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Europe is suddenly in a hurry.

Apparently, the U.S. administration’s overtures to Russia and its reminded the continent’s leaders of the cynical adage that one is either at the table or on the menu.

“There is only one thing that counts, and that is speed,� Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in February, announcing a . Meanwhile, in neighboring Germany, Chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz is reportedly for the Bundeswehr worth hundreds of billions of euros. And the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas even argued that �, to take this challenge� of leading the free world.

But is Europe really on the cusp of transforming into a geopolitical power?

In terms of population, technological development, and economic size and strength, Europe could easily qualify as a great power. However, the continent’s future will depend on more than its nations� ability to convert their economic might into defense capabilities.

To truly become the great power some aspire it to be, Europe will need a political structure that enables it to exercise the leadership long provided by the U.S. And its outlook for forging such a structure faces significant hurdles.

Today, two powerful institutions occupy center stage on the continent: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Yet, neither can be easily converted into a vehicle for European self-protection and power projection.

For starters, the U.S. has dominated NATO since its inception. It’s possible to conceive of the alliance’s reorganization into U.S. and European spheres, with military commands for the continent assigned to European forces and the position of top military leader � the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) � given to a European instead of an American. However, it’s difficult to think of any European power conceding that post to an officer from a European rival.

Knowing that the alliance’s military leader would always be an American avoided the political competition that historically afflicted Europe. If that were to change, would, say, the Élysée accept a German or British SACEUR?

Moreover, the alliance’s European side would, by necessity, include many nations with foreign policies that might be in conflict with those of its core powers. And even if these leaders could be convinced to hold back their vetoes on a given issue, the delays required for arm-twisting could be considerable � as was demonstrated by the drawn-out process of Sweden’s accession to NATO.

Using such a slow and plodding decision-making structure to attain consensus on matters of continental security doesn’t amplify great power status � it impedes it.

Moving on to the EU, making modifications there would raise similar problems. Creating a unified command structure for the bloc would require centralizing bureaucracy to an unprecedented degree. And just as the EU’s foreign minister � the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy � is often overshadowed by the foreign ministers of major European countries, it’s hard to imagine a European commander in chief outranking the chiefs of staff of France or Germany.

Europe remains a mosaic of nation states more than a federal system � the preferences of some of its elites notwithstanding. So, unless and until the bloc evolves into something resembling a United States of Europe, any concerted effort to project the continent’s power will require its major players to form a multilateral military staff.

An historical precedent for this does exist. During World War II, Washington and London formed the Combined Chiefs. And while their decisions were, of course, subject to the approval of the British prime minister and the U.S. president, they created a degree of cooperation that had yet to be seen at the military level.

Unfortunately, though, the establishment of a similar structure for contemporary Europe would raise several difficult questions.

First, how many countries would participate? The number of EU members is far higher than any concept of bureaucratic efficiency would allow. And if all countries can’t participate, which ones should? While objective considerations of size, military capability and foreign policy tradition might suggest the U.K., France, Germany, Poland and, perhaps, Italy as a plausible starting point, any initial organizational structure would also lead to a cacophony of objections.

What’s more, a combined staff responsible for unifying the continent’s forces and acquiring equipment could also cause intragovernmental difficulties in countries where military officers haven’t been major foreign policy players. And any arrangement that prioritizes Europe’s larger powers would require its smaller countries, including those most exposed to Russia’s revanchism, to plug into the command via one of the larger powers. This formal inequality would be a major break with the bloc’s founding ideology � though perhaps not with its practice.

Nevertheless, if Europe is to possess military capabilities commensurate with a leading global role, some new organizational structure will be necessary. And the level of effort to establish Europe’s autonomy will be directly proportional to the depth of shock it can absorb from the shifts currently underway in U.S. policy. These shocks might even rise to the level of questioning whether Europe needs an independent nuclear deterrent � something that would make any potential command structure an even more sensitive issue and require a reassessment of existing nuclear capabilities.

During World War II, the U.S. and the U.K. were able to successfully project power because they shared not only a common language but also a common political heritage. The nations of Europe share much less. And only time will tell whether they’re prepared to take on the challenge of overcoming their differences.