Last week the Israeli Air Force bombed Syrian military and security positions in retaliation for an operation on the Syrian-Israeli border in the Golan Heights. Four Israeli soldiers were wounded when Hezbollah attacked their Jeep. Hezbollah it seems was looking to kidnap them. This time they failed, but, said Hezbollah sources, 鈥淲e are sure we will succeed in the near future.鈥�
Maybe. If so, it is sure to resonate throughout the Middle East. The last time Hezbollah kidnapped Israeli soldiers it touched off a monthlong conflict in the summer of 2006. After the devastation Hezbollah suffered, hundreds of its elite troops dead and billions of dollars鈥� worth of damage done, the party鈥檚 general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, said that had he known how the Israelis would respond, he never would have taken their soldiers in the first place. So now that Nasrallah knows what Israeli countermeasures look like, what could he possibly be thinking?
The answer is that it鈥檚 not Nasrallah calling the shots. Hezbollah is Iran鈥檚 long arm in Lebanon. Accordingly, its activities on Israel鈥檚 northern border, taken together with the maneuvers of other Iranian allies on the southern frontier鈥攚eapons transfers to Gaza-based militants and their rocket fire on Israel鈥攁re evidence of a new Iranian boldness. Perhaps as a consequence of the interim nuclear agreement Iran struck last November with the P5+1 powers (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), Tehran imagines that the White House will rein in Jerusalem. But if that鈥檚 what Obama is advising, Israel isn鈥檛 paying attention. Israel鈥檚 aggressive defense suggests that if Iran keeps pushing, it may soon find itself in open warfare.
For the last year and a half, Israel has kept Iran鈥檚 allies on its borders almost totally quiet. The 2006 war that many, including Hezbollah, believed Jerusalem had lost served instead to reestablish the credibility of Israeli deterrence. To the south, Israel鈥檚 November 2012 Pillar of Defense campaign in Gaza left Hamas reeling, while the Syrian civil war and the sectarian furies it unleashed loosened the bonds that tied Iran to its chief Palestinian asset. Even as the conflict in Syria burned, Israel was careful to show that it had no stake in the outcome and would stand aside so long as neither Assad nor the rebels tried to involve it鈥攐r transfer weapons to Hezbollah.
Israel has repeatedly targeted weapons convoys moving strategic, or game-changing, arms from Syria to Lebanon, typically striking at their point of origin rather than their destination. The reasoning seems to be that with Assad under fire already and reluctant to open another front against Israel, it鈥檚 advisable to hit there rather than in Lebanon, where Hezbollah might be compelled to act to save face. Nonetheless, on February 24 the Israeli Air Force struck a Hezbollah position in Lebanon鈥檚 Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah鈥檚 retaliatory campaign has included at least four border incidents. In one of them, Hezbollah fighters crossed several hundred yards into Israeli territory and planted IEDs.
Until last week, Israeli responses had typically been measured鈥攆iring artillery rounds into Syrian territory, for instance. The decision to target Assad鈥檚 forces now鈥攁s Israel did not do during the 2006 war, when Damascus kept transferring supplies to Hezbollah鈥攊s something of a game-changer itself, and needs to be seen in the context of Israel鈥檚 southern front.
Earlier in March, Israeli naval commandos boarded a Panamanian-flagged vessel, the Klos C, in the Red Sea carrying arms destined for Gaza, most likely intended for Palestinian Islamic Jihad but undoubtedly with the acquiescence of Hamas. If Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hoped that the interdiction of Iranian arms was something like a public relations coup that would change the White House鈥檚 mind about its bargaining partner in Tehran, the administration paid little heed. 鈥淚t鈥檚 entirely appropriate to continue to pursue the possibility of reaching a resolution on the nuclear program,鈥� White House spokesman Jay Carney said after the arms seizure.
However, the fact that the administration showed itself unmoved was perhaps the key factor in Jerusalem鈥檚 strategic messaging campaign, for Washington wasn鈥檛 Jerusalem鈥檚 only intended audience. The Israeli government was also signaling to its own citizens. The message was twofold: First, Iran is a strategic threat, not merely because of its nuclear weapons program, but also because of its support for the axis of resistance on Israel鈥檚 borders, a message underscored when Palestinian Islamic Jihad rained dozens of missiles on Israeli towns. Second, the Obama administration isn鈥檛 greatly bothered by the fact that Iran doesn鈥檛, as the president put it, 鈥渙perate in a responsible fashion.鈥�
As Defense Minister Moshe Ya鈥檃lon said last week: 鈥淲e had thought the one who should lead the campaign against Iran is the United States. But at some stage the United States entered into negotiations with them, and, unhappily, when it comes to negotiating at a Persian bazaar, the Iranians were better. .鈥夆€�.鈥夆€�. Therefore, on this matter, we have to behave as though we have nobody to look out for us but ourselves.鈥�
If the weapons seizure was meant to drive home to Israelis that they鈥檙e on their own when it comes to Iran, then the raid on Syrian targets last week was intended to reassure them. Jerusalem showed that it will stop Iran鈥檚 allies on its borders, and also that it鈥檚 willing to go to the source鈥攕tates that sponsor terrorist war, like Syria and, if the clerical regime continues to escalate, perhaps Iran, too.