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The Dispatch

India-Pakistan Hostilities Complicate India鈥檚 Diplomatic Options

Will Washington be able to successfully navigate India鈥檚 evolving outlook?

President Donald Trump shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a joint press conference at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, on February 25, 2020. (Prakash Singh via Getty Images)
Caption
President Donald Trump shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a joint press conference at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, on February 25, 2020. (Prakash Singh via Getty Images)

The dust is settling, slowly, from India and Pakistan鈥檚 military collision as a U.S.-brokered ceasefire took hold May 10. The origins of the conflict are clear enough: India sought to severely punish Pakistan for alleged links to a in late April in Kashmir, a region that both countries claim and have previously fought wars over. But the details of the fighting thereafter remain hazy at best, by the two governments鈥� reluctance to admit losses, rampant misinformation on social media, and hypernationalist 鈥渘ews鈥� shows everything from military coups to cross-border invasions on live TV. 

Even without total clarity, what is known about the eruption of hostilities between the two nuclear powers was enough to unnerve world leaders: massive aerial dogfights, relentless shelling, and the deepest strikes into each other鈥檚 states in the last half-century. While confusion reigned on the battlefield, the fighting simultaneously brought into much sharper focus broader trends in the geostrategic environment, especially the dramatic changes reshaping India鈥檚 foreign policy options. 

India has historically held to a strategy of 鈥渘onalignment,鈥� avoiding alliances with great powers to preserve its diplomatic independence. Yet this proud tradition鈥攊nitially designed to protect against the pitfalls of taking sides in the Cold War鈥攈as grown increasingly difficult to sustain in a world increasingly divided again, now by U.S.-China rivalry.

The United States faces a delicate balancing act: how to deepen cooperation with India as their strategic interests converge, while respecting India鈥檚 deeply rooted commitment to diplomatic autonomy over formal alliances.

The evolution of nonalignment.

For a country that had just achieved hard-fought independence from Britain, a receding global superpower, asserting uncompromising independence from鈥攁nd skepticism toward鈥攖he intrigues of the new superpowers was as much an innate reflex of the new republic as a calculated policy decision. 

The approach allowed India to take firm stances on international affairs in seemingly contrary directions. In 1956, for example, India both condemned the Anglo-French-Israeli incursion into Egypt during the Suez Crisis and Soviet intervention in Hungary鈥檚 anti-Soviet uprising. Building on Gandhi鈥檚 moral vision and international fame, India bundled idealistic commitments like support for decolonization, peaceful resolution to disputes, and 鈥渘on-interference鈥� in internal affairs with its nonalignment brand to garner moral authority in a world riven by conflict and international meddling. India鈥檚 approach helped it to punch above its weight globally as a leader among developing nations, instrumental in founding the broader Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a forum which today includes 120 countries. 

India鈥檚 nonalignment brand was so successful, in fact, that some India watchers express that India can鈥檛 shake its association with it, despite shifts in its approach since the policy鈥檚 heyday in the 鈥�50s and 鈥�60s. Pressure from India鈥檚 wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 forced the country to tilt toward the Soviet Union in the later Cold War, despite retaining nonalignment rhetoric. The Soviet Union鈥檚 collapse naturally also forced a redefinition of 鈥渘onalignment鈥濃攔esisting taking a side is hard when one side has disappeared. India shifted to stressing 鈥渟trategic autonomy鈥� instead, suggesting that it could still avoid joining military alliances or picking permanent friends, while being more practical in how it dealt with powerful countries. And in the early- to mid-2000s, 鈥渕ultialignment鈥� became the new buzzword, emphasizing India鈥檚 ability to juggle active relationships with (sometimes conflicting) groups and powers鈥攁n approach that probably wouldn鈥檛 fit with nonalignment鈥檚 original meaning.

U.S. policymakers used to managing groups of friends or foes often become frustrated with what they perceive as stubborn Indian duplicity. To American sensibilities, it鈥檚 scandalous that India can simultaneously play a key role in the Quad鈥攁 grouping of the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan designed to counter Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific鈥攁s well as in and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, two bodies that include China and Russia as founding members and aim to act as counterweights to Western-led institutions. At its worst, American policymakers complain, India鈥檚 nonalignment tradition is simply an excuse to do whatever it wants, whenever it wants, with whomever it wants鈥攚ithout regard to any other relationships.   

Still, there is a certain respect for such dogged insistence on one鈥檚 own interests and independence that India鈥檚 approach can command even among those who have felt crossed by it. Henry Kissinger once Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for her perceived intransigence with Richard Nixon. Decades later, however, he her statesmanship and expressed for India鈥檚 unyielding strategic mindset that once drove him up the wall. Whether one admires or resents India鈥檚 nonalignment tradition, America鈥檚 ability to effectively engage with it hinges on both nations鈥� capacity to adapt nimbly to the world鈥檚 changes.

A clarifying moment.

Nothing clarifies geopolitics quite like military confrontation, which cuts through diplomatic pretenses to show who really stands where, and why. India鈥檚 clash with Pakistan is no different.

Most obviously, the conflict showcased how much new Cold War-like dynamics have seeped into the ever-persistent Indo-Pakistani rivalry. A about the conflict as a litmus test of Chinese military technologies鈥� prospects against Western equivalents unmistakably echoes Cold War technological rivalries, with one New York Times headline that 鈥淚ndia vs. Pakistan Is Also U.S. vs. China When It Comes to Arms Sales鈥� as each South Asian country has rejigged its weapons suppliers in recent years. Much has been made of U.S. officials鈥� that a Chinese-made J-10 jet from Pakistan shot down at least one of India鈥檚 French-made Rafale fighter jets. No less notable is India鈥檚 of its successful use of kamikaze drones manufactured in India using technology from Israel, one of America鈥檚 closest allies. That level of collaboration is particularly remarkable given that India鈥檚 nonaligned posture historically strongly favored Palestine over Israel.

Diplomatically, too, the onset of the crisis further solidified years of growing U.S.-India and China-Pakistan ties, respectively. Many officials in Delhi took the robust support expressed by both and in the wake of the Pahalgam terrorist attack as approval for a strong retaliation against Pakistan, a country whose strategic relevance to the United States has diminished still further since the United States鈥� withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan in 2021. China has meanwhile spearheaded support for Pakistan in the face of India鈥檚 response, confirming that the country is an 鈥渋ronclad friend and all-weather strategic cooperative partner,鈥� not to mention a leading of Chinese investment and advanced .

India finds itself on the other side of this conflict needing to recalibrate its fiercely independent diplomatic tradition. The world鈥攁nd especially its region鈥攊s rapidly realigning around Sino-American rivalry. Meanwhile, India continues its ascent as a global power in its own right, evolving into the kind of major player its nonalignment principles initially cautioned against allying with. Recent conflict dynamics are a case in point: India鈥檚 conventional and economic over its fragile archenemy appears decisive, with India dwarfing Pakistan鈥檚 GDP by an order of magnitude. However, its neighbor to the north maintains an economy now the size of India鈥檚, unambiguously supports its archnemesis in conflict, and still harbors territorial disputes with India of its own. These realities鈥攁nd emerging allegations that Beijing direct intelligence and air defense support to Islamabad in advance of the clash鈥攚ould seem to demand still closer collaboration with the United States, fast.

Given India鈥檚 diplomatic tradition, these facts won鈥檛 translate into the typical alliance model that the United States is accustomed to and longs to see from the only country with the long-term potential to counterbalance China in the Indo-Pacific. It鈥檚 not just that India鈥檚 prior history of colonialism grates against such a commitment. Equally, India鈥檚 forward-looking ambition to become an independent pole of an emerging multipolar world makes it allergic to becoming one among the U.S.鈥檚 many allies, expecting instead a unique working relationship of equals, commensurate with its status as the world鈥檚 largest nation and one of its oldest civilizations. If India鈥檚 legacy of nonalignment inhibits its consistency in growing the U.S.-India relationship, America鈥檚 lack of recent experience partnering with a peer power complicates its ability to engage well with India. The best chance of balancing the Indo-Pacific in the 21st century may ride on how well, or poorly, each nation addresses these tendencies.

The violence we witnessed in early May should drive home the need for India and the U.S. to collaborate more closely. But the aftermath of the conflict has demonstrated how a lack of attentiveness threatens to derail that imperative: The Quad its opportunity to express support to India on a comparable level to China鈥檚 support for Pakistan; India to even mention the United States鈥� role in brokering a ceasefire in its initial public statement, underscoring the country鈥檚 insistence on strategic independence; and President Trump鈥檚 repeated descriptions of the negotiation process have been deeply to India鈥檚 nonalignment tradition. Much as the recent violence has highlighted the need for greater U.S.-India cooperation, there remains much space for improvement.