈥� U.S. may be forgoing its ability to lead at all.