In 1936, Germany鈥檚 Deputy Fuhrer Rudolph Hess asked British Lord Castlereagh, 鈥淲hy do you not have Winston Churchill in your British Cabinet? Then we should know you meant business.鈥�
The question was largely rhetorical. Churchill had been a lonely voice in the political wilderness for many years, his warnings about the Nazi menace falling on deaf ears. Today, as America faces an increasingly dangerous and aggressive Chinese Communist Party (CPP), one wonders whether they have any reason to know that President Biden means business. Actions taken in the administration鈥檚 first hundred days point in the opposite direction.
Biden has ordered a of American forces from Afghanistan. He is seeking to , which would remove the sanctions that have crippled Iran鈥檚 economy. He did not respond to Ukraine鈥檚 request for assistance when Russia amassed thousands of troops on its border before . He has presided over the largest influx of crossing the U.S. southern border in 15 years. And his budget proposes substantially reduced .
One can make a case for some of those decisions. The already diminished U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan has uncertain value today. There is undoubtedly wasteful spending in the Pentagon budget. But as internationalists are fond of pointing out, the world is highly interconnected. What happens in Afghanistan, Iran, Ukraine, the Mexican border, or even the U.S. defense budget, can have a profound impact in the eyes of adversaries, just as the composition of the British Cabinet did in the view of the Nazis.
Biden partly justified his decision to leave Afghanistan on the grounds of freeing the military鈥檚 attention and resources for more important conflicts 鈥� presumably China. Absent any moves against China, however, it is unlikely the leaders in Beijing will view it that way as the Taliban triumphantly .
Administration defenders might claim the recent sanctions imposed on Russia and expulsion of 10 of their diplomats signal that Biden means business. But what sort of business would that be? For months, Biden described Russian cyberattacks, election meddling and other misdeeds in catastrophic terms. He as 鈥渁mong the greatest threats to our global security in the 21st century.鈥� Yet in announcing the sanctions, Biden went out of his way to describe his response as 鈥減roportionate.鈥� If he considers a few largely symbolic sanctions and expulsions 鈥減roportionate鈥� to the crimes he described, then the signal sent is one of weakness, not strength.
China is where all this matters most. Whether the CCP leadership thinks America means business is central to deterrence, and deterrence keeps the peace.
Today鈥檚 China is a rival unlike any America has faced. Its economic power and potential vastly exceed that of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Its violent domestic policies and aggressive nationalism has begun to rival those earlier totalitarian foes. It is against millions of its own ethnic minority citizens. It the democratic bastion of Hong Kong.
Notably, China destroyed Hong Kong鈥檚 freedoms knowing full well that doing so would bring an economic setback. It was willing to take that financial hit to promote its larger nationalistic ambitions. Genocide and economic self-sacrifice in the cause of strengthening the regime are powerful evidence of China鈥檚 intentions.
Many believe China鈥檚 next target is Taiwan. China鈥檚 communist leaders are unmistakable in their expressed intention to 鈥渦nify鈥� with democratic Taiwan. Chinese over and around Taiwan have increased in frequency and aggression. What鈥檚 to stop the destroyers of Xinjiang and Hong Kong from moving next on Taiwan?
For decades, the answer has been American deterrence. America鈥檚 military presence throughout Asia, including the Navy鈥檚 patrolling the Taiwan Strait, has been highly effective. The U.S. is not bound by treaty to go to war to defend Taiwan, as it is for Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Nonetheless, Chinese leaders have long had reason to believe there was a meaningful chance it would do so. American management of multiple crises in the Taiwan Strait since the 1950s reinforced that belief. China concluded it was not a risk worth taking. Does it still think that today?
Former President Trump鈥檚 actions toward China were more confrontational than the Chinese leaders were used to. As significantly, Trump鈥檚 actions elsewhere, including the and the , signaled to China that he was not to be trifled with. Deterrence was enhanced.
Biden鈥檚 initial foreign policy and security decisions undermine deterrence. They might make China鈥檚 leaders think they could capture Taiwan without much American resistance other than post-action sanctions they could easily live with. The president should consider the picture he has painted in his first 100 days and adjust accordingly, or risk finding out who really means business.
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