Bubakar Shekau declared that the 鈥淛ihad has begun in July, 2010. His Nigeria-based movement, known to outsiders as Boko Haram鈥� but among its members as "Jama鈥檃tu Ahlisunnah Lida鈥檃wati Wal-Jihad," subsequently emerged as Africa鈥檚 most violent insurgent group. Since Boko Haram鈥檚 铿乺st attack in September 2010, the group has murdered more than 4,000 Christians, government o铿僣ials, Muslim leaders, and civilians in Nigeria. In 2013, for the 铿乺st time, Boko Haram gained control over more than ten municipalities in northeastern Nigeria.1 Their alarming expansion prompted President Good luck Jonathan to declare a State of Emergency resulting in military operations against Boko Haram鈥檚 safe havens in Nigeria鈥檚 borderlands with Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The army鈥檚 efforts succeeded only temporarily: Boko Haram reemerged at the end of 2013 and has carried out massacres of civilians on a greater scale than any time since the start of the insurgency.
In 2011, a faction of al-Qaeda-trained Boko Haram members formed Jama鈥檃tu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Supporters of the Muslims in the Land of Black Africans), more commonly known as 鈥淎nsaru.鈥� Ansaru鈥檚 amir declared that Shekau was 鈥渋nhumane鈥� for murdering defectors from Boko Haram to Ansaru and un铿乼 to lead his own organization. On an operational level, the creation of Ansaru was part of former Al Qaeda commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar鈥檚 strategy to leave al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb鈥檚 (AQIM) North African zone of operations and 鈥渟pread throughout the entire Sahara.鈥�2 Like Belmokhtar, Ansaru has stated that it would target foreigners and foreign interests and the Nigerian government, but not Nigerian Muslims and Christians save for instances of 鈥渟elf-defense.鈥�
Since 2011, both Boko Haram and Ansaru have risen to prominence among in- ternational jihadi groups with alarming speed. Western analysis of the two groups and their ideologies, however, is still lacking. The U.S. State Department and the British Home O铿僣e designated both groups terrorist organizations years after Boko Haram鈥檚 铿乺st attack and Ansarau鈥檚 铿乺st kidnapping. Few Western journalists and national security professionals are familiar with these two movements鈥� origins and ideologies. Consequently, the Western media frequently confuses the two groups. Such was evident in March of 2013 when the press misleadingly reported that Boko Haram kidnapped and murdered seven foreign engineers in Bauchi in March 2013, when it was actually Ansaru. Similarly, the Western media reported that Boko Haram was behind the UN Headquarters bombing in August, 2011, but the network of militants who carried out the attack were more closely tied to Ansaru and AQIM. Such misrepresentations cause confusion as to the identity of different Islamist players, what their ideological objectives are, and what to expect from them in the future.
Three questions concerning the groups鈥� rise remain unanswered:
# Why did Muhammad Yusuf鈥檚 brand of Sala铿乻m gain such wide traction in northeastern Nigeria from 2002 to 2009?
# How was Abubakar Shekau able transform Yusuf鈥檚 ideology into the basis for a jihadist insurgency in northern Nigeria after Yusuf 鈥檚 death in 2009?
# Under what circumstances did Ansaru develop its pan-West African ideology and opposition to Shekau when it formed in 2011?
This article 铿乶ds answers to these questions in the ideologies of Yusuf, Shekau and Mamman Nur. The article emphasizes the in铿倁ence of Saudi Arabia鈥檚 brand of Sala铿乻m,known as wahabbism, on Boko Haram鈥檚 ideology and the role Algerian jihadists played in in铿倁encing Boko Haram鈥檚 understanding of jihad itself.
Who Was Yusuf ?
Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf was born in Northeastern Nigeria鈥檚 Yobe State in 1970. As a youth, he experimented with the leading Islamist currents of the day. Among them was Ibrahim al-Zakzaky鈥檚 Iranian-funded Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN).3 The IMN drew ideological inspiration from the thought of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, particularly Hassan al-Banna and Said Qutb, who revived the concept of an Islamic State governed by Sharia Law in the 铿乺st half of the twentieth century.4 Al-Zakzaky,however, incorporated Khomeinist doctrine into the IMN's ideology. His organization imitated Iran鈥檚 anti-American rhetoric and trained a paramilitary wing for 鈥減roviding security to members of the movement鈥� modeled after Iran鈥檚 Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah.5 Muhammad Yusuf, however, broke away from al-Zakzaky in the 1980s after he and other Nigerian Sunni Muslims began to believe the IMN had a 鈥淪hi鈥檃 agenda鈥� that included the veneration of Iranian leaders and the observance of Shi鈥檃 religious rights.
Yusuf and other Nigerian Sunnis began to oppose the IMN in part because Saudi Arabia began funding Sala铿乻t groups in Africa in the 1980s to counter Iran鈥檚 growing in铿倁ence on the continent.6 Years after Yusuf鈥檚 departure from the IMN, he stated that Nigeria had 鈥淪unni groups that started as Muslim Brothers, but ended up turning into a Shi鈥檃 sect.鈥�7 He added that one of the causes for division among Muslims in Nigeria was that鈥渟ome 铿乬ht as Shi鈥檃, others as Su铿� and others as a mixture of everything.鈥�8 Yusuf would later come to believe that only Muslims should follow 鈥渢rue Sala铿乻ts鈥� and all others were in铿乨els.9
Two of the Sala铿乻t groups that emerged in northern Nigeria in the 1980s that Yusuf joined included Jama鈥檃tul Tajdid Islam (Movement for the Revival of Islam), or 鈥淛TI,鈥� and Jama鈥檃tu Izalatul Bid鈥檃 wa Ikamatu Sunna (Movement for the Removal of Innovation and Reestablishment of Sunni Islam), or 鈥淚zala.鈥� In 1994, Yusuf became the Borno State amir of JTI, which had been formed in Kano.10
That same year, JTI activists reportedly beheaded a Christian trader who allegedly used a page of the Koran as tissue paper. JTI partisans responded to the offense by parading the impaled head on the streets of Kano, resulting in a wave of animosity between Muslims and Christians that has persisted until the present day.11 JTI was comprised of radicalized IMN members and, like al-Zakzaky鈥檚 movement, rejected the secular Nigerian government as well as the northern Nigerian Hausa Muslim leaders who worked with the government. Unlike the IMN, however, the JTI followed Saudi-Arabian Sala铿乻t doctrine, not Shiism or the pan-Islamic ideology of the Iranian Revolution.
Later, in the 1990s and 2000s, Yusuf became a铿僱iated with the Izala movement, which subsumed JTI in 1999. He also studied under the prominent Saudi- trained imam Sheikh Jafa鈥檃r Adam.12 By 2002, however, Yusuf himself had grown in prominence and openly challenged Jafa鈥檃r Adam in sermons about Sala铿乻t doctrine. In 2002 Yusuf also became the Borno representative on Sheikh Ibrahim Datti Ahmed鈥檚 Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria that supported Yusuf and his expanding followership. Datti Ahmed鈥檚 organization sought to Islamize Northern Nigeria. In 2000, Ahmed stated that Muslims were 鈥渞eady to go to war鈥� if his version of Sharia Law was not followed.13 In time, however Yusuf and others in the Supreme Council became dissatis铿乪d with the implementation of Sharia law in Nigeria. Consequently, Yusuf and other members formed a new movement called Ahl-Sunna wal Jamma (Companions of the Prophet). Locally, the new group took on the title of the 鈥淣igerian Taliban鈥� or 鈥淵usu铿亂a鈥� (Followers of Yusuf).14
In 2004, Yusuf 鈥檚 disagreements with Jafa鈥檃r Adam over Sala铿乻t doctrine also began to surface. In a series of sermons delivered in Mosques in northern Nigeria, both men debated Sala铿� doctrine.15 The most contentious issues were Yusuf 鈥檚 bans on Western education and employment in Nigeria鈥檚 secular government. Yusuf argued that boko, or the Western education that British colonial administrators brought to northern Nigeria, including agriculture, biology, chemistry, engineering, geography, medicine, physics, and English language, were haram, or prohibited for Muslims. Yusuf also contended that the Nigerian educational system was itself haram because it mixed men and women in the same classrooms.16
Jafa鈥檃r Adam argued that if Nigerian Muslims followed Yusuf鈥檚 bans and rejected Western education and refused to serve in the government, then 鈥淧agan [Christian] policemen would kill and injure Muslims, and when taken to hospitals pagan doctors and nurses would attend to them.鈥�17 The disagreement became personal, as Adam disparagingly labeled Yusuf a 鈥渟o-called Islamic scholar.鈥� In Yusuf's sermons, however, he argued that Western institutions were corrupting unto themselves stating:
Anyone who reads history, except a fool, knows that the Europeans handed over secular education to the missionaries. The missionaries incorporated into the curriculum of Western education the belief systems and values of Christianity. But we have said again and again that every Christian teaching regarding God and the universe is completely and fundamentally different from Islamic revelation. In fact it is not Islam and has nothing to do with Islam.18
In his arguments against Western education, Yusuf cited the work of a prominent Saudi Wahabbist scholar: Global, Foreign and Colonialist Schools: Their History and Dangers by Bakr bin Abdullah Abu Zayd.19 According to Abu Zayd, European colonialists introduced secular education into Islamic societies as a 鈥渃amou铿俛ged conspiracy鈥� in order to maintain hegemony over Muslim societies. The aim of such hegemony was to corrupt Islamic morals with Western liberal norms, replace gender roles with permissive sexual mores, and undermine communal identities built on Sala铿乻t notions of piety and righteousness. Abu Zayd鈥檚 in铿倁ence on Yusuf鈥檚 thinking is undeniable. Yusuf stated in his sermons:
European Scholars came and completely changed the history of Islam, claiming that even the Prophet of God came not to establish Islam or a political State, but to 铿乬ht a tribal war. As such, they abolished the Caliphate and confused the unintelligent and unfaithful ... When Europeans were withdrawing from most Muslim countries and handing over power to the citizens, they separated religion from politics, arguing that religion has no role in the administration of political power. This became the faith of those who took power from the colonialists. They insisted on the secular nature of the contemporary state and established democracy and human rights of all sorts in different places. Islamic 铿俛gs and symbols were replaced with national 铿俛gs and symbols. The Shari鈥檃, Qur鈥檃n and Sunna were replaced with secular law.20
Yusuf believed that as a result of 鈥渢he Europeans destroying Islam and its values . . . the Europeans created the situation in which we [Nigerian Muslims] 铿乶d ourselves in today.鈥� Yusuf described that situation as one where a formerly prosperous northern Nigeria that 鈥渂etrayed God鈥� was 鈥渧isited upon by poverty, jealousy, fear, and Muslim chiefs who are also wicked politicians.鈥�21
Borno State, the home of Boko Haram鈥檚 鈥淚bn Tamiyya Headquarters鈥� and Yobe State, Yusuf鈥檚 birthplace, formed part of what was once an ethnic Kanuri-led Islamic Caliphate that existed from around 1,000 A.D. until the and of the 19th century. The Caliphate, known as the Kanem Empire and, its successor, the Borno Empire, spanned from present-day Nigeria to Libya and had diplomatic and trade relations with other states as distant as Ottoman Turkey.22 The social, political and economic fabric of the former Caliphate in Borno, however, was fundamentally transformed following the French colonization of present-day northern Cameroon, southern Niger, western Chad, and the British colonization of Nigeria. Modern changes in the society became cemented with the amalgamation of southern and northern Nigeria at the beginning of the 21st Century.
Boko Haram has maintained that all of these developments were for the worse. Among their grievances against the legacies of Western imperialism are the economic rise of southern Nigeria through its trade relations with the United Kingdom and the West; the economic decline of northern Nigeria that resulted from the obsolescence of overland Saharan trade and pilgrimage routes due to maritime and air travel; the arrival of Christianity in northern Nigeria in the 20th century that 鈥渄iluted鈥� the Muslim identity of Borno and northern Nigeria; the growing prominence of the English language that superseded Arabic language learning and marginalized the traditional Arabic-speaking Muslim religious intellectuals of northern Nigeria; and the emergence of a Nigerian government that has 鈥渆mbezzled money鈥� and had security forces who 鈥渂rought to [Borno] not just HIV and AIDs, but corruption, extortion and torture.鈥�23
The appeal of Yusuf鈥檚 message has an ethnic dimension as well. His followers in the Borno and Yobe States and his fellow ethnic Kanuris are particularly receptive to his grievances against the West鈥檚 legacy in Nigeria. Kanuris not only believe that they were the inheritors of the Caliphate in Borno, but also that they were the 铿乺st ethnic group in the country to fully embrace Islam. As a result, they regard themselves as the standard bearers of the Muslim faith in Nigeria. According to Yusuf, Shekau and Nur, the ethnic Fulani and Hausa Muslim leadership of northern Nigeria, who were closely tied the Nigerian government, sold out Nigeria鈥檚 Muslims for secularism and democracy. Yusuf argued that the traditional leader of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim religious establishment in Nigeria, the sultan of Sokoto should be called only the 鈥渟arkin鈥� of Sokoto, meaning 鈥渃hief鈥� in Hausa, and not the 鈥渟arkin鈥� of Muslims, since the sultan accepted the legitimacy of Nigeria鈥檚 non-Islamic form of government.24 Yusuf believed that the Nigerian government and the Muslim ruling class needed to be replaced with a new government of Sala铿乻ts:
We follow the ideology of the Sala铿乻ts and any fatwa issued by a Sala铿乻t scholar. No matter how important an Islamic scholar is, we need to know if he is guided by Sala铿乻t principles before we accept such a scholar. As a group, we will not accept personal interpretations, opinions and judgments. Every teaching of a scholar must be supported by the writings and teachings of Sala铿乻t scholars.25
Yusuf鈥檚 teachings captivated a wide audience in northern Nigeria most of all because he reinforced the perception that Western education corrupted Islamic morals, secularized Muslim leaders and perpetuated Western hegemony over Muslims. He furthermore spoke to simmering resentments towards the Nigerian government in claiming that it was a present-day embodiment of the old colonial order. Yusuf was therefore able to pin all of the economic, social and political troubles that people in northeastern Nigeria faced on the Nigerian government. Yusuf also took this ideology a step further by sending dozens of his followers to Algeria and Mauritania in the early 2000s to 鈥済ain the strength to succeed鈥� in jihad in Nigeria through training with AQIM.26
From Yusuf to Shekau: The Transition to Jihad
In 2007, Yusuf's ideological rival, Jafa鈥檃r Adam, was assassinated outside of his mosque in Kano. Though the perpetrators were never caught, some journalists suspected that Yusuf or his followers were behind the murder.27 Yusuf鈥檚 accountability for the crime notwithstanding, he consequently became even more prominent among young Islamic clerics in northern Nigeria.
Toward the end of the 2000s, Yusuf supplemented his two main prohibitions with others modeled after the Taliban in Afghanistan. He forbade participation in sports because it violated the Sala铿乻t principle that Muslims should not develop affection for non-Muslims, such as exceptional athletes. Yusuf also banned watching movies, which he claimed cast Muslims in the role of hateful villains and non-Muslims in the role of the lovable hero.28 Yusuf also began to identify with the leading jihadists of the post-2001 era鈥攎aking him one of the 铿乺st Sala铿乻t-Jihadist ideologues in northern Nigeria. Whereas previous generations of Islamist leaders in northern Nigeria, like al-Zakzaky, looked to Muslim Brotherhood leaders or the Iranian Islamic Revolution鈥檚 leaders as models to emulate, Yusuf looked towards al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Yusuf stated in 2009 that, 鈥淎ll Islamic scholars who undermine Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna and Osama Bin Laden are not authentic Islamic scholars.鈥� Yusuf had a particularly potent admiration for Algerian Islamists. In the same speech he stated that:
We are yet to establish a pure Sunni Islamic sect that will be ready to take on ignorance and secularism. The few we have that are functioning are al-Qaeda and the Taliban, whose ideology and theological foundations are purely Sunni in nature. Finally, we have other groups emerging in Algeria, all of them have missions committed to the spread of Islam and I hope you understand all these.29
The in铿倁ence of Algerian Islamism on Yusuf鈥檚 thinking cannot be understated. According to the prominent imam, Muhammad Auwal al-Bani of Zaria, Kaduna:
Yusuf had listened to some leaders of the Algerian Islamist insurgency pronounce a fatwa that prohibited the militants from attending schools and working for the government. Besides having been rejected by the vast majority of Algerian scholars, the fatwa was rooted in the speci铿乧 experience of the Algerian civil war of the 1990s between the military government and armed Islamist cells operating from the mountains. Yusuf blindly absorbed it and applied it to Nigeria.30
Despite ongoing insurgencies in Somalia with al-Shabaab and Iraq with al-Qaeda, Yusuf primarily discussed the Algerian experience in his sermons. Yusuf would refer, for example, to the Algerian military鈥檚 cancellation of democratic elections that the Islamists won in 1991 and to the amnesty that members of the Sala铿乻t Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), accepted in the mid-2000s. Both developments divided the country鈥檚 main Islamist group and effectively ended the insurgency in Algeria.31 As a result, Yusuf, and later Shekau, have stated that no reconciliation could be reached with the Nigerian government unless the country is ruled by a Sala铿乻t and Sharia is the law of the land. Citing the Algerian example, Yusuf said in 2009 that:
In Algeria, they tried to introduce democracy. But when they realized democracy was anti-Islam and anti-God, they came back to the way of Shari鈥檃. They formed an Islamic Jihadist group that was initially made up of more than 50,000 people. But when the group refused to follow the way of Shari鈥檃, the way of Allah, their numbers declined drastically.32
His admiration for the Algerian Islamist model notwithstanding, Yusuf did not instruct his followers to engage in a 鈥渏ihad鈥� against the Nigerian government or security forces. While Yusuf and his followers held extreme views, their attacks on the Nigerian security forces were sporadic and were never part of a broader insurgency. Yusuf went so far as to claim that 鈥渁n Islamic system of government should be established in Nigeria, and if possible all over the world, but through preaching the faith (诲补飞补鈥檃).鈥�33 In preparation for an inevitable con铿俰ct with the government, Yusuf told his followers: 鈥淚f there is not enough strength to ensure that a Muslim becomes the leader, then two things must be done: Muslims should proceed on a hijra or search for the strength to succeed.鈥�34
The former is precisely what several hundred of his followers did in 2003, when they left mainstream society and established a community called 鈥淎fghanistan鈥� in Kanamma, Yobe State. The community refused to follow local ordinances and frequently clashed with the local police. In the 铿乶al clash in late 2003, Yusuf鈥檚 followers raided several police stations, but the police responded with su铿僣ient force to put down the rebellion, destroy the encampment and prevent the community from forming again. The incident compelled Sheikh Datti Ahmed to praise Yusuf鈥檚 followers: the 鈥淣igerian Taliban鈥� moniker was born.35
Yusuf nonetheless believed violent jihad鈥攁s opposed the concept of jihad as a form of self-discipline鈥攚as ultimately the solution for Nigeria鈥檚 Muslims. He told his followers:
The only thing that can stop the killing of Muslims and the insults against their Prophet is Jihad. However, the group must exercise patience until there is the strength to carry out the jihad. We are for jihad, and our jihad is to put an end to democracy, to western education and western civilization. The Jihad is intended to make Muslims return to our basics and the original state of Islam.
Yusuf urged followers not to fall in the 鈥渢rap鈥� that 鈥渢he Europeans conspired to hide from Muslims about the true meaning of Jihad.鈥� He said the Europeans had
separated religion from politics, limited religion to the private sphere and argued that religion should be excluded from the public domain because religion is about a private affair between the adherent and his God. European-educated Muslims returned home only to confuse other Muslims, claiming that democracy is compatible with Islam and Jihad should only be for self-control.36
Yusuf鈥檚 death at the hands of the security forces in an extrajudicial killing during clashes between the government and Yusuf 鈥檚 followers in Borno State in July2009 led to a transition in which Yusuf鈥檚 notoriously more militant鈥攁nd feared鈥攄eputy, Abubakar Shekau, assumed leadership of the movement. Moreover, dozens of Yusuf鈥檚 followers 铿俥d Nigeria to train with AQIM in the Sahel to avenge Yusuf鈥檚 death. Some of Yusuf鈥檚 followers believed that Shekau, against Yusuf鈥檚 better instincts, ordered the very attack that resulted in Yusuf鈥檚 death. The violence back铿乺ed and led to scores of Boko Haram deaths, and hundreds of arrests.37 These AQIM-trained followers, who questioned Shekau鈥檚 judgment, would later be inclined to join Ansaru as an alternative to following Shekau.
Shekau nonetheless played on the anger of Yusuf鈥檚 followers who remained in Borno State and their desire for revenge against the government for killing Yusuf.38 Shekau sought to ignite the Jihad that Yusuf only spoke of in ideological terms. Whereas Yusuf praised Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and followed the history of Algerian jihadists, Shekau overtly reached out to al-Qaeda and implemented its model of Jihad for Yusuf鈥檚 former followers.39 In his 铿乺st video statement released in July 2010, Shekau said that as Yusuf鈥檚 deputy he would now become a leader in Yusuf鈥檚 place and addressed his message to 鈥渓eaders of al-Qaeda and its a铿僱iated groups in Algeria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen.鈥� He offered his
condolences on behalf of the mujahideen in Nigeria to the mujahideen in general, in particular to those in the Islamic State of Iraq, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya Al-Libi, Abu Abdullah Al-Muhajir, the Emir of the Islamic State in Somalia, the Emir of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Emir of the Mujahideen in Pakistan, in Chechnya, Kashmir, Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, and our religious clerics whom I did not mention.
Shekau also extended Yusuf鈥檚 previous anti-Western position to a particular hatred of the United States stating: 鈥淒o not think jihad is over. Rather jihad has just begun. Oh America, die with your fury.鈥�40
Shekau also diverged from Yusuf鈥檚 teachings in his belief that Christians are an enemy in Boko Haram鈥檚 Jihad and should be eliminated from Nigeria. Shekau鈥檚 sermons with Yusuf before July 2009 equated Western civilization with atheism and identi铿乪d the three fundamental pillars of Western civilization: education, the Judeo-Christian tradition, and democracy. The collaboration of these three pillars led to what Shekau calls 鈥済lobalization and the modern world order.鈥� Shekau, like Yusuf and the Saudi cleric Abu Zayd, argued that the West used education to 鈥渋n铿乴trate Muslim minds and destroy Islam.鈥� Western education, according to Shekau, is the foundation of evil in the world and must not only be rejected but also replaced by religious education.
Shekau claimed that the Judeo-Christian tradition encouraged the more liberal textual interpretations that have become predominant in the practice of most modern religions, and has therefore had a corrupting in铿倁ence on Islam. Thus, in Shekau鈥檚 thinking, secular systems attribute to God what God has not instructed. As a result, Shekau completely rejected the use of the Judeo-Christian calendar and holidays that were recognized in Nigeria and adopted by secular governments all over the world. He has called Christians 鈥減olytheists鈥� and 鈥渋n铿乨els鈥� and said that 鈥渢rue Muslims鈥� should have no personal associations with them.
Finally, Shekau described democracy as the rejection of God鈥檚 supreme leadership over his creations. Such is evident in Shekau鈥檚 claims that Nigeria鈥檚 return to multiparty democracy and the Constitutional a铿價mation of its secular identity af铿乺med this rejection of God鈥檚 supreme leadership. He argued that the rejection of God鈥檚 law in Nigeria was evident in the use of national symbols like the national anthem, national pledge and the national 铿俛g. Shekau believed the concepts of honor, unity and glory that accompany these symbols should only be ascribed to God and no other entity; to Shekau, the nation-state is a human construct that denigrates God. Moreover, Western education, the Judeo-Christian tradition and democracy are the elements of a conspiracy meant to destroy Islam. Thus Muslims must 铿乬ht them everywhere, at all times and by all means.41
Shekau, like Yusuf, was a charismatic and persuasive speaker in classical Arabic, Hausa, Kanuri and even in heavily accented English. He is also like Yusuf in that he distinguished himself from all other Islamist schools of thought in Nigeria, including the Sala铿乻ts in Izala, the Maitatsine, and the Shi鈥檃. Furthermore, Shekau, like Yusuf, has had success in manipulating the memory and political history of the Borno State in order to rally his followers to embrace jihad.
The 铿乺st Boko Haram attack under Shekau took place on September 7, 2010. Fighters attacked the Bauchi prison and freed over 100 members who had been detained in the July 2009 clashes in which Yusuf was killed. Soon after, Boko Haram carried out a string of assassinations against religious and political leaders who opposed their agenda or who were participating in the 2011 presidential elections. Over the course of 2012 and 2013, Boko Haram burned down dozens of schools and churches, especially in Borno State, thereby indicating that Boko Haram was carrying out Shekau鈥檚 call to Jihad.
Even after Shekau was forced into hiding from 2010 onwards, he continued to advocate the same ideology he preached prior to July 2009. However, after July 2009, his sermons were only released through videos on YouTube, sent to international media outlets or posted on online jihadi forums. Shekau鈥檚 messages to civilians, which often warned them that anyone who cooperated with the security forces would be killed, have been distributed through lea铿俥t drops in communities.
In a January 10, 2012 video, Shekau stated that the 鈥渃oncept of democracy and constitution are pagan.鈥� Two weeks later, on January 26, 2012, Shekau said that 鈥渄emocracy is neither God鈥檚 ideology nor the Prophet鈥檚鈥� and that 鈥淢uslims know well that democracy is incompatible with Islam.鈥� Shekau called on Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and Christians to 鈥渆mbrace Islam and be saved鈥� and reminded them that secular education, sports, and music are part of a Jewish conspiracy to distract Muslims from studying the Quran. In an August 4, 2012 video, Shekau similarly said that 鈥渄emocracy and constitution鈥� are forbidden themes under Islam and that Boko Haram wants to 鈥渃hange the system by introducing God鈥檚 law, the Sharia.鈥� In 2013, Shekau also consistently threatened U.S. President Obama, French President Hollande, Queen Elizabeth, and former U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, mocked the U.S. designation of Shekau as a terrorist, and promised that Boko Haram would attack the U.S. 鈥渢omorrow.鈥�
The candid sermons of Shekau prior to 2009 and after becoming the leader of Boko Haram in 2010 demonstrate that his ideology has largely remained intact; since 2010, however, he has made his ideology operational. The ideology he preached before 2010 is now manifesting itself in Boko Haram鈥檚 attacks against Christians, Nigerian government o铿僣ials, and English language schools. More- over, he has appealed directly to al-Qaeda.
Mamman Nur and the Rise of Ansaru
Shekau鈥檚 rhetoric against the Nigerian government, cristians and religious and political opponents since the start of Boko Haram鈥檚 violent insurgency in 2010 has accompanied his tolerance for civilian deaths. Shekau proclaimed a 鈥渨ar on Christians鈥� and, according to his spokesman, Shekau sought to extend Boko Haram operations to Sokoto in order to 鈥渞educe the powers of the sultan to traditional rulership functions, while all religious authority would be vested in a Boko Haram leader [Shekau] to be based in Yobe.鈥� The spokesman warned that 鈥渁ny ruler who would obstruct Boko Haram鈥檚 plans would regret his action.鈥�42 Boko Haram was able to strike a Sokoto police station with a suicide at- tack in July 2012 and assassinate more than 30 religious leaders who were close to the sultan that year, but Boko Haram ultimately failed to extend its in铿倁ence outside of the ethnic Kanuri areas of northeast Nigeria.
One of the main reasons for Boko Haram鈥檚 failure to expand its in铿倁ence into majority Hausa states in Nigeria was that its large-scale attacks alienated the population. In one particular instance, the group staged an attack on government buildings and churches in Kano, on January 20, 2012 that resulted in the death of nearly 200 people, most of whom were civilians.43 Ansaru鈥檚 announcement of its 鈥減ublic formation鈥� in 铿倅ers distributed in Kano, which stated that Boko Haram was 鈥渋nhumane鈥� for killing innocent Muslims as well as for targeting defectors, followed a week after the attacks.44 Shekau was evidently compelled to comment on the Kano attack and justify them in his January 26 video, in which he said that Boko Haram undertook the attack in Kano 鈥渋n retaliation for the arrest and detention of several group members, including women and children, and that Boko Haram is responding to injustices.鈥�45
Despite Shekau鈥檚 efforts to reach out to al-Qaeda with the praise for 鈥渟oldiers of God in the Islamic State of Mali鈥� when AQIM controlled territory in northern Mali in 2012, no other al-Qaeda a铿僱iate has recognized Shekau or Boko Haram as one of their own. Boko Haram鈥檚 unapologetic murder of civilians proved burdensome for al-Qaeda鈥檚 public image. One of AQIM鈥檚 spiritual leaders, Abu Mundhir al-Shniqiti, even issued a fatwa in 2013, which appeared to be in reference to Boko Haram鈥檚 murder of students in a dormitory:
Anyone who reads history, except a fool, knows that the Europeans handed over secular education to the missionaries. The missionaries incorporated into the curriculum of Western education the belief systems and values of Christianity. But we have said again and again that every Christian teaching regarding God and the universe is completely and fundamentally different from Islamic revelation. In fact it is not Islam and has nothing to do with Islam.18
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AQIM was much closer ideologically and operationally with Ansaru in Nigeria. Ansaru鈥檚 铿乺st operation in Nigeria was in May 2011, when a cell kidnapped a British and Italian hostage in Kebbi State and killed them during a rescue operation in Sokoto in March 2012.47 Unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru almost exclusively targets foreigners for kidnapping.48 Indeed, Ansaru is suspected of playing a role in kidnapping a French priest who had been assisting refugees 铿俥eing from Boko Haram鈥檚 violence, and a French family in February and December of 2013 in northern Cameroon.49
Ansaru has also obtained notoriety for its members鈥� participation with Mokhtar Belmokhtar in his attacks against an energy plant in the town of In Amenas in Algeria in January 2013 and French mining facilities in Niger in June 2013.50 While devoting most of its efforts to targeting foreigners and foreign owned tar- gets, Ansaru has also attacked Nigerians as well. In January 2013, Ansaru militants ambushed a convoy of three buses carrying 180 Nigerian soldiers through Okene, Kogi State, en route to Mali, killing two soldiers. Ansaru claimed the troops 鈥渨ere aiming to demolish the Islamic Empire of Mali鈥� and warned African countries to 鈥渟top helping Western countries 铿乬ht Muslims.鈥�51
Ansaru鈥檚 operations are distinguished from Boko Haram鈥檚 in that they kill few local civilians, and principally target foreigners and foreign interests. Furthermore, most of Ansaru鈥檚 operations took place in northwestern Nigeria, where Boko Haram under Shekau had minimal in铿倁ence. One explanation for Ansaru鈥檚 departure from Shekau鈥檚 focus on targets in northeastern Nigeria, such as churches, government o铿僣es and schools, is that former Yusuf deputy, Mamman Nur, inspired Ansaru鈥檚 internationalist agenda. Nur, like Shekau, was a deputy of Yusuf鈥檚 before July 2009. However, Nur, a native Cameroonian, may have had a personal interest in detaching Boko Haram鈥檚 aims from Nigeria alone by regionalizing the group such that he could solidify his legitimacy as a leader. When Yusuf was killed in July 2009, for example, Shekau won a power struggle over Nur and took over the leadership of Yusuf 鈥檚 followers in part because Shekau was seen as the 鈥渓ocal鈥� while Nur was considered an 鈥渙utsider.鈥�52
Nur also was known as an 鈥渋nternationalist鈥� because he connected with al-Shabaab in East Africa and AQIM between 2009 and his return to Nigeria in 2011.53 Upon his return, AQIM coordinated attacks with Nur, including a suicide bombing on the UN Headquarters in Abuja that killed 22 people in August 2011. Nur鈥檚 international experience and more extensive theological background compared to Shekau is one reason why Nur was well-prepared to lead the followers of Yusuf who rejected Shekau鈥檚 methods and wanted to launch attacks on foreign targets. Before July 2009, Nur鈥檚 sermons focused on the history of Jihad in West Africa and northern Nigeria and on the legacy of Usman dan Fodio: the founder of the northwestern Nigeria-based Sokoto Caliphate.
Nur, like Yusuf, blamed 鈥減overty鈥� in northern Nigeria on the Muslim leaders who rejected Dan Fodio鈥檚 Jihad and accepted instead the secular constitution from the Europeans. Nur stated that:
Anyone who reads history, except a fool, knows that the Europeans handed over secular education to the missionaries. The missionaries incorporated into the curriculum of Western education the belief systems and values of Christianity. But we have said again and again that every Christian teaching regarding God and the universe is completely and fundamentally different from Islamic revelation. In fact it is not Islam and has nothing to do with Islam.18
1
He also argued that:
Anyone who reads history, except a fool, knows that the Europeans handed over secular education to the missionaries. The missionaries incorporated into the curriculum of Western education the belief systems and values of Christianity. But we have said again and again that every Christian teaching regarding God and the universe is completely and fundamentally different from Islamic revelation. In fact it is not Islam and has nothing to do with Islam.18
2
It is not likely that Nur leads Ansaru鈥檚 kidnappings operations;56 however, Nur鈥檚 ideology is prevalent in the group and will remain an alternative to Shekau鈥檚 preoccupation with Nigeria and willingness to murder civilians.
Since February of 2013, Ansaru has become operationally silent in Nigeria, attacking only French mining facilities in Niger with Belmokhtar in June 2013 and kidnapping a French priest in Northern Cameroon in December 2013. Indeed, several of Ansaru鈥檚 commanders have reverted back to Shekau, likely including al-Barnawi, who Nigeria listed in November 2012 as the top-ranking member on Shekau鈥檚 Shura. Ansaru is therefore left with its 鈥減ropaganda鈥� wing that issues statements in line with AQIM that include criticisms of Boko Haram for killing Muslim civilians and of the Egyptian military for removing Mohammed Morsi from power.57 It furthermore sustains AQIM鈥檚 hostility towards Nigerian Christians, with threats against Christian militias in the Middle Belt and MEND in the Niger Delta.58 Granted that Nur is the only known former Boko Haram member connected to AQIM Ansaru鈥檚 铿乺st operations, it is likely that he remains part of Ansaru鈥檚 ideological core.
Conclusion
Boko Haram is an outgrowth of the social, economic, and political troubles in northern Nigeria. The group gained a following under Muhammed Yusuf because he provided a satisfactory explanation for the failures in their society: the cultural corruption that European colonialism brought to undermine their faith in Islam. Yusuf absorbed al-Qaeda鈥檚 ideology as well as Saudi Arabia鈥檚 brand of Sala铿乻m. In turn, Shekau operationalized Yusuf鈥檚 thinking into a jihadist insurgency that continues to the present day.
Yusuf 鈥檚 death was the trigger that enabled Shekau to mobilize his mentor鈥檚 followers to wage an insurgency. While Nur and Ansaru鈥檚 ideology is an outgrowth of Yusuf鈥檚 preaching, it is more re铿俥ctive of the in铿倁ence of other actors such as AQIM. Consequently, Shekau and Nur have sought to expand the reach of Yusuf鈥檚 ideological in铿倁ence and focus on those whom Boko Haram believed were directly responsible for northern Nigeria鈥檚 鈥減overty and suffering鈥� i.e. the Nigerian government, Westerners and Christians in the Middle Belt.
Moreover, Nur, like many of Yusuf鈥檚 followers, came to see that Shekau鈥檚 brutality may be effective on the battle铿乪ld, but that it has been politically counter- productive. Indeed, most northern Nigerians now reject Boko Haram鈥檚 ideology, whereas Yusuf鈥檚 ideology was widely popular in northeast Nigeria.
Nigeria has yet to effectively counter the ideology that underscored the growth of the Boko Haram movement before 2009. Even if the Nigerian government succeeds in defeating the group on the battle铿乪ld, another incarnation of Yusuf鈥檚 ideology will likely challenge the existence of the Nigerian State once again. Nigeria would be wise to address the frustrations of Nigerians throughout the country, especially in Borno State, in order to prevent the manifestation of such an ideology in the future. The country and its Muslim religious leaders would be all the wiser if they promoted other more traditionally accepted brands of Islamism to challenge the in铿倁ence of Saudi wahabbism, and AQIM鈥檚 interpretation of jihad. The political defeat of the Islamist ideas of Boko Haram would contribute to curbing the in铿倁ence of Islamism in Africa, and indeed the entire world.