华体会

As the United States鈥� real and perceived advantages over China wane, many analysts are calling for a shift in US policy to prioritize the Indo-Pacific at the expense of Europe. They believe Washington needs to pare down US engagement in other regions and marshal American military resources to the Pacific to prepare for a confrontation with China. A leading role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and robust material support for Ukraine have become luxuries America can no longer afford, .

Advocates for Pacific prioritization are correct in that an increasingly aggressive China is a complex and significant threat to US interests. But they undervalue both the destabilizing effects of continued Russian aggression and Europe鈥檚 role in US interests鈥攊ncluding in the Pacific. A siloed approach to Chinese and Russian threats risks negative outcomes in both theatres. The credibility of Western security commitments is on trial in Ukraine, and Beijing is a key party to Moscow鈥檚 war. Ignoring active Russian aggression to focus on a simmering conflict with China is a sure path to failure.

The appeal of a Pacific prioritization strategy is founded on myths and misunderstandings. Below are the seven most important myths and the reasons they are false.

Myth 1: Russia is a distraction from the most important long-term threat to US interests, China.
 

• China will be a significant threat to US interests for the foreseeable future. US policymakers should plan for all contingencies, including a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But just as a homeowner would be foolish to spend time buying insurance for a future flood while shrugging off a fire raging in the attic, the US should not ignore the ongoing war in Europe because of the threat of war in Asia.
• Russia is waging a shadow war against the US and its allies. In addition to Vladimir Putin鈥檚 genocidal war against Ukraine, Moscow has conducted missions on Western soil, including assassinations, cyberattacks, influence operations, and sabotage of key infrastructure. Reports even suggest that Russia has conducted directed energy attacks against US and Canadian officials.
• China and Russia are not distinct threats but rather a single problem set. China is the of Russia鈥檚 war against Ukraine. Beijing gives Moscow diplomatic cover, purchases Russian energy, and provides the Kremlin鈥檚 war machine with vast amounts of the components and machinery necessary to produce advanced weapons. Despite Russia鈥檚 continued targeting of civilians, China recently doubled down on its assistance. Beijing now with nitrocellulose for ammunition production, engines for drones and cruise missiles, and access to satellite imagery to improve Russia鈥檚 targeting. In September, reports indicated that China and Russia are developing and building drones in China before exporting them to Russia, whereas China had been exporting just weapon components. If true, would mark an escalation in Beijing鈥檚 direct support for Moscow鈥檚 war.
• What happens in Europe does not stay in Europe. The outcome of Putin鈥檚 war against Ukraine matters for China鈥檚 moves against Taiwan and in the broader Pacific. Chinese leadership is closely watching the outcome of the war鈥攎ost importantly whether the US-led Western coalition has the capacity, courage, and fortitude to follow through on its commitments. Conflict in the Pacific will become far more likely if Putin succeeds in Ukraine.
• US support for Ukraine deters China. In March, Admiral John Aquilino, former commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), before the House Armed Services Committee that 鈥渁ll that other money that is supporting the Ukraine problem set also provides a deterrent value for INDOPACOM. . . . An inability for Russia to succeed is a deterrent for President Xi.鈥�
• Taiwan understands the importance of support for Ukraine. The island nation recently donated $200,000 to help rebuild the Ohmatdyt Children鈥檚 Hospital, which a Russian missile strike devastated in early July. Taiwan has also supplied Ukrainian forces with weapons. and donated Taiwanese-made Revolver 860 combat drones to Ukraine, and the US bought recently retired Hawk surface-to-air missile systems from Taipei and transferred them to Kyiv. In May, Foreign Minister that 鈥渟ome have argued that international support for defending Ukraine from Russian aggression is draining attention and resources away from the task of standing up to Chinese aggression. According to this view, the defense of Ukraine has left democracies such as Taiwan more vulnerable. But that argument underestimates the extent to which the geostrategic interests of the world鈥檚 democracies are linked鈥攁s are the agendas of Moscow and Beijing.鈥� US support for Ukraine. 鈥淎 display of unabated and unquestionable resolve to safeguard democracy does not detract from the defense of places such as Taiwan: in fact, it is a key deterrent against adventurism on Beijing鈥檚 part,鈥� Wu said.

Myth 2: Security in Europe can and should be handled by Europeans.
 

• America鈥檚 security and prosperity depend on a strong NATO. As such, Washington should look for ways to strengthen the alliance rather than seek to jettison its NATO commitments.
• American prosperity depends in large part upon the stability of Europe. represents one-third of global gross domestic product (GDP) in terms of purchasing power. In 2023, 48 states exported more goods to Europe than to China.¹ The US and Europe are also by far each other鈥檚 largest sources of inbound foreign investment. In 2022, over of global investment into the US came from Europe.
• The US remains the essential nation in NATO. This position provides America underappreciated benefits, including an outsized influence on the continent. Without America鈥檚 conventional capabilities, gravitas, and nuclear arsenal, NATO鈥檚 Article V would be less formidable, and Europe would be an appealing target for Russian expansionism and Chinese pressure. It is na茂ve to think that US disengagement would shock European NATO members into replacing US capabilities. Instead, disengagement from NATO would erase US credibility and increase the risk that Russia would expand its war in Europe or that China would start a war in the Pacific.
• Europeans have already stepped up defense investment. In 2024, 21 of 32 NATO nations will spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. Nearly every NATO member already meets the second benchmark of spending 20 percent of their defense budgets on new equipment acquisitions. This is not to say Europe does not need to do more. European governments should consistently make the political decision to invest in defense. But by disengaging just as Europe begins to rebuild its capabilities, America would send the wrong message and leave its allies unduly exposed.

Myth 3: America can improve its stance in the Pacific by disengaging from NATO.
 

• The transatlantic security alliance, grounded in NATO, is the foundation for global peace and security. Even non-aligned nations, like India, that have sought to straddle the line between the Russia-China axis and the West recognize that the transatlantic alliance is crucial for worldwide stability. This in part may explain why, despite Russian requests, India has not stopped European countries from Indian munitions they bought. By standing with Europe, the US has a better chance of keeping undecided nations outside the orbit of the autocratic coalition.
• In a conflict with China, the US would ask European allies for support. The US would need naval powers like France and Britain to contribute militarily and grant the US access to their overseas territories. For the remainder of Europe, the US would seek cooperation on sanctions to punish Xi Jinping and damage the Chinese war effort. It is unlikely that the US would be able to defend Taiwan as effectively without the support and resolve of European allies.
• Betraying European allies in their hour of need could impact their willingness to assist the US. In the United States, the war in Ukraine feels remote. But in Europe, Russian aggression is a looming reality. If America does not stand with its transatlantic allies, European nations will be less likely to support the US in the current cold war against China鈥攖o say nothing of a future active conflict over Taiwan.
• America鈥檚 Pacific allies are watching. US allies in the Indo-Pacific will draw their own conclusions about the credibility of America鈥檚 commitments. If the US guts the transatlantic alliance, Pacific allies might feel insecure about their own ties with Washington and hedge toward Beijing.

Myth 4: Forces stationed in Europe would be better utilized in the Indo-Pacific.
 

• The US already has a historically small presence in Europe. While the US has deployed additional rotational forces to Europe since 2014, permanent forces number , the bulk of which are Army soldiers.² In historical terms, this is a small footprint. At the height of the Cold War in 1962, the US stationed more than 400,000 troops in Europe. At the turn of the millennium, America still had troops on the continent.
• European allies offset the cost of US basing. In 2020, to support the American presence on its soil, and Poland is to upgrade facilities that house US troops.
• Europe is America鈥檚 forward operating base for much of Eurasia. US bases in Europe are an asset against threats across the broader region. American troops in Europe help to deter Iran and hamper Chinese efforts to gain inroads in Europe and Africa.
• The Pacific is primarily a naval theater. The US Pacific Fleet  200 vessels, about two-thirds of the Navy鈥檚 296 ships. Weakening deterrence in the Atlantic theater by diverting further forces to the Pacific would be a poor trade-off.
• Forces removed from Europe would not necessarily be redeployed to the Pacific. The Trump administration鈥檚 plan to withdraw nearly would have moved roughly half to elsewhere in Europe and the remainder to the US, rather than redistributing them to the Pacific. Additionally, the US would incur significant upfront costs in transporting and basing Atlantic-deployed forces to the Pacific.

Myth 5: Support for Ukraine undermines deterrence in the Pacific.
 

• Russia and China are part of a unified threat. Last year, Admiral Aquilino, then commander of INDOPACOM, testified that he did not believe that aid to Ukraine was hurting his command鈥檚 ability to deter China. 鈥淭he fight that鈥檚 ongoing between the Ukrainians and the Russians鈥攖he munitions that we are providing to Ukraine at this time鈥攁re not degrading capabilities that are necessary for the fight that might occur in Taiwan,鈥� . The admiral in March 2024, stating that 鈥渢he global threats are inextricably linked.鈥�
• The fight in Ukraine requires different equipment than a fight in the Pacific would. noted that 鈥渁 closer look at arms received by Ukraine and ordered by Taiwan confirms that while there is overlap between the two, it is considerably smaller than often assumed.鈥� For instance, the armor and artillery the US has given to Ukrainian forces are not especially useful in the Pacific.
• Aiding Ukraine has helped rebuild the US defense industrial base. Of course, there are overlaps between US requirements in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, namely air defense systems, long-range fires, and armed drones. But by supporting Ukraine, the US has learned difficult but valuable lessons on expanding defense industrial capacity, particularly in fielding the requisite workforce. Regarding the latest Ukraine supplemental package, in April that 鈥�80 percent of the spending for Ukraine is replenishment of American weapons and stocks. That鈥檚 a really important thing for our own US industrial base and defense base.鈥� Aiding Ukraine has begun to usher in long-overdue changes to the US defense industrial base, strengthening deterrence in the Pacific.
• US support for Ukraine has not hampered Taiwan鈥檚 ability to procure essential systems. In June, Taiwan鈥檚 Ministry of National Defense noted that of the 18 open budget items for weapons purchases from the US, only three were delayed and 13 were running on schedule. Two items, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the Javelin missile, . Taiwan鈥檚 of US weapons deliveries largely predates the Russian war against Ukraine; it was already at the end of 2021.
• The US military and defense industry are learning from the American systems鈥� performance in Ukraine. In particular, the poor performance of in Ukraine will hopefully result in future improvements. Other about remote maintenance, counter-drone warfare, and are also valuable for the Pacific theater.
• Precedents set in Ukraine benefit Taiwan. The White House鈥檚 successful use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to rapidly deliver Ukraine existing US weapons stocks led the Biden administration to through PDA for the first time ever in 2023.

Myth 6: The US cannot afford to defend allies in both Europe and the Pacific.
 

• American capacity does not need to be a zero-sum game. Defense budgets and manufacturing capacity are not immutable. With sufficient political will, Washington can expand them. Consider that between 1949 and 1991, the US spent an average of 7.63 percent of its GDP on defense to deter one peer adversary. ³ Today the US faces one peer and one near-peer adversary yet spends only 3.4 percent of its GDP on defense. Recent inflation means that the US military鈥檚 real purchasing power is lower than it was a few years ago. US defense spending should rise to meet the challenges the nation faces. One calls for the US to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense. Whether or not this is the correct end target, it is clear that current US defense investment is inadequate for the current threat environment.
• Increased defense investment is a necessity, not an impossibility. Pacific prioritization advocates resign themselves to the belief that the US is either permanently unwilling or unable to grow defense spending and outputs. Defense investment is an investment in security and creates the conditions necessary for national prosperity. This is not to say raising defense investment will be politically or financially painless. But it is a necessary expense to secure America鈥檚 future.
• Defense spending is not among America鈥檚 biggest budget concerns. Increasing the defense budget should not preclude a national conversation about reining in federal spending. Thus far in fiscal year 2024, defense spending only accounts for of the federal budget. Tackling deficits will require addressing the main drivers of the national debt like Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. Social Security already accounts for but could be insolvent within a decade.

Figure 1. Declining Support for an Active US Role in World Affairs

Source: .

Myth 7: Abandoning Europe would preserve public support for American involvement in a confrontation with China.
 

• Domestic support for American involvement abroad does not need to be zero-sum. Pacific prioritizers argue that aiding Ukraine depletes a finite well of public support for committing American resources to overseas wars. But this model is incorrect. The American public is more likely to support a strong foreign policy if policymakers (a) demonstrate that American engagement abroad achieves its goals, such as defeating Russia in Ukraine, and (b) highlight how US leadership supports the security, freedom, and prosperity of all Americans. Washington should not make reactive foreign policy decisions based on polling data. Instead, policymakers should proactively make the case to their constituents that American global leadership is in the US interest.⁴

Figure 2. Diverging Support for Economic and Military Aid to Ukraine 

Source: .

• Arguments against US involvement in Europe may undermine public support for all US involvement abroad. Pivot-to-Asia arguments conveniently provide cover for isolationists whose real goal is American retreat from global leadership. The loudest recent voices against transatlantic engagement have come from the right (see figures 1 and 2). This reflects the trend among right-of-center voters of declining support for broader global engagement.⁵

Conclusion 

The US is in a dangerous era of great power competition as an axis of adversaries, led by Russia and China, seeks to undermine the US-led order. Abandoning key US allies in Europe would hollow out the transatlantic alliance and harm the security and prosperity of the US and its Atlantic and Pacific allies alike.

By examining the myths that underlie arguments in favor of prioritizing the Pacific, policymakers can arrive at a more nuanced and effective approach to the distribution of US hard power.

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