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The Hill

Biden Woos India While Visiting South Korea and Japan

husain_haqqani
husain_haqqani
Senior Fellow and Director for South and Central Asia
aparna_pande
aparna_pande
Research Fellow, India and South Asia
Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, U.S. President Joe Biden, and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity in Tokyo on May 23, 2022. (Photo by Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images)
Caption
Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, U.S. President Joe Biden, and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity in Tokyo on May 23, 2022. (Photo by Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images)

President Biden is in Asia, continuing the pivot to a region that is described as his administration鈥檚 top priority. But while his are taking him to South Korea and Japan, the U.S. president鈥檚 attention is more focused on Australia and India, both members of the Quad, alongside Japan and the United States.

Australia is expected to be a critical partner as the Quad evolves into a mechanism for facing China鈥檚 increasingly assertive and aggressive posture in the Indo-Pacific. India, on the other hand, is expected to rally other countries in realizing that China may now be a threat to the rules-based international order. With a population that nearly matches China鈥檚, India is often characterized as China鈥檚 biggest potential rival in Asia.

Although the Quadrilateral dialogue has come a long way, surviving changes in leadership in the U.S., Japan and Australia, it isn鈥檛 deterring China. It lacks a hard power component, and India, while willing to partner on issues such as climate change and emerging technologies, has dragged its feet on becoming part of a U.S.-led security architecture for the Indo-pacific.

India lags behind China in economic and military capabilities. The United States, Australia and Japan have shown willingness to invest in building India鈥檚 capacity. Only recently there were reports of a $500 million military funding from the U.S. for India that would deepen security ties and wean India off dependence on Russian military equipment. But India鈥檚 reluctance to get entangled in anything that resembles a military alliance remains an obstacle to the Quad鈥檚 evolution on anything more than what China dismisses as 鈥� 鈥�

India faces a formidable challenge from China along the two countries鈥� 2,167-mile land border. Americans see the threat from China in maritime terms, and the partnership they envisage with India 鈥� in the Indo Pacific and through the Quad 鈥� reflects that focus. China has signaled to India repeatedly that the U.S. and its Quad would not be able to help India in a confrontation with China in the Himalayas.

Since April 2020, following an of the People鈥檚 Liberation Army (PLA) across the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC), relations between these nuclear-armed neighbors have remained at an impasse. The two sides have held 15 rounds of negotiations in two years of their border dispute. But India鈥檚 leaders are not willing to risk a complete breach in ties with China, while pursuing the Quad partnership with the U.S., Japan and Australia.

Indian leaders that China has disturbed three decades of 鈥減eace and tranquility鈥� with its actions along the border, and India鈥檚 remains 鈥渢o restore the status quo ante, as it existed in April 2020,鈥� when Chinese troops moved into territory controlled by India. According to India鈥檚 new army chief, General China wants 鈥渢o keep the boundary issue alive鈥� instead of resolving it. A visit by Chinese Foreign Minister in March 2022 did little to change things along the border.

China鈥檚 policy seems to be to change the position on the ground, just as it has done in the case of islands in the South China Sea, leaving India to play catchup. In 2022 Chinese troops replaced prefabricated bridges across a lake that spans eastern Ladakh and western Tibet, with two permanent bridges. India has responded by increasing the number of troops on the border, while its ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) technologies and logistics capabilities with U.S.

Like their Japanese and Southeast Asian counterparts, Indian leaders had long hoped that the potential of the large Indian consumer market would convince China to avoid open confrontation with India. Only recently has India become willing to use economic coercion to force a resolution of the border crisis.

In 2020, India more than 60 primarily Chinese made apps, including Tik Tok. This was followed up in 2021 with the banning of around 120 apps belonging to tech companies such as Tencent, Alibaba and NetEase. In 2022, the Indian government $700 million in bank assets of Xiaomi, one of China鈥檚 largest tech companies, accusing the company of violating India鈥檚 foreign exchange laws.

China鈥檚 upping the ante on the border with India was based on the presumption that it would stop India from moving closer to the United States. Notwithstanding India鈥檚 hedging behavior in continuing talks with China and avoiding a formal alliance with the U.S., Chinese actions along the Sino-Indian border have only drawn India closer to the U.S.

At the Quad Summit in Tokyo, President Biden has an Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi what more the U.S. can do to strengthen India鈥檚 resolve in dealing firmly with China. Indian leaders know that while the United States and its partners around the world support India鈥檚 rise as a global power, China has long opposed India鈥檚 rise. What remains now is to develop a strategy that moves the Quad beyond vaccine diplomacy, climate change and technology to areas such as enhanced security, intelligence and military cooperation.

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