Nawaz Sharif鈥檚 participation in Narendra Modi鈥檚 inauguration may be the first time a Pakistani pri颅me minister has attended such celebrations in India, but it is just one of many occasions that have been billed as an opportunity for laying the foundations of a new relationship between India and Pakistan.
In 1950, Prime Minister Liaq颅uat Ali Khan travelled to Delhi and si颅gned the Liaquat-Nehru pact, wh颅i颅ch was expected to resolve the issu颅es created by the violent Partition of 1947 that gave birth to Pakistan. But the optimism about the agreement died within a year with the ass颅assination of its Pakistani signatory. Pakistan went through several years of political instability while the army gained influence in policymaking.
Then, once General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan assumed the reins of power directly in a coup d鈥檈tat in 1958, it was argued that a Pakistani military leader was better positioned to normalise relations with India than the weak politicians who preceded him. Pakistan鈥檚 participation in US-led military alliances was also meant to give the new country sufficient self-confidence in dealing with a larger, more powerful and ostensibly hostile neighbour.
Ayub Khan said that only two is颅sues caused friction between Ind颅ia and Pakistan. One related to the di颅vision of the Indus waters, which was resolved by the US-backed and World Bank-funded Indus Waters Tr颅eaty. The other, according to Ay颅ub, was Jammu and Kashmir, and the field marshal started the 1965 war hoping to find its final solution.
Another war, in 1971 over Bangladesh, resulted in a massive military defeat for Pakistan and the loss of half its territory. Ayub鈥檚 successor as military dictator, Yahya Khan, was forced to relinquish power to civilian Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It was presumed that now a more coherent Pakistani state and a triumphant India would find lasting peace.
At Shimla, in 1973, Indira Gandhi purported to show magnanimity. The Ceasefire Line in Kashmir became the Line of Control and a carefully worded agreement committed both countries to the peaceful resolution of disputes. But the Simla Accord virtually fell by the wayside after the military coup of 1977 that led to Bhutto鈥檚 judicial murder two years later.
General Zia-ul-Haq and Morarji Desai spoke of peace amid Western media commentary that the two ostensibly pro-US leaders could accomplish what left-leaning Indian governments under the Congress could not. In the end, Zia lasted in power for almost 11 years, but good relations between Pakistan and India did not.
When Benazir Bhutto was elected prime minister in 1988, we heard the 鈥渘ew beginning鈥� mantra again. India was now led by Rajiv Gandhi, and the two young prime ministers were expected to transcend the bitterness of Partition, of which neither had any personal memory. But the Pakistani establishment cut short Benazir鈥檚 tenure while stepping up jihad for the liberation of Kashmir.
Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi civilian originally backed by the army, was supposed to be the new miracle worker. But he was pushed out of office by the establishment within three years of his election. Sharif was succeeded by Benazir Bhutto for three years, only to return to office after another palace coup.
By the time Sharif returned to office in 1997, Pakistan鈥檚 Inter-颅Services Intelligence (ISI) had helped install the Taliban in power in Kabul and myriad jihadi groups were seen as challenging India鈥檚 might in Kashmir.
Once Pakistan tested nuclear weapons following India鈥檚 nuclear tests in 1998, the rationalists argued that a Nixon-to-China moment had arrived. If only Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpa颅y颅ee would travel to Pakistan and talk to the Muslim nationalist Pakistani leader, a modus vivendi between the two countries could be found.
Vajpayee did indeed travel to Lahore, assuring Pakistanis of India鈥檚 acceptance of their country and its nuclear status. But that did not prevent General Pervez Mu颅s颅harraf from plotting and executing the war in Kargil and subsequently taking over the reins of power in Islamabad. Musharraf kept talks with India going under the shadow of both nuclear weapons and terrorism. But details of the elaborate deal his emissary is said to have worked out with Satish Lamba are nowhere to be found in Pakistan鈥檚 Foreign Office since the general lost power in 2008.
Civilian President Asif Zar颅dari鈥檚 vision of regional integration was blown to pieces by Lashkar-e-Toiba鈥檚 terrorist attack in Mumbai in November 2008 within a couple of months of his election. Now, hopes are being pinned on renewed dialogue under Nawaz Sharif, who does not need to negotiate the complexities of Pakistan鈥檚 coalition politics, unlike Zardari.
Hope springs eternal and engagement is always better than giving up in despair. But it is important to understand the reason for the historic failure of efforts aimed at fostering friendly neighbourly ties between India and Pakistan.
There are many logical reasons for why and how India-Pakistan ties can be normalised. It is psychological, not logical, factors that have he颅ld the relationship back so far. As lo颅ng as Pakistan鈥檚 establishment co颅ntinues to paint India as an existential threat and a permanent enemy in the minds of its people, no Pakistani leader 鈥� civilian or military 鈥� can embrace the Canada-US model in India-Pakistan relations.
Although Indians are now focused more on their internal development, they have a long way to go in reassuring Pakistanis that their acceptance of a united Pakistan is final and irreversible.