p(firstLetter). The crucial question for the American Right today, as it has been for at least 60 years, is: What is the nature of its confrontation with modern liberalism?
Is it a policy argument over how to achieve the common goals of liberal democracy? Are we working to expand liberty, equality, and prosperity for all citizens? Do we share the same principles with American liberals but differ with them over policy and how best to implement those principles? Is it really, as , 鈥渁 coherent debate between left and right forms of liberalism鈥�?
Or is this conflict a much deeper existential struggle over the very nature of the American 鈥渞egime鈥� itself鈥攊ts principles, values, institutions, mores, culture, education, citizenship, and 鈥渨ay of life鈥�? Is it, as , that we are in a 鈥渓arger existential war for the soul of America鈥�?
I would argue that Hanson is essentially correct: We are in the middle of a 鈥渞egime鈥� struggle.
Put another way: We are in an argument over the meaning of 鈥渢he American way of life,鈥� because the weight of opinion on the progressive Left rejects the classic constitutionally based American regime.
Instead, progressives envision a new way of governing in both politics and culture based on an individual鈥檚 race, ethnicity, and gender rather than on our common American citizenship.
Progressives don鈥檛 really deny this. Recall President Barack Obama, who in 2008 famously (or infamously) announced his administration would be 鈥�.鈥� America, as it actually existed at the time, was something Obama viewed as deeply problematic鈥攑ermeated with 鈥渋nstitutional鈥� racism and sexism.
There can be no doubt that Obama understands the ongoing progressive-liberal campaign against conservatives and traditional America as a 鈥渞egime struggle鈥� (鈥淭hey get bitter, they 鈥� and 鈥溾� is trending their way). But somehow, many Americans still want to resist or deny the implications of these words.
The Foundations of Modern Conservatism
Sixty years earlier and across the political spectrum, the founding fathers of modern American conservatism in the mid-1950s at National Review also envisioned, not the give-and-take of bread and butter politics, but an existential conflict over the regime, i.e., over the 鈥淎merican way of life.鈥�
In the premier issue of , William F. Buckley, Jr., wrote that liberals 鈥渞un just about everything鈥�.Radical conservatives in this country [among whose numbers he included himself and the NR editors]鈥hen they are not being suppressed or mutilated by the Liberals, they are being ignored or humiliated by a great many of those on the well-fed Right.鈥�
This sounds familiar.
In response to the 鈥減rofound crisis of our era鈥� the new magazine would 鈥渄efend the organic moral order鈥� and stand 鈥渁thwart history, yelling 鈥楽top!鈥欌� These are not exactly examples of political rhetoric as usual, certainly not in 1955.
One year later, National Review that 鈥渃ontemporary Liberalism鈥� regarded 鈥渁ll inherited value鈥攖heological, philosophical, political鈥攁s without intrinsic virtue or authority鈥� and, therefore declared, 鈥淟iberals are unfit for the leadership of a free society.鈥�
In those early days at National Review, the adversary was modern Liberalism itself, often spelled with a capital L. At the same time, of course, classical liberalism was part of what was labeled conservative 鈥渇usionism鈥� alongside cultural traditionalism and militant anti-Communism.
, another National Review senior editor and Buckley鈥檚 mentor at Yale,, declared: 鈥渢he question 鈥業s Liberalism a revolution?鈥� can have only one answer. Since it seeks a change of regime, the replacement of one regime by another, of a different type altogether, it is, quite simply, revolutionary.鈥� Kendall further asked, 鈥淚s the destiny of America the Liberal Revolution or is it the destiny envisaged for it by the Founders of the Republic? Just that.鈥�
James Burnham, National Review鈥檚 foreign policy guru and Buckley鈥檚 closest advisor, posited that liberal ideology thoroughly undermined not only the American regime, but the entirety of Western civilization itself. He wrote in , 鈥淟iberalism permits Western Civilization to be reconciled to dissolution.鈥� The 鈥減rincipal function of modern liberalism,鈥� Burnham tell us, is to facilitate the suicide of Western civilization. Moreover, this suicide would be rationalized 鈥渂y the light of the principles of liberalism not as a final defeat, but as a transition to a new and higher order in which Mankind as a whole joins a universal civilization, that has risen above the parochial distinctions, divisions, and discriminations of the past.鈥�
Administrative State and the Cultural Leviathan
In the second decade of the 21st century, the twin pillars of the ongoing progressive-liberal revolution to fundamentally transform the American 鈥渞egime鈥� are the administrative state and the cultural leviathan. In recent years the foremost observers of 鈥渞egime conflict鈥� are associated with the 鈥淲est Coast Straussians,鈥� students of , and centered in or around the .
The leading theorist of the administrative state, Claremont Institute scholar has traced the successful progressive-Left advance through the political and cultural institutions of American life. In the political arena, a powerful administrative state often exercises legislative, executive, and judicial powers in what can only be described as an illegitimate exercise or 鈥減ost-constitutional鈥� manner. Liberal-dominated regulatory agencies and politicized courts make crucial policy (rather than judicial) decisions while an elected Congress (under both Republican and Democrat control) has lacked the will and confidence to confront these post-Constitutional usurpers. Indeed, at times, they have encouraged it.
In the cultural sphere, Marini notes, we have witnessed a 鈥渘ew kind of civil religion鈥� in which Americans are judged not as equal citizens 鈥渂ut by the moral standing established by their group identity.鈥� Under the all-consuming concept of 鈥渄iversity,鈥� mainstream liberalism enforces ethnic and gender group rights and political correctness in the major institutions of civil society that the progressives have captured. Liberals under the banner of 鈥渄iversity鈥� are establishing what Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci called 鈥渋deological-cultural hegemony鈥� in the moral-intellectual realm of society, the sector that Tocqueville called 鈥渕ores.鈥�
Today the facts on the ground tell us that the progressive Left dominates major institutions of American life: the universities, the mainstream media, the mainline churches, the entertainment industry, and the human resources departments of the Fortune 500. Thus, Harvard, Yale, CNN, the Episcopal Church, Hollywood, and Silicon Valley (all private sector institutions of the often vaunted civil society) are part of a nexus that I will call the 鈥渃ultural leviathan,鈥� which is allied to the administrative state.
Let us take an empirical look at this cultural leviathan. In October 2016 Econ Journal Watch of faculty voting registration at forty leading American colleges which revealed an overall Democrat preference over Republicans by 11.5-to-1, among history professors the ratio was 33.5-to-1. In May 2015, the Crimson that between 2011 and 2014, (long before the political rise of Donald Trump) 96 percent of political contributions by Harvard professors in the Arts and Sciences were for Democrats. At Harvard Law School, 98 percent of political donations went to Democrats. The revealed that in 2012 Barack Obama crushed Mitt Romney in Hollywood celebrity fundraising 9-to-1.
In October 2016, noted that, except for Peter Thiel, 鈥渘early all of Silicon Valley鈥檚 political dollars are going for Hillary Clinton.鈥� In the fall of 2016, the liberal published a report entitled 鈥淛ournalists shower Hillary Clinton with campaign cash鈥� revealing that around 96 percent of the political contributions of media professionals went to Clinton.
Not surprisingly then, in May 2017, researchers at Harvard鈥檚 Kennedy School found that 93 percent of coverage of President Trump鈥檚 first 100 days from . The New York Times was 87 percent negative, with the Washington Post 83 percent negative, and the Wall Street Journal鈥�s news section 70 percent negative.
Enforcing the Opinion Corridor
The rarely stated, but clear function of the cultural leviathan is to enforce the boundaries of the , or what the Swedes call the 鈥渙pinion corridor.鈥� In other words: what is acceptable public discourse, and what isn鈥檛; what is tolerable and intolerable, within the context of political correctness, with the goal of promoting the overarching 鈥渄iversity鈥� project.
Year after year, the opinion corridor narrows. was forced out as president of Harvard University for angering the forces of the diversity project on campus. , a major high-tech pioneer and innovator, resigned under pressure as CEO of Mozilla, after it was disclosed that he contributed $1,000 to the pro-traditional marriage campaign in California. , an engineer at Google, by the Silicon Valley giant after he wrote a reasoned, well documented memo challenging some of the major assumptions of gender and ethnic group preferences. The vestry of (Episcopal) in Alexandria, Virginia announced that after 147 years they would remove memorial plaques of their most famous parishioners George Washington and Robert E. Lee. The church vestry told the congregants that a plaque that simply states, 鈥渋n memory of George Washington鈥濃斺渕ake[s] some in our presence feel unsafe.鈥�
I gave three examples (but could have presented 300) of efforts to enforce and/or manipulate the opinion corridor or the Overton window. Every day our history and our culture are under assault.
The California NAACP denounces the National Anthem as 鈥渞acist,鈥� and another speaker is shouted down on our nation鈥檚 campuses. Clearly, George Washington and the national anthem are de-legitimized and denigrated by the cultural leviathan, because America鈥檚 past and America鈥檚 common culture must be repainted in negative colors, if the progressive future is to be achieved. Decades ago, George Orwell famously reminded us in Nineteen Eighty-Four that 鈥渉e who controls the past, controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past.鈥�
What Should Be Conserved?
The relentless advance of the administrative state and the cultural leviathan in both the public and private sectors presents a classic historical dilemma for those who call themselves 鈥渃onservatives.鈥� What should be 鈥渃onserved鈥� when the major institutions of civil society are anti-conservative? Do conservatives focus on recovering redeemable sectors of the status quo or is a more revolutionary conservatism required? Is it even accurate to call what is needed here 鈥渃onservatism鈥� or does that terminology only add to our confusion? In America how do 鈥渃onservatives鈥� restore the Constitution and our culture when doing so would seem to involve tearing down now long established institutions?
In the Spring issue of Modern Age, asks whether conservatives 鈥渨on or lost鈥� in the 2016 election and concludes it 鈥渕ight be wise to sustain and cultivate such uncertainty as a way of understanding ourselves and our role in the Trump era.鈥�
Levin describes Trump鈥檚 winning political coalition as a 鈥渃oalition of the alienated鈥� that fostered 鈥渄isruption.鈥� Trump gave 鈥渧oice to a growing (and in key respects surely justified) alienation from dominant streams of the culture, economy, and politics in America.鈥� Because of this alienation from the elites running major American institutions, Levin contends, many on the Right 鈥渨elcome[d] the potential for disruption that [Trump] introduced.鈥�
The concept of alienation is at the center of his essay. 鈥淎lienation can sometimes make for a powerful organizing principle for an electoral coalition,鈥� Levin declares. 鈥淏ut it does not make for a natural organizing principle for a governing coalition.鈥� He worries that 鈥渢he upsurge of this alienation on the right is even more of a challenge to conservatism in particular, because alienation cannot help but make the right less conservative.鈥�
鈥淐onservatives,鈥� Levin notes 鈥渋ncline to be heavily invested in society and its institutions鈥� and even when these institutions are 鈥渄ominated by the left . . . conservatives by instinct and reflection tend to argue for reclamation and recovery鈥攆or building spaces within these institutions more than for rejection and contempt for them.鈥�
At several points, Levin poses a stark contrast between 鈥渄isruption鈥� and 鈥渢ransformation鈥� (meaning cultural renewal). The former is negative, the latter is positive. Conservatives, he says, should not be 鈥渕istaking disruption for transformation.鈥� Finally Levin emphasizes that conservatives should not focus on 鈥減rogrammatic policy objectives, but rather the preconditions for a healthier politics.鈥� Specifically, this means, 鈥淎 constructive conservative politics in the Trump years must therefore be first and foremost a politics of constitutional restoration.鈥�
Few conservatives would disagree with Levin鈥檚 goal of a constitutional restoration. How best to achieve this through 鈥渄isruption,鈥� cultural 鈥渢ransmission鈥� or some combination of the two is another question.
鈥淲e are called to enable a revival, not to mount a total revolution,鈥� Levin says. Yet an important segment of conservative thought from 1950s National Review to today鈥檚 Claremont Review of Books envisions both as complementary, not contradictory, revolution (against progressive-liberalism) and revival (of American constitutionalism) or 鈥渄isruption鈥� and 鈥渢ransmission.鈥�. Some form of disruptive activity (in politics, the academy, the media) against progressive hegemony is necessary at first in order to achieve the renewal that Levin and the rest of us seek.
Historically, no political reform movement of the Left or Right (civil rights, temperance, suffragist, abolitionist, conservative) has ever succeeded without a two pronged 鈥渂ad cop-good cop鈥� approach, without a radical wing and a mainstream wing working in tandem, at least implicitly, if not explicitly. The American Revolution itself is a classic example. Without the radicalism of Tom Paine and Samuel Adams the moderation of George Washington and John Adams would not likely have succeeded.
While some movement conservatives emphasize a conservative 鈥渄isposition鈥� others decade after decade have embraced the metaphor of 鈥渞evolution鈥� as in the Reagan Revolution of the 1980s, the Gingrich Revolution of 1994, and the Tea Party uprising of 2010. Lee Edwards of the Heritage Foundation labeled his history of modern American conservatism as 鈥淭he Conservative Revolution: The Movement that Remade America.鈥�
While Yuval Levin asks whether conservatives 鈥渨on or lost鈥� the 2016 election and suggests that we 鈥渃ultivate such uncertainty鈥濃攑rogressive-liberals have no doubt that they lost the Presidential race and exhibit no ambiguity about what to do next.
As has written, 鈥渢he election of President Donald J Trump鈥resented a roadblock to an on-going progressive revolution鈥� and 鈥渦nlike recent Republican presidential nominees,鈥� (he specifically mentions McCain and Romney), Trump 鈥渨as indifferent to the cultural and political restraints on conservative pushback.鈥�
鈥淓ven more ominously,鈥� for progressives, Hanson notes, 鈥淭rump found a seam鈥� in the blue wall and 鈥渂lew it apart,鈥� actually carrying Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa, and winning the election.
The result, Hanson notes is that 鈥淲e are witnessing a desperate putsch to remove Trump before he can do any more damage to the Obama project鈥�.The branches of this insidious coup d鈥檈tat are quite unlike anything our generation has ever witnessed.鈥� (all italics added)
So, again, the question remains what should conservatives do in the current situation, in the middle of an all-out attempt by powerful elements in the administrative state-cultural leviathan axis to nullify the 2016 Presidential election?
Remain aloof, cultivate one鈥檚 own garden of the little platoons in quietist, and often, ironic fashion; talk mostly of civility and temperament; write carefully tailored 鈥渕oral equivalence鈥� essays faulting both Trump and his critics in equal measure on issues of the day, such as the NFL national anthem or historical statues controversies; work like some center-right commentators with liberals to form a new political alignment, a 鈥淣ew Center鈥濃攐r go on the offensive against the progressive left and renew the fighting faith of the founders of modern conservatism and their spiritual heirs: Frank Meyer; Willmoore Kendall; Jim Burnham; Bill Buckley in the first decades of National Review; Harry Jaffa and his students; and
鈥淎pproved Conservatives鈥� of the Past and Present
We should remember that it was not only the leadership of the John Birch Society and Ayn Rand who were 鈥渆xpelled鈥� from the mainstream conservative movement in those early days, but also some faux New York Times style 鈥渘ew conservatives鈥� including Clinton Rossiter and Peter Viereck who condemned the National Review circle for 鈥渢hought-control nationalism鈥� and described the magazine鈥檚 writers as 鈥渞ootless, counterrevolutionary doctrinaires.鈥�
Clinton Rossiter declared that America was 鈥渁 progressive country with a Liberal tradition鈥� and 鈥渁 liberal [political] mind.鈥� The goal of his conservatism was 鈥渢o sober and strengthen the American liberal tradition, not destroy it.鈥� Peter Viereck proclaimed conservatism as a 鈥渃entrist philosophy鈥� that was not intrinsically hostile to liberalism. He touted the liberal Democrat Adlai Stevenson and progressive Republican Senator Clifford Case as exemplars of a genuine American conservatism.
Needless to say, NR editors hit back.mocked the 鈥渘ew conservatives鈥� as unprincipled, focused mostly on 鈥渢one鈥� and 鈥渕ood,鈥� and anxious to be received into 鈥減olite society.鈥� He continued, 鈥淭his is not a problem of tone nor attitude, not a difference between the conservative and the radical temperament; it is a difference of principle.鈥� (italics in the original) In a similar vein, Willmoore Kendall wrote that Viereck and Rossiter explained 鈥渉ow you can be a Conservative and yet agree with Liberals on all not demonstrably unimportant.鈥� In an interview Buckley told historian George Nash that the phrase 鈥渘ew conservative鈥� was 鈥渁 way in which liberals designated people they thought respectable.鈥� It was a means, Buckley contended, by which liberals separated 鈥渁pproved鈥� conservatives (Viereck, Rossiter) from National Review writers.
Today, history repeats itself, as neither tragedy nor farce (pace Marx), but in an eerily familiar manner. A gaggle of liberal 鈥渁pproved conservatives鈥� essentially play the role that Rossiter and Viereck played sixty years ago. They parrot what National Review called the 鈥淟iberal propaganda Line,鈥� whose 鈥�fons et origio,鈥� Professor Kendall noted, was the New York Times.
These 鈥渁pproved conservatives鈥� are permitted (actually, enthusiastically welcomed) to use the columns of the New York Times and the Washington Post for two purposes. First, in general, to support a type of conservatism centered on tone and temperament that does nothing to challenge and, on the contrary, everything to reinforce, progressive ideological-cultural hegemony among the chattering classes. However, like the original 鈥渁pproved conservatives,鈥� the contemporary breed, pretends a conservative temperament while hyperventilating in the Times and Post about other conservatives (and, of course, the president.) Second, and most importantly, these writers help promote the foremost immediate goal of American Liberalism鈥攖he removal of Donald J. Trump from the Presidency of the United States.
On the contemporary conservative continuum Yuval Levin stands between the Never Trump 鈥渁pproved conservatives鈥� and Trump-friendly right of center intellectuals at the Claremont Institute; among social conservatives; immigration hawks; defense specialists; and the editors and writers of American Greatness. Levin emphasizes Burkean gradualism with a genuine restrained style. Unlike, the hysterical, gratuitous, and sanctimonious language of Never Trump New York Times-Washington Post 鈥渁pproved conservatives鈥� (Max Boot, Michael Gerson, Jennifer Rubin, and Bret Stephens come to mind), Levin鈥檚 critiques actually are sober, reasoned, and worth answering.
Are we in a crisis or not?
Besides his unease over the welcome of 鈥渄isruption鈥� in the Trump era by many on the American Right, Levin suggests the fear in 2016 of a Hillary Clinton presidency was overwrought. He downplays both the power and the animosity of the Progressive project (exercised by the cultural leviathan and the administrativestate) towards traditional America, noting that some conservatives assign 鈥渢o Progressives much more malice (and competence) than is warranted and credits them with far more than they have actually achieved and it sells our society short.鈥� Further, he argues that it is a mistake to believe that we are facing a unique crisis today, just as it was a mistake for conservatives in previous generations (in 1933 or 1955 or 1980) to believe that they faced a unique crisis.
The hope for conservatives, Levin tells us, is 鈥済enerational.鈥� The endurance of an unchanging human nature means it is possible to win the next generation, or at least thoughtful elements within it, to a sober conservatism. Levin, of course, is right to emphasize the centrality of winning the young for the revival and renewal of the American way of life. But this crucial task of promoting conservatism among both the young (who are often attracted to an insurgent mindset rather than a conservative disposition) and the not so young, has become more difficult for a variety of reasons.
One reason would be the changing demographics resulting from massive, continuous low-skilled immigration which is combined with an anti-assimilation 鈥渕ulticultural鈥� approach to integrating newcomers into American life. Another reason would be the almost complete leftist conquest of American universities that occurred the past few decades as the patriotic Arthur Schlesinger-style liberals and the few remaining conservatives have retired or died out, replaced by tenured radicals.
What could be successful is a new form of 鈥渂ad cop-good cop鈥� disruptive-transformative conservativism. By 鈥渂ad cop鈥� I do not mean unsophisticated analysis, but a sharper, more polemical style (James Burnham鈥檚 Suicide of the West would be a case in point.) On immigration policy, for example, conservatives have moved after years on the defensive to an offensive strategy, including an array of what I will call 鈥渂ad cop鈥� discourse (a new emphasis on how liberal controlled 鈥渟anctuary鈥� jurisdictions and lax diversity visa policies threaten American lives with reference to specific cases, e.g., Kate Steinle and Sayfullo (Sword of Allah) Saipov respectively, have helped change the shape of the immigration debate.
A combination of bad and good cop discourse has helped to dislodge modern liberalism from the moral high ground on the immigration question. The commanding heights of the debate are now contested space. Put in non-metaphorical terms, progressive-liberals and Republican 鈥渨ets鈥� who place their highest priority on securing amnesty for the so-called 鈥渄reamers鈥� (many now in their thirties) are forced to deal with immigration hawk arguments on ending chain migration; implementing mandatory electronic verification identification for all employment in America; and abolishing the senseless 鈥渄iversity visa lottery.鈥�
Today Trump-friendly conservatives are openly and consciously seeking to dismantle the post-constitutional administrative state. In a powerful Wall Street Journal essay my Hudson colleague (and former AEI President and Reagan administration regulatory expert) explains that the Trump administration with a phalanx of de-regulation stalwarts (Scott Gottlieb, Scott Pruitt, Ajit Pai, Ryan Zinke, Betsy DeVos, Elaine Chao, Neomi Rao) is in the process of making 鈥渢he administrative state less stultifying and more constitutional.鈥欌� At the Federalist Society鈥檚 national convention, the White House counsel, called for preventing 鈥渢he unconstitutional transfer of legislative authority to the administrative state.鈥�
For a little over a century, the administrative state has expanded massively and exponentially as generation after generation of conservatives fought the growth of this unconstitutional 鈥渇ourth branch of government.鈥� Were those earlier conservatives mistaken (as Yuval Levin would have us believe) to think they were in some unique 鈥渃risis鈥� in their own time? Were earlier conservatives overreacting to the power grabs of Woodrow Wilson and FDR in portraying their historical period as one of 鈥渃risis鈥�? Was Ronald Reagan crying wolf in 1980 when he envisioned a 鈥渃risis鈥� as he sought to overturn the malaise and stagnation of the 1970s? I think not.
What has happened is that the 鈥渞egime鈥� conflict which has been with us since the early 20th century progressive era has witnessed (particularly after the eight Obama years) the massive expansion of a powerful post-constitutional administrative state that is now simply become too big and too dangerous to ignore.
So what is the nature of modern progressive-liberalism and what should be the conservative response in the Trump era? Are we involved in politics as usual or a 鈥渞egime鈥� struggle? Levin says our political divisions are a family argument between two forms of liberalism: progressive liberalism and conservative liberalism. For the Trump era, he suggests a strategy of cautious ambiguity towards the administration, while focusing on the promotion of the 鈥渞evival of intermediary institutions of society鈥� and a recognition of twenty-first century public policy by 鈥渁llowing solutions to rise from the bottom up.鈥� Our conservative project, Levin says, 鈥渕ust ultimately be understood as a civic labor of love not a political fight to the death.鈥�
Hanson proposes to the Progressive Project and the Trump administration. As noted earlier, Hanson declared that we are in a 鈥渓arger existential war for the soul of America.鈥� Further, he states, 鈥渨arts and all, the Trump presidency on all fronts is all that now stands in the way of what was started in 2009鈥� (Obama鈥檚 鈥渇undamental transformation of the United States of America.鈥�)
鈥淭he Marquess of Queensberry world of John McCain and Mitt Romney,鈥� Hanson tells us, will not halt the march of the Progressive Left, a form of disruption is required. 鈥淓ither Trump will restore economic growth, national security, the melting pot, legality, and individual liberty or he will fail and we will go the way of Europe,鈥� Hanson writes. 鈥淔or now, there is no one else in the opposition standing in the way of radical progressivism.鈥�
What is the proper role of 鈥渄isruption鈥� in the conservative strategy? Does the conservative project embrace the vision of Yuval Levin or Victor Davis Hanson? In the months ahead, conservatives will be making their choice. I have made mine.