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Commentary
CNAS

Total Competition: China鈥檚 Challenge in the South China Sea

patrick-cronin
patrick-cronin
Asia-Pacific Security Chair
Former Research Associate

Introduction: An Unstoppable Force?

China鈥檚 bid for ascendancy remains anchored in the South China Sea and surrounding Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deems it economically and militarily vital to dominate the resources and sea lines of communication of a body of water twice the size of Alaska. Achieving this goal requires tethering neighboring countries into Beijing鈥檚 ambit while making the existing ruleset more favorable to China and displacing the dominant power behind the existing regional order. Some may find comfort in describing the scenario underway as a return to a 鈥淐hina-centered鈥� rather than 鈥淪ino-centric鈥� region.1 However, an authoritarian China鈥檚 coercive attempts to wield hegemonic control of the South China Sea threatens the sovereignty of Southeast Asian states and international freedom of the seas, both of which are of fundamental national interest to the United States. Yet the South China Sea and Southeast remain the least defended and most bountiful region susceptible to Chinese predations and inducements.

The CCP leadership is obsessed with the idea that outside forces intend to contain China鈥檚 development, foment internal unrest, and prevent it from retaking what it considers to be its rightful place center stage in regional and global affairs. In partial response to deep-seated insecurities and renewed great-power ambitions, Xi Jinping and the CCP are in the process of attempting to exercise control over the entire nine-dash line claim covering the vast majority of the South China Sea and to turn Southeast Asia into a latter-day tributary system. CCP propaganda casts China鈥檚 quest for control over maritime Asia as an inexorable outcome of China鈥檚 rise and America鈥檚 decline. Curiously, the only government speaking seriously about 鈥渟topping鈥� China is Beijing, suggesting that its policies are influenced more by subjective internal fears than by objective external realities. China wants nothing to stop it from consolidating its maximalist historic claims, from denying the United States the ability to intervene in regional conflicts, and from dismantling America鈥檚 postwar alliance system.

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