While it鈥檚 clear U.S. President-elect Donald Trump wants to end Russia鈥檚 war against Ukraine, how he鈥檒l achieve this in a just manner that results in a lasting peace remains unclear.
The preferable approach, of course, would have been to provide Kyiv with the weapons and resources needed to restore control over its internationally recognized 1991 borders. But due to Washington鈥檚 dithering and indecisive approach, the U.S. only ever provided the country with enough assistance to survive 鈥� never enough to win.
This isn鈥檛 Ukraine鈥檚 fault. It鈥檚 the collective fault of America and its European allies.
But as speculation mounts over what a Trump-negotiated settlement might look like, we must consider two points: Ukraine must feel that any settlement to end the war is a fair one, and it must also feel secure from future Russian attacks.
The latter point is particularly crucial because history tells us that if there鈥檚 only a pause in fighting, Russia will likely return to try and finish the job.
This is why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy鈥檚 comments about ending the of the war in exchange for NATO membership is so important. And though some will dismiss this idea outright, if Ukraine is willing to consider it, so should we.
Currently, there鈥檚 a lot of conjecture that the U.S. might ask Europe to provide a post-war security force for Ukraine, hoping to avoid direct involvement in future conflicts. But those who believe this would keep the U.S. out of any future war in Europe are being naive.
The idea that French, British or German troops could come under Russian attack without there being a NATO response is inconceivable, whether or not those troops operate under a NATO mission. Such a scenario would lead to one of two outcomes: direct U.S. military involvement or the end of NATO鈥檚 credibility and, by extension, the alliance itself.
This is precisely why Ukraine joining NATO could provide the best offer for enduring and effective peace in Eastern Europe. Not only would the country鈥檚 membership serve as a credible deterrent against future Russian aggression, it would also ensure meaningful burden sharing among NATO members.
And most crucially, even if a post-war settlement were to leave part of Ukraine鈥檚 territory under de facto Russian control, there鈥檚 still a responsible, realistic and reasonable way for Ukraine to join the alliance. To make this work, however, NATO and Ukraine would need to take three key steps:
First, as part of any peace settlement, Ukraine鈥檚 government would need to formally declare a 鈥渘on-use of force鈥� pledge to reclaim its occupied territories, and focus on a long-term diplomatic strategy instead. This shouldn鈥檛 be a problem, as Zelenskyy this possibility already. Meanwhile, the pledge itself could be modeled after West Germany鈥檚 1954 declaration on the eve of its NATO membership it 鈥渦ndertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the re-unification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes.鈥�
Next, all of Ukraine鈥檚 internationally recognized territory 鈥� including the regions temporarily occupied by Russia 鈥� would be invited to join NATO, but only the areas outside Russian-occupation would receive the Article 5 security guarantee. Article 6 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty defines NATO鈥檚 as the 鈥淣orth Atlantic area, north of the Tropic of Cancer,鈥� and as a result, U.S. territories like Guam and Hawaii, the U.K.鈥檚 Falkland Islands and France鈥檚 R茅union Island aren鈥檛 covered by Article 5. So, Ukraine wouldn鈥檛 be the first alliance member with partial territory excluded from the collective defense clause.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the alliance would then need to amend Article 6 to exclude Ukraine鈥檚 regions under Russia鈥檚 control. This amendment could be made during the accession-protocol process each alliance member undergoes before admitting a new country 鈥� and there鈥檚 precedent for this too. Article 6 was amended before Greece and Turkey joined in , and in 1963, after Algeria鈥檚 independence, the North Atlantic Council that Article 6 no longer applied to the Algerian Departments of France.
However, there are some who won鈥檛 agree with this process and will claim that countries are prohibited from joining NATO until any outstanding territorial disputes are resolved. But this is a common misconception that鈥檚 rooted in a poor understanding of the , which was published by the alliance in 1995.
A closer look at this document actually shows that territorial disputes don鈥檛 necessarily prevent a country from joining the alliance, as the study reads: 鈥淪tates which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes 鈥� must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the alliance鈥� (emphasis mine).
Of course, prospective members would ideally resolve any outstanding border disputes before joining the alliance. But policymakers have to operate in the real world, not in the world they would like to be in. The Study on Enlargement clearly states the resolution of such disputes would be 鈥渁 factor鈥� 鈥� not 鈥�the factor鈥� 鈥� in determining whether an invitation is extended, and there鈥檚 precedent for countries with border disputes joining NATO. Estonia, for example, which joined the alliance in 2004, still lacks a legally agreed border with , and Croatia, which joined in 2009, has unresolved border disputes with .
Since its first enlargement in 1952, NATO鈥檚 open-door policy has greatly enhanced transatlantic security. But Russia鈥檚 malign actions in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova 鈥� and the transatlantic community鈥檚 inability to push back 鈥� have essentially given Moscow a de facto veto over future NATO membership. Right now, Russia knows that all it needs to do to prevent a country from joining is to invade and partially occupy it.
Temporarily amending Article 6 would deny Moscow this veto 鈥� starting with Ukraine. The only question is whether leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have the creativity and political will to make it happen.
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