On May 22, China鈥檚 ruling Communist Party acted to end the autonomy that Hong Kong had enjoyed since its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Hong Kong had been promised fifty years as a special, self-governing region inside the People鈥檚 Republic not just by Deng Xiaoping personally but by the provisions of the treaty that effectuated the city鈥檚 transfer from the UK to the PRC. To be sure, Beijing had been tightening its grip on Hong Kong and its governing institutions for years but, until last week, it never attacked it frontally. Why now?
Beijing鈥檚 move will not be cost-free. It will now have to be far more open in its use of force in suppressing millions of democracy-minded Hong Kongers. And then there are the economic costs. Hong Kong鈥檚 assets, real and financial, are owned in substantial part by state enterprises and well-connected mainlanders. Lower prices on the Hong Kong bourse and the dissolution of its rule of law will not only cost the already debilitated PRC economy, it will constrain, and maybe even destroy, Hong Kong鈥檚 capacity to be a vital source of international capital for the mainland.
But the main casualty will be the so-called 鈥渙ne country-two systems鈥� scheme by which Beijing had hoped to lure Taiwan into its fold. From now on, no Taiwanese will ever be able to take seriously Beijing鈥檚 vows to protect their rights. Nor should the rest of the world. The treaty which enshrined Hong Kong鈥檚 special status was, in fact, deposited in the United Nations, and therefore is a matter for all UN members. The Chinese Communist Party鈥檚 unilateral abrogation of the treaty speaks to the credibility of any international commitment the Party has made or will make.
Deng Xiaoping鈥檚 epochal decision in 1978 to 鈥渙pen up and reform鈥� China鈥檚 economy quickly led to a show of force throughout the Chinese-speaking world. Deng wanted the moribund People鈥檚 Republic to emulate the high-growth economies of Sinophone Asia鈥擳aiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. He also wanted to enlist the rich and successful Chinese communities in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Billions of dollars in investments poured into the PRC from the other parts of Sinophone Asia, accompanied by the experience and expertise that overseas Chinese had acquired through long familiarity with capitalism鈥檚 ways. This was a behemoth in the making and the world-transforming potential of 鈥淕reater China鈥� was sobering.
Why, then, didn鈥檛 the Communist Party not just sit back and wait for it to happen? In the 1990s, the affairs of Sinophone Asia were certainly moving in Beijing鈥檚 direction. In 1992, Taiwan and China had seemed to reach a so-called 鈥渃onsensus,鈥� though no one anywhere was quite sure what 鈥渙ne China鈥� meant. The reversion of Hong Kong in 1997 was widely welcomed, too.
It is alleged that Chinese strategic culture is uniquely endowed with patience, but Xi has been unwilling to play the long game. Xi has amassed unprecedented power on the claim that centralized and continuous Party leadership was needed to fulfill the 鈥済reat rejuvenation鈥� of the Chinese Nation. He has since sped-up the PRC鈥檚 many-faceted bid to establish a New Sinophone Order dominated by Beijing. As the intensifying 鈥渃ampaigns鈥� and repression and mass atrocities inside today鈥檚 PRC empire show, the Party must 鈥渟truggle鈥濃擷i鈥檚 favorite word鈥攁gainst many powerful loci of opposition. Xi may believe he is realizing a 鈥渙ne China鈥� on the Party鈥檚 own terms, but, instead, his actions have been driving the offshore components of Sinophone Asia away from the mainland.
On Taiwan, polling in February indicated that more than eighty percent of that island nation鈥檚 people think of themselves as Taiwanese, not Chinese. Beijing鈥檚 military build-up and incessant harassment of Taiwan have been met with more American security assistance and increases in Taipei鈥檚 own defense budget. Popular support for Taiwan throughout the world is also growing, inspired not only by Taiwan鈥檚 bravery in the face of the PRC, but also by the superb performance of its democratic system in the global health crisis that was exacerbated by China鈥檚 one-party dictatorship.
As for Hong Kong, millions there have turned out in pro-democracy demonstrations and a deeply-rooted sense of separate identity is surging. The young especially are defining themselves not as Chinese but as Hong Kongese, and there is widespread advocacy that they would be better off independent of the PRC all together.
All this is a reminder that 鈥淐hina鈥� is not the same as the People鈥檚 Republic headquartered in Beijing and, indeed, that its political potentials are far greater than the Chinese Communist Party鈥檚 bid to dominate it. The most consequential, albeit often underappreciated, force in driving the modern history of Sinophone Asia, has been the interrelationship between its so-called 鈥渃ore鈥� and its 鈥減eriphery.鈥� Indeed, since the late nineteenth century, if not earlier, the Sinophone core has drawn repeatedly on the many smaller polities of the periphery for ideas and energy. For one example, Sun Yat-sen鈥檚 advocacy of a Chinese Republic ultimately freed modern China from imperial control because of the strong support for it in the overseas polities and networks of Sinophone Asia. Likewise, Deng鈥檚 efforts to revivify the People鈥檚 Republic鈥攁nd to save Communist Party rule鈥攚ould not have been possible without the know-how and aid of Greater China.
Today, the Communist Party under Xi has resolved to reverse this modern dynamic and assert its own imperial writ. And this has created a profound dilemma: Because Beijing鈥檚 tyranny and aggression have transformed the periphery into a major obstacle to the PRC鈥檚 own grand ambitions, the Party leadership now believes that its own self-preservation depends on quashing that opposition. The Party knows that the existence of compelling counter-models to it along the Sinophone periphery are a danger to its hold on power inside the People鈥檚 Republic itself. It is an historic gamble: Xi鈥檚 ongoing bid to subjugate Sinophone Asia to communist rule is threatening the very Asian peace and economic potential which made China鈥檚 emergence since 1978 possible in the first place.