In this week’s episode of China Insider, Miles Yu unpacks name changes made across the United States Department of State’s website and why these designations carry significant implications for US foreign policy toward China. Next, Miles peels back the curtain on Xi Jinping’s latest meeting with high-profile leaders in China’s technology sector, and whether this will truly infuse confidence in the Chinese economy. Lastly, Miles analyzes China’s evolving legal warfare campaign against Taiwan across the Global South, and how this impacts the status quo in cross-strait relations.
China Insider is a weekly podcast project from , hosted by , who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world’s future.
Episode Transcript
This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.
Miles Yu:
Welcome to China Insider, a podcast from the »ªÌå»á's China Center. I am Miles Yu, senior fellow and director of the China Center. Join me each week for our analysis of the major events concerning China, China threat and their implications to the US and beyond.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
It’s Tuesday, February 25th and we have three topics this week. First, Miles looks at the rectification of names across the US government and the US State Department's change from the PRC to China. Second Miles peels back the curtain on Xi Jinping's latest meetings with high profile Chinese entrepreneurs in the technology sector and what can we expect from these discussions. Lastly, we examine China's expanding legal warfare campaign against Taiwan, specifically targeting the global community and what this means for Taiwan security in the Indo-Pacific at large. Miles, how are you doing today?
Miles Yu:
Very good, Colin. Nice to be with you again.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Likewise. So we start things off this week with the recent revision to the US State Department's website changing all references of the PRC, that's the People's Republic of China, to China. State Department spokespeople claim this is to emphasize the importance of the trade deficit in expanded dissection on economic ties and in a way to counter Chinese cyber activity as well as withdrawing slightly from existing partnerships that assist China on cultural and environmental issues. Miles, what can we make of this change in designation and what really is the significance here?
Miles Yu:
You know, US-China relationship is very peculiar. Peculiar, it means that it is not really normal. One of the sort of lack of normalcy in US-China relationship is the semantics. Semantics play a very important role. And the name itself, for example, it's People's Republic China, and this is the designation, the prefix, of people's republic of a communist country is actually one of the essential concept of Marxism-Leninism. Because in Marxism-Leninism, all normal democracies in the west are phony, bourgeoisie. They do not represent the true democracy. True democracy is something that the Marxist-Leninists called people's democracy. So that's why virtually all the communist countries, they must use the prefix people's republic of something. For example, during the Cold War, People's Republic of Albania, People's Republic of Yugoslavia, People's Republic of Bulgaria, People's Republic of Hungary, People's Republic of Mongolia, People's Republic of Czechoslovakia, and of course People's Republic of China. And another one of course is North Korea. North Korea's official name is Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It's DPRK.
So this is highly ideological and has been using this for a long, long time and communist country normally insist the international community to be compliant with that kind of naming. Now since 1949 when People's Republic of China was established, in the West, there are different names to call China. Communist China, Red China, and in 1971, Richard Nixon was preparing his trip to China. In order to be nice to the Chinese government, to show respect, he actually ordered the US government to use exclusively the new name. That is, all government printings, government communications, must use the People's Republic China to show American government's respect for the communist government's sensitivity. So that's basically is a very official, so it's very ideological. By doing so, you sort of inadvertently subscribe to the kind of conceptual trap and also to be sort of implicitly in compliance with the Chinese communist ideology.
That's why the change of name is very, very important. So now according to China, that's exactly what it is. There's also another very important subtlety here. That is, the Chinese Communist Party would like you to call People's Republic of China, in contrast with what Taiwan’s official name, that is Republic of China. So there's a PRC versus ROC. Now, internationally as well as the people in Taiwan, very few people call it Republic of China. Internationally, Taiwan is just that, Taiwan. So by dropping the People's Republic of China, you actually getting closer to reality. That is, it's China versus Taiwan, not the People's Republic of China versus Republic of China, even though it says the same thing. So that's why the name changing in the State Department website is very important. That's the thing. But there is still more to that because if you look at the State Department's website page on US-Taiwan relationship, it's even more significant.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
Yeah, and I was actually going to ask about that because a lot of the context between the nomenclature of how you term the People's Republic of China versus China, there has been at least some initial response and feedback that the shift to China is going to be harmful to the current sovereignty and existence of Taiwan and the Republic of China as it were. So what is the significance then in that regard?
Miles Yu:
Well actually no, the reverse to call it China is actually good because that means that China and Taiwan are two concepts. And this is also is in total compliance with the US government's position on the issue of Taiwan, and this is the national status, because the United States government has never recognized Taiwan is a part of the People's Republic of China. Now, United States recognized China's representativeness of China, comes in 1971 through the UN Resolution 2758. But that resolution only solved the issue of who should represent China. By UN vote, by consent of the United States government, by the majority of the world countries, communist China now has the sole right to represent China, but then who should represent Taiwan? Nothing. So that's why the issue of Taiwan’s status remains very murky. The United States government has never recognized that resolution 2758 solved the Taiwan's natural status. So that's where we are right now.
So by calling communist China, China, is actually very good thing because now the issue is China versus Taiwan rather than People's Republic of China versus Republic of China, even though officially it's called Republic of China in Taiwan. But the State Department's website on the Taiwan page is actually very, very interesting. First of all, it dropped the phrase which existed and added during the Biden administration that United States government does not support Taiwan independence. This is basically an idiotic insertion because it was done by China's insistence in November, 2023 in Bali, Indonesia during the summit, where Xi Jinping demanded the Biden administration make an open statement that United States government does not support Taiwan independence. So after that, and this phrase was added, it is totally own goal. There's no, totally unnecessary, it's very confusing too. Because the issue of Taiwan independence is a red herring. Chinese government always use this. No government official in Taiwan has ever said that Taiwan is going to declare independence. As a matter of fact, the Taiwanese government leaders year after year have been saying the following, that there's no need for Taiwan to declare independence because Taiwan is already an independent country. Its name is Republic of China in Taiwan. So Chinese government is basically hyping the red herring of Taiwan independence movement to justify its military takeover and invasion of Taiwan. So this is basically they're playing the semantic game. The Chinese government is very good at that.
Now, there is also another very interesting change on the Taiwan page in the State Department. That is, regarding US supporting Taiwan's participation in international organizations. Previously it said the US is going to support Taiwan's representation in international organization, “where statehood is not a requirement�. That line is dropped. Now the new line is Taiwan-China dispute should be resolved “free from coercion in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the strait�. That is very important. That is, whatever you do, you have to really gain a consensus by people from both sides. So that's important. But I think most importantly, there's also a subtle change, but significant, in the State Department of Taiwan website page that is in a similar vein about supporting Taiwan's international representation. The new website says “The United States will continue to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations, including membership were applicable�. Now that's very important, particularly the last part of this sentence, including membership where applicable. That means United States is implicitly supporting Taiwan's membership in all international organizations, potentially could include United Nations. And that's why, because so far we have always said we're going to support Taiwan's observer status in most international organizations. Now we're talking about membership where applicable in all international organization. I think that is very important and significant.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
I have to agree with you there because I think a lot of it has, a lot of recent conversations around DC have been at least, as far as the US-Taiwan relationship, trying to understand what Trump 2.0’s approach is going to be, especially in the short term, but over the course of his administration. I think these developments, as you keenly point out, help to solidify what the One China policy will be moving forward under Trump 2.0. And I think that language too is something that is reflected on the updates to the PRC and China's page, but is there anything that we can draw from those implications that you might see as well?
Miles Yu:
Well, all I see is this. The People’s Republic of China, formerly known as the People’s Republic of China, now China, is very good at creating conceptual ambiguity, sort of a trap. So you fall into it. For example, they keep saying One China principle as if United States agreed that Taiwan should be part of One China, and we never say that, right? If you read the three communiques, the three communique never say the United States agree with China on the issue of Taiwan being part of the People's Republic of China. We just say we're aware of the fact that the Beijing, you have this argument. We're not saying we are opposing it, nor are we saying we are agreeing to it, right? So that's basically is the concept. So when you hear the phrase like the One China principle, you have to be very careful. I'm so glad we have a knowledgeable person at the helm of the State Department, Senator Marco Rubio, Secretary Marco Rubio knows all this. He has so many years of experience serving in the Senate and he's the descendant of the Cuban immigrants and understand the communist playbook. So I think that this is a reflection of the strong, clear, and wise leadership of the State Department.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
And that's certainly what we hope to expect going forward from here. So turning now to our next topic for today. Xi Jinping met with high profile entrepreneurs from China's technology sector, including Alibaba founder Jack Ma and DeepSeek founder Liang Wenfeng, in an attempt to, what seems to be, reinvigorate indigenous technological investment and production, and also requested the companies show confidence in China's development model. Now, this meeting seems to mirror the one Xi called for back in 2018 at the Great Hall of the People to address the then going on trade war. But Miles, can you tell us a little bit about what this meeting means in particular and why it took place?
Miles Yu:
This meeting is the desperate effort for Xi Jinping to salvage the Chinese economy, which is at the bottom, is rock bottom, shall we say. I mean, by the way, this economic abyss is Xi Jinping’s own making. So everybody understand that. Now, if Chinese Communist Party is not in such a powerful overpowering position in China, if China has a free flow of capital, most of the companies Xi Jinping have summoned heads of to the meeting, would've already gone. They would have already left China, because Chinese investment environment is not only hostile to international capital, but also to domestic capital, those non-state sector. So this meeting was held by Chinese propaganda machine as a revival of Chinese private entrepreneurship. This itself is also a misnomer, if not misinterpretation, because there is no such thing called the private entrepreneurship.
First of all, anything that related to private economy, you must have a constitutionally guaranteed protection of private ownership. In China, technically you have a non-state private enterprise, but in reality everything belongs to the state. State can come here and confiscate anything you want. And so that's why that's the issue. Now, this meeting had about 30 heads of the non-state enterprises in China, and most prominently is Jack Ma. Now, Jack Ma has been in exile for a long time. Now, Xi Jinping seemed to have given the reprieve and he’s back at the front row, but that's basically the show. Alibaba is gone, under direct control by the state, and Jack Ma literally has no control over it. By state decree, by the way. So you can see the essential sentence of Xi Jinping’s speech is this. He said, the Chinese Communist Party will and I quote “Unwaveringly encourage, support, and guide the development of the private economy�.
Now talk about this. Encourage, why do you need encouragement? Because people in those non-state sectors have no confidence. They're dejected, they're discouraged. So that's why he is now encouraging them. Now, Xi Jinping has done, has been doing, a lot of discouragement over the years. Now nobody is cooperating with him, so he freaked out and that's why he wants to encourage them. Support, that means the government now is going to provide a lot of subsidy and protective measures to give these guys easy loans. But the problem is people are not interested in doing business in China anymore. So support means state approach. It is part of the command economy, so it's not going to work. But most importantly he said he's going to guide the development of the private economy. The party has to guide them, has given directions. Nothing can be done without the party's guidance and approval. That's not the way to revive private sector or non-state sector. So that's why I think the whole issue is just moribund from the beginning.
Now, another thing is, interesting thing is, because of the lack of confidence in the Communist Party’s economic policy, the society responded to this meeting with great suspicion and also kind of a skittish spirit. It is not only important who showed up, but what's important is who didn't show up. And if some CEO didn't show up, that means the company is now in big trouble. The party doesn't like you anymore. And you see it's very important. One of the very interesting example is this. China's version of Google search, the number one search engine giant is called Baidu. Baidu's CEO is a guy by the name of Li Yanhong. He didn't show up. His absence freaked the market and Baidu's stock in Hong Kong Stock Exchange plummeted that day because of his absence by 7% losing a total value of $2.4 billion. That's the sensitivity people are watching with. So that's why it's a very, very interesting thing.
Now, the CEO of some of the phony “private enterprises� also didn't show up. The most obvious one is DJI, the drone maker. That's a different story because DJI they say is a non-state run enterprise, but in effect is a Chinese military intelligence run organization. So they don't have to show up. So that's why it really doesn't fit in the category in the first place. So I think that this is my reading of this meeting. This meeting is basically a last ditch effort to save a moribund economy, and I don't see any good things out of this high profile hoopla.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
I was going to say infused confidence seems to be the term that has come from this meeting, and you would think that within this structure, principally the CCP would otherwise have the upper hand here. But I think as you keenly point out, there is very much a reliance on the so-called private tech sector within China, which is somewhat separate at least term wise from the state owned enterprises, but it's still principally tied in with the CCP. But it just shows how reliant they are on that private sector and especially with technology has been a, if not the, principle focus of US-China strategic competition dynamic. And seems this meeting signals that the CCP acknowledges the need for these specific firms to compete with the US and the global community in the technology sector. So especially with the pivotal role of AI development. Let me ask you then, Miles, do you think this meeting will really have any kind of impact on China's domestic tech development and perhaps even contribute to any kind of increased consumption of Chinese tech products? Or is this going to be a flash in the pan for now?
Miles Yu:
Well, there's one aspect of this that is pretty significant in the future. I believe one of the purposes is this. There are Chinese non-state run enterprises. They are closely connected with the international free trade system. So they have access to Western technology, they have access to Western, leading, cutting edge stuff, and talents even. So I think the Chinese government right now is trying to use those connections for its own benefits to enhance the kind of technological transfer, talent transfer from the West to China, because of the increased export control, if both of the economies impose on China. So I think that's one of the things that they would do. For example, Huawei. Huawei’s CEO, Ren Zhengfei, the founder was there in the meeting. And Huawei has global outreach in many, many countries, particularly in Latin America, in Africa, Asia, and in certain part of Europe. Like in Hungary, Huawei is basically everywhere. So I think with companies like that, China wants to basically to use the Huawei's outreach, international outreach, to basically continue to do its own bidding. That is to, I won't say steal, definitely basically technological transfer and they can control a very significant portion of global telecommunications. That's just one example. So I think this is probably one of the real reasons they're having this meeting.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
And I think that kind of very nicely brings us to our final topic for today. And speaking of the CCP coercive apparatus, we're going to shift the focus now to Taiwan and the ongoing battle for international recognition in the face of China's robust legal warfare and coercion campaigns. A recent article from the Economist cited a joint report with the Lowey Institute stating 70 countries have now “officially endorsed both China's sovereignty over Taiwan and that China is entitled to pursue all efforts to achieve unification�, without mention of a peaceful resolution. This striking development is the apparent result of a reformed CCP coercion campaign across the Global South, including other nations such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and most every African nation. Before we get too far into this report, Miles, what can we make of this expanding coercion campaign and the impact on the cross strait status quo?
Miles Yu:
Well, China basically tries to justify its use of force to liberate or unify Taiwan. To do that, they have to overcome a lot of international objection. So now it launches some kind of a publicity campaign to do just that. Now, the report itself is a little bit hyperbolic in my view, because you say 70 countries support China's all efforts to unify Taiwan. Now, of course, in implication, implication is very simple to also support China's use of force to do so. Another category is to endorse China's wording of its claim over Taiwan. So that means Taiwan is part of China, but then they didn't say yes or no on the use of force. So the most important thing is these countries endorsing the claim and all unification methods including use of force, the article says over 70 countries. As you imply earlier in your question, almost all of the countries are in Africa. Africa have about 54, 55 countries. China has about 51, 52 of them supporting China's all efforts to claim Taiwan, including use of force. Now, virtually no other countries in the world supporting these methods. Now there are in Latin America only three countries, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. And in Asia you've got Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and North Korea, and that doesn't say much. So overall, I think the claim that over 70 countries in the world supporting China's use of force to unify Taiwan is a little bit of the hype because countries of significance, countries of meaningful weight is not there. So I think the whole effort looks kind of impressive, like in many things, Chinese statistical analysis is basically its major failure.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
And I am glad you brought that up too because it is important that while there are 70 nations now adhering to the updated language from Beijing, the large majority of these countries currently hold either critical mineral and natural resource agreements, and or harbor Chinese financed ports under the Belt and Road Initiative. And while China's foreign investment and lending has declined slightly in recent years, it appears the shift in that has now focused more on the influence that they can exert through those coercive means and has grown significantly from linking aid to foreign policy initiatives. And I would like to, if I can, your thoughts on what the US and its allies could possibly do to counter these coercive efforts in relation both to Taiwan, but just in general around the global community.
Miles Yu:
I think one of the message is basically peace, global peace. United States� essential mission in geopolitics is to make sure that the world should be safe for democracy number one. The world should be safe for commerce and also the world should be safe for sovereignty. Now, I think in each of the categories, Belt and Road Initiative fails. If you look at the safe democracy, every time there is a heavy BRI investment in virtually every country, there is some kind of political crisis because the people will not like their elite leadership signing deals with China. And in all these major countries, every time there is an election, China's BRI and China's influence will always become major politically destabilizing factor. In Sri Lanka, in Malaysia, and in many other countries, Kenya for example. So you have this issue. So it's not very good for democracy because some of the elites were captured by China. Some of the deals were signed in secrecy. China basically put severe conditions on those BRI projects.
Secondly, BRI is basically trying to create a global dominance in commerce and some regions, exclusive to China. And that's why I think it is not good for equal opportunity for commerce for many other countries getting in because BRI normally would sign deal with certain countries long-term contract, by the way, and at the expense of other countries� equal opportunities. And I also think that the BRI has a lot of problems in terms of qualities. Chinese construction, Chinese projects, look good, look cheap, look speedy. But then there's very little market guidance. People build a lot of fancy impressive projects, but then it's hard for them to reap benefits and profits. And pretty soon many of the projects will reach the peak of this maintenance and repair period. That's going to cost a lot of money. Who's going to share the burden? The local governments. So you're going to put those people not only in a debt trap, but also in a repairment trap. So essentially you have to rely on market, you have to rely on transparency, and you have to rely upon sovereignty and independence. Many of the BRI countries are losing their sovereignty in Burma, in Kenya, Angola, even Egypt, right? Pakistan definitely a good example because if you cannot pay off the debt and China's control you, and China's going to basically dominate your major infrastructure projects. That's why I think how to combat that, and that's the strength of the West. Transparency, democratic values and quality and sovereignty. So all those factors get in. The problem is that we should get our act together. We should really, really enhance our international outreach to have a strong, robust voice in the defense of all the values we cherish.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
So with the, I think for our listeners, it's also going to be important to focus on the importance of language in this development for anyone who might be familiar with China's coercive campaigns, especially in the information sphere, and as it relates to their three warfares, because in addition to this development, the CCP has made similar efforts to supplant Tibet with Xizang, and certainly you see it in Xinjiang as well. I should also mention that the China Center has elevated this issue as a key focus as well since beyond this past year, notably with events both in DC and Taipei involving China's legal warfare through the anti-secession law like we've seen over the past few months. So I guess the question also kind of really ties into our unofficial title for today's episode is, what's in a name? But I think here within the context of international organizations and especially with the Indo-Pacific region, do you feel confident that this increasing and encroaching coercive campaign will stop here at these 70 countries? Do you think the US and its allies is in a place currently to prevent and deter further encroachment of this course of apparatus?
Miles Yu:
I think we have to really amplify our voices, our positions better, to do a better promotion. Another side of that is, really you mentioned about what's in the name. The Chinese Communist Party uses a system of nomenclature, a system of concepts that are similar to the West on surface, but completely different in substance. For example, when Chinese government say human rights, that mean totally different things. Reactionaries, bourgeoisie, bad guys in United States do not have human rights. So it is totally different from the Western concept of human rights, which is basically the unalienable rights of all people who are created equal. So it has categories. So when you use a concept like that, it's a people's republic. It's not people's republic. People of China is the subject of oppression by the government. So we got to be very careful about the nomenclature, about the concepts used by the Chinese Communist Party. So if you look at the Chinese Constitution it is beautifully written. Democracy, human rights, free speech, and a free election they're all guaranteed. If you look at it, for example, free election. Yes, you have a free election, but Constitution also says that Chinese Communist Party must be the winner of all elections. I mean, what's the purpose of the election? So winner is guaranteed. So that's why we have to study the conceptual, philosophical, and ideological logic of the Chinese Communist Party and the regime. That's what the China Center here has specialized in.
Colin Tessier-Kay:
And we could easily spend another handful of episodes on this critical topic alone, but we've unfortunately reached our time for today. Miles, thank you as always for your analysis and insight, and we'll check back again with you next week.
Miles Yu:
See you next week.