This monthly report from Hudson鈥檚 Zineb Riboua examines Russia鈥檚 growing influence in the Middle East and Africa.
Putin Whistles Past the Graveyard in Syria
At his annual , Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to project strength and authority. He touted Russia鈥檚 economic resilience against sanctions and military success in Ukraine and downplayed longtime Russian ally Bashar al-Assad鈥檚 fall in Syria.
鈥淚 haven鈥檛 yet seen President Assad since he arrived in Moscow, but I plan to. I will definitely speak with him,鈥� Putin told an American journalist. With this statement, Putin sought to (a) minimize the issue, (b) highlight Russia鈥檚 enduring influence in the Middle East, and (c) frame Moscow as a stabilizing power in the region, with Assad鈥檚 fall as another step in its plan.
鈥淵ou want to present what is happening in Syria as a defeat for Russia,鈥� he said. 鈥淚 assure you it is not. We have achieved our goals.鈥�
Why it matters
Putin rejected the prevailing narrative that Assad鈥檚 fall hurts Russia. But the collapse of a long-cultivated ally is a significant blow to Moscow鈥檚 influence. Along with tarnishing Putin鈥檚 image as a reliable ally, the regime鈥檚 collapse raises questions about the future of Russia鈥檚 military foothold in the Middle East. Russia looks set to lose the critical bases that have anchored its presence in the region鈥攁nd served as a launching pad for the Wagner private paramilitary group鈥檚 efforts to expand the Kremlin鈥檚 influence in Africa.
Now Russia has two choices: (1) strike a deal with Syria鈥檚 transition government, or (2) cut its losses and refocus elsewhere. The latter could mean doubling down in Libya or seizing an opportunity in Sudan. Either way, Moscow鈥檚 influence and prestige on the global stage have taken a significant hit.
This opens the door for the United States to reassert leadership, strengthen its alliances, and counter Russian influence in the Middle East and beyond.
Chalkboard Diplomacy: Russia鈥檚 Education Strategy in Burkina Faso
The Washington Post that Russia is expanding its educational and cultural programs in Burkina Faso. Russia also agreed to accept Burkinabe exchange students after France . This underscores Ouagadougou鈥檚 pivot toward Moscow following the 2022 coup that brought Captain Ibrahim Traor茅 to power. With help from Russia鈥檚 Wagner, Traor茅鈥檚 junta has on its Western partners鈥攑articularly France鈥攁nd rolled out the red carpet for Russia.
Facing rising Western sanctions, Russia has reciprocated this enthusiasm. Putin announced in July that Russia had increased its quota for African students by in the last three years. And at the 2024 Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 鈥渢he cooperation between the Russian Federation and African states is becoming increasingly comprehensive and multidimensional.鈥�
Why it matters
Russia, like a spider spinning a web, is positioning itself as the central partner for African nations that wish to break from the West. Educational initiatives, which seek to shape and influence Africa鈥檚 future elites, are more than cultural exchanges鈥攖hey are another thread of Moscow鈥檚 grand geopolitical designs. Russia seeks to nurture a generation of African leaders fluent in Russian culture, politics, and values, ensuring Moscow鈥檚 influence lingers long after the diplomas are handed out.
This approach dates to the Cold War. were educated in Soviet institutions like the prestigious Patrice Lumumba University (now the Peoples鈥� Friendship University of Russia). They would go on to shape their nations鈥� trajectories and maintain ties with Moscow.
While the United States struggles to fully engage with Africa鈥攐ften focusing narrowly on counterterrorism and trade without adequately addressing deeper, long-term partnerships鈥擱ussia is quietly building its influence by fostering personal and institutional ties through education and cultural diplomacy.
Senegal and the Ivory Coast Say Au Revoir
The wave of anti-French sentiment sweeping across West Africa has reached Senegal and the Ivory Coast. In December 2024, Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye was 鈥渙bvious鈥� that French soldiers would soon depart Senegalese soil. 鈥淛ust because the French have been here since the slavery period doesn鈥檛 mean it鈥檚 impossible to do otherwise,鈥� he added. Similarly, Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara of French forces in his end-of-year address.
Paris had already planned to its military presence in West and Central Africa from 2,200 troops to around 600. But France鈥檚 departures from the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Mali signal a clear turning point for Paris鈥檚 alliances in West Africa.
Soon after President Faye鈥檚 statement, Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko 鈥渢he president of the republic has decided to close all foreign military bases.鈥� While the official statement did not explicitly mention France, the implication is obvious. But another foreign power could soon have boots on the ground in Senegal. Paris鈥檚 declining political and military influence in a region historically dominated by Western powers leaves a strategic vacuum that Moscow appears eager to fill.
The , which portrays France and the United States as exploitative neocolonial powers, has resonated in the Sahel and West Africa, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. Russia presents itself as an alternative, offering military support鈥攐ften through the Wagner Group鈥攁longside promises of resource-backed partnerships.
In July 2024, Putin invited African leaders to a summit in St. Petersburg, where they agreed to promote a multipolar world order and combat neocolonialism. the states鈥� commitment 鈥渢o the formation of a just and democratic multipolar world order.鈥�
Why it matters
This rebalancing in West Africa poses significant challenges for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization鈥檚 southern strategy. The Sahel, once central to French and NATO counterterrorism efforts, is becoming a security vacuum. Russia and China have rushed to fill this void, seeing an opportunity to challenge US influence and reshape regional power dynamics in the Mediterranean and Atlantic.
Instability in the Sahel fuels terrorism, jihadism, illegal migration, and trafficking. Each year Jihadist violence kills over in the region, and migrant arrivals in Europe have . France鈥檚 reduced presence and the absence of a coordinated NATO response allow actors like Russia to exploit instability in the region. The absence of US allies and increased presence of adversaries on the continent limits America鈥檚 ability to project power and undermines its efforts to strengthen partnerships with African countries in areas such as counterterrorism.
Libya in the Kremlin鈥檚 Crosshairs
showed Russian cargo planes ferrying military equipment and personnel from Syria to Libya in mid-December, signaling a major shift in Moscow鈥檚 military strategy. A Syrian official confirmed that an II-76 cargo plane from Syria鈥檚 Hmeimim Air Base, heading straight for Libya. This suggests Russia seeks to maintain its military presence in the Mediterranean in the wake of the Assad regime鈥檚 fall.
Russia advanced air-defense assets, including the formidable S-300 and S-400 systems, to bases in eastern Libyan territory controlled by notorious warlord Khalifa Haftar. The country鈥檚 central location and ongoing instability make it an attractive target for Moscow, particularly as challenges in Syria intensify. Still, Russia faces significant opposition from Libyan factions and regional powers, all reluctant to cede control of the gateway to the Mediterranean. The internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and Khalifa Haftar鈥檚 eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) are locked in a power struggle, further complicated by the involvement of militias.
Why it matters
With these deployments, Russia seeks to outmaneuver Western interests and position itself as the dominant force in North Africa. Russia鈥檚 interest in establishing a military presence in Libya is closely tied to its broader strategy of projecting power into Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa through the Mediterranean.
One way that Moscow can gain leverage against the West is by weaponizing migration to create instability on European nations鈥� southern borders. From , Libya hosted approximately 787,000 migrants from 44 nations, a 3 percent increase from the previous quarter. This surge underscores Libya鈥檚 role as a critical transit point for migrants heading to Europe. Russia can exploit this situation to sow discord among European countries as they seek to manage growing waves of migrants.
Libya鈥檚 fragmentation is a quagmire for Russia, which will face difficulty maintaining influence as alliances shift and factions compete. With Moscow also losing ground in Syria, the US has a golden opportunity. By backing the GNU and United Nations鈥搇ed peace efforts, Washington can further limit Russia鈥檚 options in the Mediterranean and bolster regional stability. The US and NATO should seize on this chance.
Russia Turns a Blind Eye to Sudan鈥檚 Famine
Russia鈥檚 recent actions in Sudan are a masterclass in geopolitical cynicism. In November 2024, Moscow vetoed a UN resolution calling for a ceasefire in the country鈥檚 bloody civil war. Moscow insists there is no famine, apparently hoping denial is a substitute for diplomacy or food aid as millions starve.
Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia鈥檚 first deputy permanent representative to the UN, dismissed reports from the Famine Review Committee (FRC) as politically motivated. 鈥淯pon examining the FRC report we couldn鈥檛 [help] but think that the issue of hunger in Sudan is being politicized and exploited to exert pressure on the Sudanese government,鈥� Polyanskiy .
But experts cited by the have accused the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), , of using 鈥渟tarvation tactics鈥� 25 million civilians across the country.
Why it matters
Russia鈥檚 famine denial in Sudan is not just callous. It is a calculated throwback to the Soviet playbook: deny the obvious, reshape the story, and push for Moscow鈥檚 interests. The Kremlin seeks to sidestep international scrutiny, undercut Western and UN relief efforts, and position itself as an anti-West champion for Africa.
Russia鈥檚 actions in Sudan are opportunistic but congruent with Moscow鈥檚 broader strategy to bolster its economy while quietly extending its geopolitical influence. For Moscow, instability is not an obstacle; it is an opportunity. By supporting both sides of the ongoing civil war, Russia hopes to maintain a foothold no matter who wins. The Wagner Group鈥檚 involvement in 鈥攑articularly gold鈥攆urther entrenches the Kremlin鈥檚 position, enabling it to profit from the instability while avoiding direct international scrutiny. Aligning with unstable regimes is central to Russia鈥檚 strategy for securing access to Africa鈥檚 vital resources.
Moscow鈥檚 goals in Sudan are clear: (1) cement Russian influence, (2) derail international peace efforts, and (3) portray itself as an agent of stability鈥攁ll while advancing its economic and military agenda. As the crisis worsens, Putin鈥檚 disinformation strategy deepens the suffering of millions and fractures global unity, paving the way for Moscow to tighten its grip on Africa.
The longer the US and its allies hesitate to secure a ceasefire in Sudan, the greater the chaos Russia will unleash, destabilizing the region, undermining NATO, and accelerating a dangerous shift in global power.