To judge from his second State of the Union address last night (January 25, 2011), President Obama聮s heart clearly lies in issues related to U.S. domestic politics and his economic and social agenda. National security and foreign policy issues were not entirely ignored, for no president could really get away with sweeping them utterly under the rug in this time of international challenges. Not much, however, was said about them. That said, it is interesting to note what President Obama actually chose to emphasize 聳 and how he chose to say it 聳 when discussing these matters.
It is telling, for instance, that in the brief remarks he devoted anything related to national security, President Obama devoted considerably more time to the issue of gays in the U.S. military (95 words) than to the situation in Iraq (72 words). His defense of scrapping the Clinton Administration聮s rules on homosexual military service also received much more attention than the nuclear crises with Iran and North Korea combined (a mere 24 words each).
Indeed, Obama spent more than four times as much time urging America to emulate South Korean approaches to education and information technology spending, and lauding the possible U.S. employment impact of a trade agreement with Seoul (102 words all together), than he did discussing the North Korean dictatorship that on this president聮s watch has conducted a nuclear weapons test, multiple ballistic missile launches, and two military attacks against South Korea. (Those events on the Korean Peninsula apparently weren聮t felt important enough to mention at all.) China was mentioned four times in the speech, but only in passing, and exclusively as a model of economic competitiveness to be emulated, and a partner with whom to strike trade deals that will 聯support聰 聳 rather, apparently, than 聯create聰 聳 U.S. jobs. One can infer much from all this about the perspectives and priorities of the current White House.
In what little President Obama actually did say about foreign policy and security issues, moreover, he spent a lot of time using a vague and magisterial 聯we聰 in discussing U.S. policies and accomplishments. There聮s nothing inherently wrong with this, of course: a president is perfectly entitled to do some bragging about accomplishments 聳 especially in a State of the Union address. In this case, however, the 聯we聰 served an interesting purpose: it allowed him to blur the line between his administration and that of George W. Bush. According to President Obama, 聯we聰 have done many good things. Yet while he clearly intended to encourage listeners to believe that the relevant 聯we聰 was the Obama Administration, his phrasing frequently described policies of which he was not the principal author, thus permitting him to disguise considerable continuity with the Bush Administration 聳 and, of course, to claim credit for what this continuity has achieved.
How remarkable, for instance, to hear the president declare that 聯we聰 have now 聯begun聰 to 聯defeat determined enemies聰 and build coalitions against them, that 聯[w]e have 聟 taken the fight to al Qaeda and their allies abroad,聰 that terrorist leaders are being 聯removed from the battlefield,聰 and that 聯in Afghanistan, our troops have taken Taliban strongholds and trained Afghan Security Forces.聰 He is proud that our fortitude in fighting terrorists has 聯sent a message from the Afghan border to the Arabian Peninsula to all parts of the globe: we will not relent, we will not waver, and we will defeat you.聰 President Obama does not mention the Bush troop 聯surge聰 and counter-insurgency strategy he continued in Iraq, but he聮s clearly delighted that it worked: he brags that we have now accomplished our goals there 聳 聯combat patrols have ended; violence has come down; and a new government has been formed聰 聳 and that 聯the Iraq war is coming to an end.聰 (The State of the Union doesn聮t contain the phrase, but 聯Mission Accomplished聰 seems now to be Obama聮s Iraq mantra. Fascinating!) No mention was made last night of the Obama Administration聮s accomplishments in continuing to detain dangerous terrorists at Guant谩namo, kill terrorist leaders in the field by means of drone aircraft strikes, and prosecute detainees before specially-created military commissions, but the president might just as well have thrown these in too....
But such artful administration-conflating credit-taking doesn聮t stop there. More than five years after the Bush Administration聮s strategic rapprochement with India, Obama crowed that 聯[w]e have 聟 built new partnerships with nations like India.聰 The president also lauded international efforts to 聯lock[] down聰 nuclear materials to help keep them out of the hands of terrorists 聳 a program which he has indeed worked to accelerate, but which began two decades ago for the countries of the Former Soviet Union, and was expanded into a global initiative under Obama聮s predecessor. Obama also observed that Iran faces sanctions today 聯[b]ecause of a diplomatic effort to insist that Iran meet its obligations聰 聳 an effort, of course, that U.S. diplomats began at the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2002, and which has included four rounds of gradually toughening U.N. Security Council sanctions since 2006, in response to Iran聮s continued defiance.
It聮s not clear what Obama meant in saying that 聯[w]e revitalized NATO,聰 but it聮s worth remembering that the transformation of that organization from a Cold War defensive alliance into a very different and much broader institution focused upon global issues and far-flung conflicts has been underway for twenty years. (The expansion of NATO聮s membership to Eastern Europe, its inaugural war in the Balkans, the first-ever invocation of the collective security provisions of the NATO Treaty after 9/11, and the organization聮s pathbreaking combined-arms operation in Afghanistan all predate the Obama presidency.) Perhaps the president meant to laud the recent and relatively successful NATO Summit in Lisbon, but leaving aside the emergent intra-Alliance acrimony there over nuclear weapon deployments in Europe, the most noteworthy accomplishment at Lisbon was the articulation of NATO support for territorial missile defense. Perhaps Barack Obama wishes to be remembered as a supporter of missile defense 聳 previously a signature issue for George W. Bush and Congressional Republicans 聳 but one wonders.
President Obama certainly deserves credit for continuing 聳 and in some cases expanding 聳 the policies that have produced these results, and one shouldn聮t begrudge a bit of over-broad disingenuous credit-claiming in a State of the Union address. Speaking as a former Bush administration appointee, I would prefer the Obama Administration to adopt Bush policies and pretend they haven聮t, than actually to reject its predecessors聮 approaches. From my perspective, policy continuity is commendable, particularly in the national security arena.
As former Vice President Dick Cheney recently put it, it does indeed seem to be the case that Barack Obama has 聯learned that what we did was far more appropriate than he ever gave us credit for while he was a candidate. So I think he聮s learned from experience.聰 And it聮s well past time for our international partners and adversaries to learn that on issues such as nonproliferation and counter-terrorism, most U.S. policies 聳 including a good many controversial ones 聳 are grounded in enduring American interests, rather than in narrow partisan or ideological ones that can be expected to change dramatically from one administration to the next.
For the most part, however, the most interesting thing about the foreign policy and national security aspects of Obama聮s second State of the Union speech is what he did not say. Take nonproliferation, for example. Frankly, the president聮s cursory treatment of this subject illustrates that there just isn聮t much to say about it right now, or at least nothing reassuring and self-congratulatory enough for inclusion in a State of the Union address after a humiliating mid-term election.
The president correctly noted that sanctions on Iran have become tougher, but he didn聮t see fit to mention why these sanctions had been adopted, and why they were necessary. This omission was no doubt considered essential, however, because these Iran sanctions don聮t actually seem very likely to accomplish their foremost goal: reversing Iran聮s rush toward a nuclear weapons capability. To mention that objective would tend to make U.S. policy seem rather more like a failure than a success.
All President Obama had to say about North Korea, moreover, is that we continue to 聯insist聰 that it fulfill its denuclearization promises. Pyongyang is in no danger of actually denuclearizing, and its behavior on Obama聮s watch has been pretty awful, even by North Korean standards. To judge by last night聮s speech, however, these are just insignificant details. Obama did not even have the grace to admit that the world faces grave and worsening proliferation challenges in both cases. (Policy continuity here is no defense, either. Obama聮s approach is largely unchanged since the second term of the Bush Administration, and has produced equally meager results.) In both of these nuclear crises, the key thing just seems to be that the president is proud to have the right rhetorical position: his audience is not encouraged to ask about results.
In some ways, the most important silence of the president聮s address was about one of the policies he sought most assiduously to make a signature issue upon coming into the office: nuclear disarmament. In fact, one might think that Obama聮s famous speech in Prague聮s Hradcany Square in April 2009, and his disarmament-anticipatory Nobel Peace Prize, had never occurred.
President Obama聮s pride in his 聯restart聰 of relations with Russia don聮t seem to have meant or brought much of anything beyond getting a new arms treaty 聳 negotiations over which, one should remember, were begun by George W. Bush in 2006. Nevertheless, 聯New START聰 really is a new agreement, and the president unsurprisingly lauds it. Indeed, it is pretty much the only concrete thing he has to offer as the smoke clears from his early emphasis upon nuclear disarmament atmospherics. (His officials have tried to explain to their disarmament-friendly political base how his program of spending more money to modernize America聮s nuclear weapons production infrastructure actually supports nuclear disarmament, but although this argument is by no means crazy, that audience isn聮t buying it.)
Obama also, however, characteristically oversells the new nuclear deal, and its distinctiveness. Like a proud parent, the president declared in his address that as a result of 聯New START,聰 聯far fewer nuclear weapons and launchers will be deployed.聰 That聮s far from the case, but it wouldn聮t have sounded very impressive 聳 under the circumstances 聳 to proclaim merely that it is probably the case that some fewer nuclear weapons and launchers will be deployed, and that the Treaty will not in itself reduce the number of nuclear weapons in existence. (In fact, 聯New START聰 only puts limits on 聯deployed聰 nuclear weapons 聳 leaving both parties free to possess as many non-deployed devices as they see fit 聳 and its counting rules permit enormous flexibility to upload strategic bombers with multiple weapons, even to levels beyond the limit of 1,550 deployed weapons officially set by the Treaty.)
The remarkable modesty of the 聯New START聰 accomplishment is not necessarily a drawback, mind you, but it聮s a bit surprising to hear it lauded as such a big deal by the man given the Peace Prize for his promises of nuclear weapons abolition. We see here, perhaps, the narcissism of small differences: with so little to boast of that is distinctively his in the national security realm, Barack Obama beats the 聯New START聰 drum loudly. Nevertheless, just about the only thing about 聯New START聰 that one would not have seen had the Bush Administration concluded this agreement is its non-binding preambular language on missile defense and its counting rule forcing one-for-one tradeoffs between nuclear delivery platforms and conventionally-armed long-range 聯prompt strike聰 systems. Are these what President Obama wishes us to remember as the distinctive accomplishments of his new agreement? Go figure.
All in all, this is pretty thin gruel for a 聯transformative聰 president whose administration bragged that by rejecting the approaches of the Bush years, it would finally solve the world聮s problems, including nuclear proliferation, by conciliatory diplomatic engagement and 聯soft power.聰 The real national security and foreign policy story of the 2011 State of the Union address would thus seem to be that President Obama just doesn聮t have much to crow about 聳 and that many of the things for which he now claims credit illustrate his on-the-job retreat from the novelty and distinctiveness he promised his supporters.
Well, I guess that聮s a change that some of us can believe in.