In this week’s episode of China Insider, Miles Yu unpacks Xi Jinping’s weeklong tour to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, and the impact these visits will have on countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region. Next, Miles examines how the Chinese Communist Party employs strategic rhetoric to establish historical legitimacy, and why this tactic prohibits good-faith negotiations in the United States–China dialogue. Lastly, Miles responds to emerging media narratives that compare US policy under Trump 2.0 and China’s cultural revolution under Mao Zedong.
China Insider is a weekly podcast project from , hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. , who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world’s future.
Episode Transcript
This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.
Miles Yu:
Welcome to China Insider, a podcast from the 华体会's China Center. I am Miles Yu, Senior Fellow and Director of the China Center. Join me each week for our analysis of the major events concerning China, China threat and their implications to the US and beyond.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
It’s Tuesday, April 22nd, and we have three topics this week. First, we unpack Xi Jinping's Southeast Asia trip to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia over the course of last week, and what this means for regional security and diplomatic relations. Second, we discuss how the concept of China's pride interferes with US-China relations. And lastly, Miles addresses emerging narratives that strike comparisons between US policy under Trump 2.0 and China under Mao. Miles, how are you doing today?
Miles Yu:
Very good, Colin, nice to be with you again.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Likewise. So we start things off this week with the biggest headline from the past week, President Xi Jinping's Southeast Asia trip to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia. This is Xi's first international trip in quite some time, and it also comes on the heels of the latest tariff developments between the US and China. President Xi Jinping met with leaders in the three nations to discuss the ongoing US trade policy impacts on the region and in attempts to enhance bilateral relations with China. There are enough questions on this development alone that we could focus on for an entire episode. So Miles, why don't we start with an overview of the trip here. What exactly went down over the course of the last week and why did Xi decide to make this trip now?
Miles Yu:
Well, this is a kind of an act of desperation from my point of view. It's like over a hundred countries in the world have sort of acquiesced to the major argument made by the Trump administration, that trade with the United States has been pretty much unfair. So we have to negotiate, we have to make compromises. Over 100 countries have come to Washington DC just to do that. Except one, China. China wants to fight the United States to the end, “战斗到底 (zhàndòu dàodǐ),” as Xi Jinping always said. It absolutely shows the extraordinary level of intransigence. And then most of the China's friends and allies have abandoned China in this call for united front against the United States, including the all-weather friend Pakistan. So China right now basically has no friends to go to except the neighboring countries that are deeply economically dependent on China. That's why there's a trip, Vietnam and Cambodia and Malaysia.
It's like your girlfriend wants to break up with you and you say, “please don't go, give me another chance, please with sugar on top.” So it's not working. I mean why Vietnam? Because Vietnam is a very critical country in ASEAN countries right next to China and has fought more wars and military confrontations with China than any other country in the neighborhood since 1970s. So there is a very tense relationship between the two communist countries. On the other hand, Vietnam's economy has been booming. Vietnam run the third largest trade deficit with the United States. That's really significant. Much of that is actually through transshipping. China has a lot of firms in Vietnam and they manufacture there and they export to the United States. So Vietnam played a very critical role, and most importantly, Vietnam is among the first country to answer Trump's call to come to Washington DC to negotiate. This basically is a major no-no for China. Cambodia obviously is China's strategic partnership. Cambodia is deep in China's pockets for decades now. Why Malaysia? Because Malaysia is the chair country of the ASEAN for 2025, and Malaysia also played a very critical role in semiconductor manufacturing and designing. So that's why there's this trip. And this trip, it's almost like a very last minute thought, last minute thoughts. So it was done in a hurry and it shows how bad situation is for China.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
And Xi's approach to this trip at least feels strategic in certain select regards, at least in targeting nations with already existing ties and agreements with China in several capacities. It is also worth noting for our listeners that several agreements were signed in each location during this trip, including forty-five in Vietnam alone, covering investments on trade, education, finance, information, agriculture, and several other sectors involving state owned firms and other BRI backed CCP working groups and bureaucratic units, such as the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. So, Miles, beyond the headlines here, what was the response like in each of the three countries and do you feel that Xi accomplished what he set out to achieve here?
Miles Yu:
Well, here's the deal. I mean, these three countries have welcomed Xi warmly and obviously they don't want to make an unnecessary enemy in the public. And I think you mentioned about the signing of various agreements, a lot of them, forty-five for Vietnam, thirty-one for Malaysia, and then thirty-seven for Cambodia. Most of them were already in existence. And secondly, a lot of projects China promise so much in the past it will be very, very foolish to believe China will fulfill all of them, most of them. So this is yet to see. Now you mentioned about the reactions when Xi Jinping went to three countries, there was a lot of pompous reception, but China in the meantime also issued very stern warning. While Xi Jinping was visiting these three countries, Chinese domestic media keep putting out the statement saying that China will not allow any other country to make deal with the United States at the expense of China. And that's a very stern message. So I think many people still have a very realistic view of China. Now, Vietnam in particular, the moment that Xi Jinping left Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communist Party leadership, put a statement saying, you know what? Vietnam and United States have a very special relationship. We have to deal with the specialists. So this basically a slap on the face of Xi Jinping. Malaysia obviously is a very important country, but Malaysia continues on its negotiating with the United States. So I don't think this is going to go very well.
Now, just before I came down to the show, I read a very interesting internet posting by somebody called Critical Spectator, and it says very interestingly, it says “Xi Jinping's ongoing charm offensive in Southeast Asia is a really comical spectacle revealing just how bad the situation in China must be at the moment that the emperor himself has to plead for cooperation with the neighbors. He's been shamelessly trying to rob for over a decade, given the situation, Xi can no longer make offers others cannot refuse. And for all the hate of Donald Trump, they will still be happier to deal with the Washington than Beijing”. And that's pretty interesting posting. What's really interesting here is that this posting, highly critical of Xi Jinping visit to Southeast Asia, is forwarded, retweeted, by Ho Ching. Ho Ching is the wife of ex-Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong.
Now, Ho Ching is not an ordinary person. She was in charge of Temasek, which is a sovereign fund of Singapore and that has a lot of Chinese money in there. The reason she actually retweeted this has caused, has made, a lot of headlines in Singapore and throughout the Southeast Asia. The reason she did this actually indicated something about Singapore, the country, because she did this after she insulted Donald Trump and his tariff policy. So Singapore is very classical example of trying to maintain neutral, get a benefit from both ways, have it both ways.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Yeah, and I guess then to tie this all together, and certainly within the context of Secretary Hegseth’s recent trip to the Indo-Pacific, how does Xi Jinping's trip impact US legitimacy and standing among the ASEAN nations? And I guess within the context of US China relations as well.
Miles Yu:
I think despite all Xi Jinping has said and done in Southeast Asia, this trip will basically be almost completely insignificant in my view because the fundamentals remain the same. Now, China still has this imperial ambition for almost like over 90% of the South China Sea. That directly affected the livelihood of ASEAN as a whole. So none of that is showing up in the discussion during Xi Jinping's trip. And also while Xi Jinping was in ASEAN country, these three countries, the Chinese Maritime Militia continue to bully the Philippines. They just have this water cannon shooting at the Filipino tiny boats, and so this is going on while Xi was there. So the messaging, it could not be really worse than that. And United States influence as a matter of fact has increased dramatically because of China's bullying activities in this region. And you mentioned about Secretary Hegseth’s visit to the Philippines. The Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States. Any attack on the Philippines will be considered as attack on the United States. And also you have other major countries still decisively, not on China's side, Indonesia for example. Indonesia biggest country, the fourth largest country in the world. So what I'm saying here is overall, overall Southeast Asian countries, want independence, southeastern countries want to have ASEAN centric role. In other words, China can no longer dictate what those countries should do and should not do.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Yeah, I'm glad you incorporated the context here for the Philippines and other ASEAN nations here. And I guess just to quickly add on, what have you been hearing since last week in terms of responses to Xi's trip from other ASEAN nations like Thailand and Singapore like you mentioned, but also other regional powers like from Japan and South Korea, maybe even Australia in that regard?
Miles Yu:
In the past, normally when the Chinese leadership make inroad in those countries, you always have some counter visits by Japanese Prime Minister or somebody, US over there, this time none because it doesn't matter anymore. Incidentally, I should also say China make a big deal out of visiting these three countries, those three countries were among the so-called “little countries” China used to despise. They use words like “小国 (xiao guo)” to designate those countries, meaning that those countries have little significance to them. Now it's a big deal because China is in pretty significant isolation, I will say, from rest of the countries. So this is basically, as I say at the beginning of this segment, that it is a desperate plea for those three countries not to leave China and to isolate China even further.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Moving to our next topic for today, US-China relations has become a principal focus of foreign policy scholars, politicians, and most every government official in the international stage over the past 10 to 15 years especially. And the current consensus is that over this period of time, US-China relations have shifted into a stage of strategic competition and increased distrust between the two global powers. And while US policy toward China has been shaped under several administrations emphasizing reciprocity and reformed relations, China's strategy under Xi Jinping's leadership has emphasized themes of national strength, rejuvenation, and China's pride as a great power, likely an attempt to legitimize the current regime's actions in the perceived context of an adversarial Washington. But Miles, I'd like to pick your brain here and explain a bit more about this concept of China's pride and exactly how it's become a major obstacle in US China dialogue.
Miles Yu:
Well, China's pride is a false concept. It indicates, it implies, that Chinese Communist Party represents the entire Chinese nation, the Chinese population. That is absolutely not true. If you go to the internet space in China, you can see whatever the Chinese government is saying and doing and is basically met with the avalanche of criticism, mockery, by the people on the street. So the idea somehow China can represent China to deal with the world country, world leadership like countries like United States is absolutely absurd. It's a failure. The failure of realizing this reality has caused so many policy missteps, on the particular on US side. Now because Chinese Communist Party leadership does not have political legitimacy. Basically it's rule, the regimes survival is critically hinged on several basic make-believe fantasies or lies, if you will.
One is that the concept, if you're a Chinese person in China, you'll be bombarded on a daily basis by the propaganda machine with the following concept. Number one, the Chinese Communist Party cannot be wrong, it's infallible. Number two, the Chinese Communist Party is invincible. It's so awesome it can do anything it wants. If you violate the Chinese Communist Party will, the party will always find a way to punish you. That's basically the installation of, the cultivation of the idea of fear of the authority of the Chinese Communist Party is very important. And finally, that the Chinese Communist Party is the representation of Chinese nation, to lead this hapless Chinese nation into national rejuvenation, to avenge the century of injustice. That is basically, you know, totally wrong. I mean the so-called 100-year humiliation is also a united front concept used by the Chinese Community Party to bamboozle the world.
You know what the biggest humiliation of the Chinese nation is imposed, inflicted by the Chinese Communist Party itself, not by any other foreign countries, on scale. There were more Chinese people die in peace time under Communist Party's brutal rule than any other period in human history. So you might say the hundred-year humiliation, yes, that existed, but it's not caused by foreign country, but mostly it is caused by the Chinese Communist Party itself. So this is why China cannot afford a foreign leader to confront it openly, directly because that threatened the several fantasies I just listed and that will break the lies and the web of lies that the Chinese Communist Party is invincible, is infallible, and it represent the Chinese people.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Why does the CCP demand such respect from the US then? I guess the natural follow up to that is really what are the limiting factors and consequences of the CCP’s refusal to shift their approach to US-China relations and ongoing dialogue?
Miles Yu:
I think I just explained why they demand excessive R-E-S-P-E-C-T, but this is also, this is fake because they want to have - the CCP’s approach normally is like this - they say the United States government, the President, you cannot openly be critical of China because that will give us a loss of face on our part, and Chinese people will be less afraid of us. And that's basically the bottom line. So whatever you want from us, we're going to negotiate with you privately through summit, closed door, behind the door. That's why they much prefer the Nixon-Kissinger approach of secret diplomacy. If [it’s through] secret diplomacy and they can negotiate, they can make compromises. But the problem is that whatever deal that you make in private, in secret, Chinese government is in no hurry to keep it. So that's why privately negotiated deals with China will never work, has not worked.
And that basically is the lesson, number one lesson, of the Nixon-Kissinger approach to China. Secret diplomacy may achieve some kind of a temporary outcome and make us look good, but in the end we just create our own Frankenstein that will torment us in the future. And I think that's basically the lesson that Donald Trump is learning. If I were President Trump, I would advise the following: Fine, I'll give the face, I'll show public respect. I'll order my cabinet secretaries away from making public statements about Chinese Communist Party, egregious acts left and right, but I'll deal with you privately. But I always threaten you with public disclosure of the content of a secret negotiation so that you will be held accountable by this threat. Secondly, I will conduct vigorous, I mean vigorous communications, engagement, with the Chinese people. And so that's very, very powerful because the Chinese Communist Party has a total control of China's information system.
Not only that, they control the complete right to interpret information and to basically to brainwash people inside China. That's why direct communication through the voices like the Secretary of the State Marco Rubio through the president himself even, or through powerful tools of Twitter, Facebook through social, you can convey your message directly talking to the Chinese people. It is Chinese people that the Communist Party fear the most. That's why you have to realize the soft spots of the Chinese Communist Party regime. That's why it will be very successful if you follow this device. But then I think the President Trump is pretty smart guy. He will do just that.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Yeah, it'll be interesting to see how this kind of develops over the next few months at least, especially as ongoing trade tariff negotiations and subsequent agreements are taking form. But that brings us to our final topic for today and kind of continuing on this thread of thought. In response to the slate of policies and targeted reforms under Trump in the second administration, there have recently been emerging narratives among policy scholars and within global forums as well, comparing the current US administration to the period of Chinese Cultural Revolution under Mao. Despite the historical and ideological differences here, Miles, what do you make of these comparisons and can you share a bit more about where these are coming from?
Miles Yu:
Well, they're coming from basically three media outlets, the New York Times, National Public Radio, and CNN. So those are the three major outlets that have been promoting this idea. It's kind of ridiculous in a way. I was listening to NPR the other day and they invited this guy called Da Wei from China to go on this show to basically to throw all this propaganda information. This is the akin to New York Times inviting Georgy Arbatov during the Cold War to talk about Soviet propaganda. There's no difference over there. I mean, this idea that somehow to compare Donald Trump to Mao during the Cultural Revolution is so outlandish. It is almost laughable. This is the part of the, some people say Trump derangement syndrome. I think this is basically similar. You have, you've been hearing for years now, Donald Trump is Hitler, he's worse than Hitler, he is Vladimir Putin's lap dog. But now he is similar to Mao. I mean, this whole comparison is totally baseless. It shows the lack of understanding of the ideological and the political foundations of the two countries, United States and China.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
So in your mind, Miles, what exactly motivates these perspectives in comparisons that are being made and what are the larger implications here for information and media outlets in the American base?
Miles Yu:
Well, this basically is very ironic because the fact that there are those news outlets of mainstream that can make this kind of claim, that United States under Donald Trump is akin to China under Mao, itself, it tells you the fundamental difference between China and the United States. There is no way under Mao’s China you can make any comparison of the Mao regime with another murderous regime in history. So there's no way in Mao’s China there was half of the country who openly disagree and hate the person in power. I mean, in the United States, Donald Trump is the President and close to half of people really don't like him. In China, under Mao, you have this personality cult. Not one single person could openly challenge the authority of Mao and even say anything bad about him. So that, basically, is fundamentally different. That's where the problem lies.
Secondly, I grew up during the China's Cultural Revolution. I knew what kind of society, what kind of life it was like. In Mao’s China, there was completely lawlessness, political ideology dominates. It is basically whatever the party thinks is right, and the party is the law. In the United States, we live in a law-abiding rules-based country. President is a very powerful person. Yes, he can run the government, but he's also guided by law. There is a constitution. There are different kinds of layers of legal barriers he has to overcome in order to get his way. So that's why there are checks and balances. That's the fundamental difference between China and the United States. The power in China is unchecked. It's absolute power. The power in the presidency of the United States is checked and balanced and it's limited. So that's why it is. Another thing is, but most importantly, Mao has no political legitimacy. He kept the power through the barrel of the gun. Donald Trump, no matter what you think about him, he was elected democratically fairly by the people of the United States. He has political legitimacy. He's powerful. He wants to do a lot of things for America precisely because he was given a mandate to govern. And in China, you don't have that kind of a political legitimacy. That's why the comparisons between Mao and Donald Trump is total garbage. It shows the ignorance of these people, and about the nature of political systems in the world. So I'm trying to be kind to these people who promoted such lunacy.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Well, we've unfortunately reached our time for today, but Miles, as always, thank you for this week's conversation and lending us your perspective on these critical issues. We will check back with you again next week.
Miles Yu:
Thank you very much and see you next week.