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The Middle East is undergoing a dramatic shift. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen, Iran’s proxies are vanishing, and Turkey is expanding its regional influence. Meanwhile, the Trump administration may withdraw United States forces from the region. Washington’s next move will be critical.

Senior Fellows Michael Doran and Can KasapoÄŸlu will discuss the evolving situation, what is next for Syria, and the future of US foreign policy in the region with Research Fellow Zineb Riboua.

Episode Transcript

This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.

Zineb Riboua:

Hello everyone, thank you very much for joining us today. I’m Zineb Riboua, research fellow and program manager of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, and today we’re going to discuss Syria, with two very distinguished guests, senior fellow and director of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, Michael Duran, and also a very special guest with us today, non-resident, senior fellow, Can Kasapoğlu, our expert on political military affairs, and also the author of the MENA Intel Digest, as well as the Ukraine Report. Thank you very much for coming, Can Kasapoğlu, from Turkey.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Thanks for having us.

Zineb Riboua:

It’s great to have you. So, Mike and Can, before we dive more into what happened in Syria, or what are the implications for US foreign policy, now that we can really take a step back, what actually happened? You would think that people would see the strikes and also the operations that Israel did to Hezbollah would have a domino effect, but it seems that this really caught everyone into surprise, what can you tell us?

Michael Doran:

You mean the fall of Assad?

Zineb Riboua:

Yes.

Michael Doran:

Yeah. It did, it’s amazing that it caught everyone by surprise. Actually, I shouldn’t say it’s amazing because it caught me by surprise too. I went on several podcasts and said a couple days before Assad fell, and said he wasn’t going to fall. So, it caught everyone by surprise, I don’t think people realize the extent to which his regular military was just a shell, an empty shell, with soldiers that weren’t ready to fight. My understanding of the events immediately preceding his fall is that President Erdogan was interested in having HTS, the organization that is now dominant in Damascus, they were interested in taking Aleppo in order to change the balance of power between the Turks on the one hand, and the Russians and the Syrians on the other.

Because what Ankara wanted, it wanted a new policy on the basis of the Russians and Assad, with respect to the Northeast Syria, where the PKK is in an alliance with the United States, in the form of the Syrian democratic forces. And Erdogan wanted a negotiation with Assad about the shape of a new Syria, where the YPG would be brought up under the authority of the central government. And Assad wasn’t negotiating, and so Ankara wanted to change the terms of the negotiation, put some pressure on Assad. And when HTS came up against the Syrian forces, the Syrian forces just collapsed, and HTS then ran to Damascus and took Damascus. So, HTS is really the dog that caught the car, this wasn’t part of a concerted plan to topple Assad and take control of Syria.

Zineb Riboua:

Can, you’re the military expert, what can you tell us on this?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Yeah, so for what I do here, and what we do as Ukraine Military Situation Report, as MENA Defense Intelligence Digest, is a 21st century thing, it is open source defense intelligence. And although it can work miracles, the most troublesome thing for us, defense analysts, is to monitor tyrannies and dictatorships, especially their domestic political military trends. Because these regimes tend to implode when they fall, not explode. The North Koreans, the Syrians, what’s happening not between the Ukrainian military and the Russian military, but what’s happening within the Kremlin, so to speak. So, one thing that caught many a surprise, like my colleague and friend, Mike Duran, is it is really hard to monitor, to track, internal dynamics within these regimes.

But I think there are three reasons why it happened. The first thing, it was very obvious, the military structure or the Syrian security apparatus, that it wasn’t a unitary Syrian Arab Army that we were seeing, it was, first of all, it was the core Alawite elite of the Syrian military, which is 30,000 to 40,000, like the 4th Mechanized division, like the Republican Guard, and that was the very sectarian extension of the regime’s political outlook. And then, there was the Sunni masses around there, with the harvest of conscripts, as well as the Iran-harvested militia formations accompanying the regular Syrian Arab Army. So, looking at Syria’s military power through the sense of, so to speak, IISS military balance, and actually looking at the elite core of the regime’s military power, were two different animals. The Syrian military wasn’t that formidable, actually, the core of the Syrian military, that was the extension of the regime, was weak, narrow, and not very powerful in manpower.

The second thing is, I think there was a time that the patrons of this regime, the Iranians and the Russians, were called very busy in their parts of the world. Russia, obviously with the Russo-Ukrainian war, I would say it would have played out very differently if there was no Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Russian Federation had massive amounts of military reinforcements to send to Syria to help Assad, and Iran was already curbed in Lebanon, in Iraq, and due to its showdown with Israel. So, I think this is the second reason, the patrons, the sponsors of them, the backers of the Syrian regime, Syrian Ba’ath regime, were already in trouble in their backyards. And I think the third issue here is, over the course of the Civil War, the Syrian security apparatus, and the Syrian people, and the Syrian Arab Army had more than enough attrition that they were unable to react to such a mounting pressure amidst a very, very limited time in a blitz fashion.

And the fourth answer, which is these are the logical military intelligence explanations to what happened, the structure of the Syrian Arab Army, the shape of the backers of the regime, and the attrition factor that played out, wear and tear. . . And the fourth factor is it happens. It happens during the fall of Mosul to ISIS, it happens during the fall of Afghan National Army to Taliban, we call it the Pearl Harbor effect, if you like it. Military affairs are not always linear, although we have mathematical modelings that work really well 90 percent of the time, 10 percent all the time, we should keep in mind that any military engagement is a chaotic system. So, it is nonlinear, and many differences in the input can create drastic changes in the output. Just like it happens during the fall of Mosul, during the fall of Afghan National Army, during the Pearl Harbor, or in Vietnam, the Tet Offensive, it happened in Syria.

Zineb Riboua:

So, what I get is that it caught you by surprise, but it’s not surprising at all that it happened. Mike, how do you see this strategic landscape now? It seems that everything completely changed.

Michael Doran:

I am actually answering your question, but I want to respond directly to what you said about it’s surprised everyone, but it’s not surprising. The thing that should be the least surprising to everyone, I think, is the rise of the Turks. If you go back to 2020, and think about what happened that year, I think people were not paying attention really. One is that there was an. . . Well, in 2020, the Turks demonstrated their dominance over the Russians and the Iranians in three different arenas, all in the same year. One was in the South Caucasus, the Azerbaijanis defeated the Armenians, they were supported by the Turks. They were using Turkish equipment, Turkish concepts of operations, and they routed the Armenians, who were using Russian equipment and Russian concepts of operations.

They did the same thing to the Russians in Libya, and then in Syria itself. And in Syria, they were not going. . . Once again, they were just trying to stabilize their front, they were trying to prevent a Russian and Iranian assault on Idlib, but in doing so, they killed lots of Hezbollah fighters, Iranians, Russians, and they demonstrated their dominance. We should have seen back then that they are, militarily, the dominant player in the Middle East, with the possible exception of Israel. And comparing the Turkish military to the Israeli military is apples and oranges, they’re very different structures, different kinds of states. The Turks don’t have some of the capabilities, like the F35 that the Israelis have, but the Turks have the ability to shape events on the ground in a way that nobody else does, and to project power all around the region.

So, the outcome of this is, first of all, number one, collapse of the. . . Near total collapse, it isn’t total. But a severe weakening of Iran’s resistance axis. Because Assad was a key node through Syria, that the Iranians can resupply Hezbollah, which is the jewel in the crown of the resistance axis, but without Syria, Hezbollah has weakened significantly. The Israelis already hollowed out Hezbollah. But without Syria, the system is a shadow of its former self, and then you have the rise of the Israelis and the Turks, who are now bumping up against each other in Syria. That, to me, is the number one strategic issue for the United States. Because we’re in an era, we have been in an era since George W. Bush, of foreign policy restraint. Meaning that the United States is very wary about sending large numbers of troops into the Middle East to reshape reality.

So, we have to work with our allies if we want to shape reality. We have only two allies in the Middle East who are capable of projecting power beyond their borders, and that’s Israel and Turkey. So, now, our two allies are bumping up against each other in Syria. So, to me, those are the two most important tasks that our foreign policy has right now. One, finish the job with regard to the Iranians, because we have a window of opportunity not just to weaken the resistance axis, but to eliminate it, and then number two, we have to mediate between the Turks and the Israelis.

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah. Before I go, before I back to this question on Turkey and Israel, can you give us more of your insights, Can, on how you assess now, there are a lot of things on the chessboard that are changing, militarily speaking, in terms of Syria, what can you tell us about that?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Well, first of all, there was one big elephant in the room that is not in the room anymore, the strategic weapons systems of Syria, and WMDs, weapons of mass destruction. It was the, I would say, threat, going beyond convention and irregular capabilities, Syria had the largest chemical weapons arsenal. Syria, by the way, although it is not making the headlines right now, Syria is not a party to the biological weapons convention, it’s signed, but never ratified that. I think this should be one of the high priorities of the West when dealing with the new rulers of Syria. The strategic weapons systems outlook also pertain to ballistic missile capabilities, or the Syrian Arab Army. As far as we know, and as far as we track, the Israeli Defense Forces preventive operations during the fall of Assad, we understand that that missile warfare prowess is not in place, or it degraded to an extent that it is not an operational threat right now, I think it is important.

The second thing is picking up where Mike left off, I do not see Israel and Turkey being structurally on a collision course, or they don’t have to be on a collision course in Syria. Let’s go through a very fast checklist. So, because of different reasons, the number one priority of Turkey and Israel is no return of the IRGC, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards, or the mullah’s cloud, mullah’s influence over Syria again. The Iranians want to destabilize Syria, they know that they’re not coming back, but they can always destabilize Syria, this is number one, I think also priority of both Israel and Turkey, no Iranian influence at the pre-revolutionary levels in Syria. It won’t be Iran Syria again, I think that is also a common understanding. No harboring or fertile ground for ISIS, al-Qaeda, or that kind of Salafi jihadi terrorism, we should keep in mind that Turkey has been very frequently targeted by ISIS affiliates and al-Qaeda affiliates, including both in its capital and Istanbul, its geopolitical core.

So, in terms of the checklist, no Iran returning back to Syria, Syria not being a fertile ground for jihadi terrorism, the demise of the Syrian strategic weapons systems, the Syrian weapons of mass destruction, and make sure that new regime do not have these capabilities, wouldn’t develop these capabilities. So, I think these are the checklist points that the Israelis and Turks would naturally agree on. Now, they have some divergences, they have the divergences as to the character of the new regime, as to the fact that the new regime has HTS, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, in its core, and it was, and still is, an Islamist organization. As to the Druze prioritization of the Israelis and Turkey’s priority in Syria, number one priority in Syria, is the offshoots of the PKK network, but I think we have tracks to handle this.

One issue that I would approach to Syria, is Syria is, the basic Syria is an Arab nation, and sociologically military is the very core of stability and security in each Arab nation, in different forms. Be it the monarchies, be it the Ba’ath regimes, be it the left wing, be it other ideologies. . . A stable military and security sector is the very core of almost every single Arab nation in the world right now. So, looking at Syria, I think the main issue with Syria, which the Israelis and the Turks can agree or find a common ground, is a barbarian sense of military unity, which is the cool academic way of saying that Syria should have one single monopoly on lethal force, on military force. Integrating the SDF elements, which we saw a recent agreement, integrating the SDF elements, Syrian Democratic Forces elements, into the Syrian military is one priority.

Perhaps integrating the Druzes, I don’t know if the Israelis would like it or not, but into the new Syrian military is one other priority. And to make sure that the Iranians are not coming back, integrating the Alawites into that one single Syrian military is also a priority. So, I think the main issue will revolve around the security sector reform in Syria. How the new military will take shape, because that military like every other Arab nation, will be one of the cornerstones, one of the main pillars of stability. Its sectarian outlook, non-sectarian outlook, the composition, the ethnic composition, the political military structure, and what kind of armed forces it would look like. We should keep in mind that the Syrian Arab Army was the Arabic-speaking Red Army during the Cold War, or Iraqi, Libyan and the Egyptian militaries, the Syrian Arab army was the one that was resembling the Soviet Red Army the most. And it remains to be seen who’s going to be the new patron of the Syrian Arab armed forces. If it becomes Turkey, for instance, can you imagine NATO nation bordering Iran, Iraq, Syria now being the main trainer and the weapon system supplier to once upon a time a client of the Soviet Union. Now, that would be a real geopolitical change, I would say.

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah. Thank you, John, for first of all giving us this great perspective of how things are, especially in terms of priorities of Turkey. Mike, there’s also the Kurdish question, which is central not just for Turkey, but also for Israel right now. And it seems to be really, I mean there’s also the Druze question as well, but the question of minorities is really a headache politically more than geopolitically. What can you give us on that?

Michael Doran:

The key question there, I think is, what’s the position of the United States? Because right now you have, in Northeast Syria you have the SDF, which is a combined Kurdish and Arab militia that is made possible only by the support of the United States. The Arabs in that part of the world and the Kurds would not form together to create a militia if it wasn’t backed by the strongest power in the world. From the point of view of the Turks, this is infuriating, because the Kurdish element is the YPG, which is the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, which is the organization that historically has wanted to break Turkey into a Turkish state and a Kurdish state in the East. Before the United States got involved, you have basically three different major, call them cantons, Kurdish cantons. Each one is separated geographically by Arabs. And so, there was no hope that those three different Kurdish areas could form together and make one little mini statelet on the borders of Turkey.

But when the United States came in and built the SDF, which is a pyramid, at the top of the SDF is the YPG, that is the PKK, and then underneath it are the Arab units. But it allows the Kurds to overcome the territorial limitations of their settlement pattern in Northeast Syria. If you’re sitting in Ankara and you look at that, the United States is building Rojava, the independent Kurdish state in Syria. And it doesn’t matter how much the Americans says, “We’re not doing that. We don’t intend to do that.� Their intention doesn’t matter, that is effectively what they are doing. The Turks have intervened militarily several times in order to divide it up and to prevent, in order to make sure that Rojava cannot rise up.

Now it looks like President Trump is inclined to pull the American troops out, which will require the YPG to then be brought up under the central government in some way. And there’s now an agreement between Mazloum, who’s the head of the YPG and Sharaa Jolani to do just that. Whether that agreement will ever come to pass, we don’t know, but it’s been reliably reported, I think that CENTCOM, the US military, put pressure on Mazloum to make that deal, which is an indication that maybe not that the Americans have one foot out the door, but they might well go in that direction. The outcome there in Northeast Syria is really going to be dependent on a conversation between . . . On a negotiation between President Donald Trump and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Apparently, and the news media is reporting that President Erdogan will be coming to Washington next month. Everyone in Syria is going to be watching that conversation very, very, very carefully, because a lot hangs on that.

All of these things that we’re talking about, that John was just talking about, the ethnic composition of the Army, who’s going to build the Syrian Army? On what terms, what’s going to be the relationship between the new Syrian military and the jihadi elements that Sharaa has under him right now. In HTS there are all these foreign fighters, jihadis, who come out of an Al-Qaeda background. What’s their role going to be in this military? A lot of those issues are going to be determined, I think, or at least the direction for the negotiation about them is going to be set by this conversation between President Erdogan and President Trump.

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah. Before I go back to you, John, Mike, in terms of the international community response, I thought it was amazing in the sense that the Saudis are ready to join in terms of reconstruction. I think Germany today announced that they’re going to open an embassy. The French are also very much involved in the talks. How do you assess the response of the Europeans, but also of Gulf countries in this regard?

Michael Doran:

Well, there’s a lack of American leadership, which is the problem. The only power in the world that can work constructively with the Turks to stabilize Syria is the United States. I don’t mean to say that the United States has to be on the ground or that it has to do all of the work, but it’s the only one who can pull together a coalition to represent the concerns of the Europeans, of the Gulf states, of the Israelis. Only the United States can pull that together and say, “We need the following things. We need a Syria that will not have weapons of mass destruction, that won’t threaten its neighbors, that won’t allow the Iranians to use its territory, that won’t have a jihadi state that’s intent on spreading jihad across the Arab world and so forth.�

If the United States doesn’t pull those allies together and develop a unified position, then all of them will start running to make their own deals for all kinds of different reasons, but looking after their own narrow interest. The only power right now in the world that has a real interest in stabilizing Syria is Turkey. There are lots of other powers that are interested in destabilizing it, if only to cause the Turks a problem. If we’re going to get stability out of the situation, the stability that I think everyone needs, Europe, the United States, the Gulf, Israel, the United States has to actually have a Syria policy, which in my experience is not something historically it has had. We have an Israel policy, we have a Lebanon policy. Sometimes we have an Iran policy all the time. We never have a Syria policy.

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah, let’s talk a bit about the Iran policy, because it seems that it’s all interconnected, John, let’s suppose you’re Khamenei right now. You’ve invested all of your life, resources, time, human capital, into building this massive IRGC and proxies. You try to isolate Israel politically, you try to cause problems for the Turks whenever you can, and you see all of that collapsing. How do you think the Iranians are really reading the situation when it comes to Syria?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Well, if I were Khamenei right now, if I had to draw parallels between myself and another species in the animal kingdom, I would say that I’m an octopus losing my arms and my tentacles. That is how I would feel if I were Khamenei. Let’s look at the Iranian resistance of Axis, the Iranian, the Persian Empire, the Neo-Persian empire three years ago, and this Neo-Persian empire right now. The Lebanese Hezbollah once a beast in Lebanon, once we published even a special report on military capabilities of the Lebanese Hezbollah asymmetric military capabilities of that formation, it is gone, especially the, I’m going to steal Mike’s concept here, Operation Grim Beeper, Operation Grim Beeper all the explosions in the call devices of the Lebanese Hezbollah leadership showed the degree, the level of the Israeli penetration using human intelligence, high-tech, and all this financial and technological supply routes to infiltrate into the Lebanese Hezbollah network. So, the Lebanese Hezbollah is gone.

The Israeli defense forces were meant to be stuck in a quagmire, that didn’t happen. Now, there is the Trump administration in the White House with Iran being the number one, the prime security threat, and your one and only state ally in the resistance of Axis, which is the Ba’ath regime of Syria, and your critical conduit to the Lebanese Hezbollah is gone. So, lots of arms and tentacles that are lost here. These arms and tentacles were not only a part of Iran’s proxy warfare policy, but they were also functioning as the buffers between the United States, Israel, and Iran’s nuclear program. Right now there is nothing standing between Iranian nuclear program and a preventive or preemptive American-Israeli joint military action.

And by that joint military action, we have to just, I think, focus on another corner of the Middle East, Yemen, the Houthis. Now, we had American strikes and even Israeli strikes hampering the Houthi military capabilities, but now we see a change. During the Biden administration we had three types of American military action against the Yemeni Houthis. One, there were defensive operations, which is again the cooler way of saying interceptions of the Houthi rockets, drones, missiles, and unmanned surface vehicles. Second, there were preventive defensive operations, which is again the cool way of saying the Houthis are about to launch a missile or launch drones, and you are on the spot preventing that, and punitive operations, just showing some big sticks to tame them. But right now, with the Trump administration, with the recent strikes on the Houthis, we see for the first time offensive action on the Houthis militia extending to the leadership and systematically crippling critical capabilities.

But there is a political element, and we should keep in mind that it is the political framework that shape every single military operation. There is a political framework that the Trump administration has initiated right now holding Iran directly responsible for every single Houthi action. Now, I think it also pertains to, I don’t want to speculate, but it also pertains to the good old question here in Washington, D.C., as well as Israeli strategic circles, a military campaign to halt, to destroy Iranian nuclear program. I think that campaign might have already started with the American action, because it is, before jumping into that and before giving the floor to my colleague, Mike, let’s understand what the Iranian nuclear program is not before explaining what it is. It is not Osirak, Iraq 1981. It is not Al Kibar, Syria 2007. It is not one single facility, one single program. It is not one single weapon system design.

First, the geopolitical factor, Iran is a huge country. It has mountainous landscape, and this nuclear program is scattered around the Iranian principle. Secondly, the Iranians have many ways to develop a nuclear device. And with that military-grade nuclear device they have developed many ways to deliver it. So, it is not a military campaign to destroy Iranian nuclear program won’t be something like the Israeli strikes on Osirak, Iraq, or Al Kibar. It won’t be something that Mike is going to wake up one day, I’m going to give him a call and I’m going to say, “This is happening right now, right today.� It is not something that you’re going to see on your Twitter, it is happening right now. It takes a process to take out such a massive program. And one prerequisite to take out that big program is to make sure that the octopus is without its arms and tentacles. The Houthis were the one arm of that octopus that can create global impact. The Red Sea is 15 percent of global trade, and maritime shipping is 90 percent of international economic transactions.

The Houthis are the only Iranian proxy that has compared to Lebanese Hezbollah, compared to Palestinian Islamic Jihad or the Iraqi militia formations that has almost an immune geopolitical location in a far distant part of the world, almost ruling out any land campaign. And it is the only leverage of the Iranians that can create a global economic impact. I think the Israeli strikes on the Iranian Air Defense Network, the S-300s, again, the Israeli strikes taking out solid propellant ballistic missile proliferation of the Islamic Republic.

Then the American offensive campaign right now on the Houthis and the new policy of holding Iran directly responsible for the Houthi aggression and Houthi disruption of maritime traffic, I think we are seeing the early telltale indicators of the military option against Iranian nuclear program. To wrap it up, and here by a military campaign I don’t necessarily mean that a military campaign that would kinetically hit portal and take the Iranian nuclear program out. Military campaigns are done to create political options. I think the Trump administration right now in league with the Israeli government are trying to set the scene that they would engage with the Islamic Republic from a very advantageous position, and they would say, “Either you give up that nuclear program, or there will be a military operation, and your arms and your tentacles are out of the table right now, you are naked.� I think we are seeing the early telltale indicators of stripping Khamenei of its, let’s say, porcupine dressing.

Zineb Riboua:

Would you say that it’s very similar to the Gaddafi situation?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

I can say that there are some parallels, but Gaddafi situation was that Gaddafi was the center of gravity of the Libyan regime at the time. Khamenei, although it is the leader of the regime, I would say the center of gravity of that regime is the Revolutionary Guard. If we see further action that degrade the Revolutionary Guard as an institution, because Iran, the Islamic Republic was established, I don’t know what Mike would say on that, but the Islamic Republic was established as a theocratic dictatorship. But I think with the over time right now it is turning into a military dictatorship with a theocratic feature in that the Revolutionary Guards make the central gravity of the regime. So, it is not that easy that you take out Gaddafi, the body will collapse.

Michael Doran:

Can I put a question to John?

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah, of course. Yeah.

Michael Doran:

John, I’m curious to know your answer to this question. Somebody just asked me earlier today, and I didn’t know what to say, because I hadn’t talked to you yet about it. How difficult do you think it is for the United States to knock out the Houthis? I’m not saying topple them, but knock them out as a serious military threat.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Let’s think systematically. I would say it is possible only if you follow the right steps. The Houthi threat at its essence is asymmetric, critical, disruptive military capabilities, which means a combination of their anti-ship ballistic missiles, which is very important, by the way, because the Chinese are watching. Because an anti-ship ballistic missile is the weapon system that can take out an aircraft carrier and that can attack a carrier strike group. And this is why the Chinese are also keeping a very close eye on the Houthis, because this is the first time that we saw an operational use of an anti-ship ballistic missile. If you, first of all, in order to take-

Michael Doran:

And there are only two countries that have anti-ship ballistic missiles, right?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

There are more developing that the Iranians have already developed that, the Houthis, they have their Iran-assisted ones.

Michael Doran:

You should tell the world what an anti-ship ballistic missile is, because-

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

It is a cool, very cool ballistic missile that can hit a moving target.

Michael Doran:

How can you hit a moving target with a ballistic?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

You have to have a very good kill chain, as we call it, your ISTAR capabilities, your Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition capabilities should be really at high standards, and you should be tracking that moving target and being able to cue that data, that targeting data to your main strike package. But you should also keep in mind that a carrier strike group is not an oil tanker. A carrier strike group has its own air and missile defenses. So, your strike package should be configured in a way that you protect your ballistic missiles from your adversary’s air defenses. To do that, you should have accompanying loitering munitions, decoys, other cruise missiles to complicate the air picture. But due to their massive warheads, anti-ship ballistic missiles are the one that deliver the knockout punch. But for the Houthis to disrupt maritime traffic, they don’t have to actually hit something. If I take a gun out and start shooting at the ceiling here, I guarantee that I empty this room. If I keep doing that-

Michael Doran:

That’s not true. John Walters will stay here.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

If I keep doing that for a week, or if people keep doing that for a week, I guarantee that I disrupt the entire economic transactions and business activity in this district. So the Houthi’s actually, this is the beauty. This is the notorious beauty of Houthi operations. They don’t have to hit anything at all. They just shoot missiles at commercial targets. This is enough to cause a financial hike to the insurance costs that is enough to cause a major disruption of the maritime traffic, and it is just enough for them to show to the Iranian patrons that they’re the most important proxy. Coming back to your question, it is possible. It is possible for the United States only if it pushes the right buttons. The first button to push is to understand that it is not about killing the Houthi militia. It is about disrupting profoundly their critical military capabilities. The second button it takes us from here is that Houthi’s critical military capabilities are not stemming from Houthi’s defense technology and industrial base. It is stemming from Iran, the Islamic Republic, and the Revolutionary Guards contingent alongside the Houthi’s.

So it remains to be seen the rules of engagement that the Trump administration will, again, as the political framework, order to the American military in the Middle East. Would they be allowed to target the Iranian component alongside the Houthi militia?

Michael Doran:

Sounds like a good idea.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

It is not a good idea. It is the only idea. You’ve got a bacterial infection. You either give painkillers to your patient so that you just spend it or you systemically treat it with antibiotics. The antibiotic systemic treatment here, not a cortisone shot, not painkillers, if you want to address the Houthi threat, you can address it only in Iran and by systematically targeting the Iranian Revolutionary Guards because this is the source of the Houthi disruptive military capabilities. Any option other than that is trying to treat a serious bacterial infection with painkillers, which we call symptomatic treatment, not a systemic one.

Zineb Riboua:

John, just following up on your remarks, there is something I hear very often and that the Houthi is try to publicize as much as possible, which is Yemen is like Afghanistan. You cannot do, I mean, geographically speaking also, you cannot do much. And it seems that a lot is changing. I mean, the Houthi’s are not retreating, but they’re being forced to retreat. What is your assessment of the recent air strikes?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Yeah. The first thing is, let’s take it from this analogy of Yemen is Afghanistan. If the Iranians or any analyst in DC is proposing that through the lens of a major strategic level land operation to seize territory and to run counter insurgence operations, I would say yes, it resembles, and I would, as a military analyst, I would oppose any and every military plan that aims to seize territory and execute a large scale land campaign. But what is different in Afghanistan is that Taliban was not a proxy force and Taliban was not using disruptive military capabilities enabled by a foreign actor. So if you cut the critical connection between the Iranian enabled critical military capabilities and the Yemen Houthi militia, you can make sure that they are posing no threat on maritime transactions, and it is possible to degrade using air power, just recalling NATO operations in the Balkans in the end of the previous century. Air power in certain situations, especially situations like the Yemeni threat, it is possible with the air power to handle that situation.

So it is up to your target set. It is up to the political mandate of that operation, and it is up to the very decision that are you targeting the puppet or the puppeteer? So in these dots in your checklist, no, it is not Afghanistan. It is a very doable military task with the US led, American led naval and Air Force components.

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah. Thank you, John. Mike, what do you make of this? The United States sit in the ground and also the pillars of-

Michael Doran:

This would make a nice Hudson very short report, put it on the Hudson website.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Is this a tasking?

Zineb Riboua:

We’re tasking live.

Michael Doran:

Yeah, it’s tasking live. It would make a very nice report.

Zineb Riboua:

Yes, it would. But what do you make of this? Because there is a debate in Washington regarding the United States engaging in the Middle East, et cetera. We know where we stand on this debate, but also it seems that the Trump administration is setting in some type of pillars when it comes to dismantling the Iran nuclear program, but also reshaping the Middle East security framework.

Michael Doran:

So I think John put it very well, and very interestingly when he said that the war against Iran’s nuclear program may have already begun. That’s one scenario. One scenario is Prime Minister Netanyahu came to Washington, spoke with Donald Trump, they agreed that there’s a window of opportunity to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program. And they agreed that the first step is to take out the Houthi militia because number one, it’s part of the mechanism by which Iran is trying to prevent anyone from attacking it but at the same time, it also sends a message of great earnestness to the Iranians that the whole change of rules of engagement from Biden to Trump is a message not just to the Houthi’s, but also to Iran. But scenario two is Donald Trump wants a negotiation with the Iranians by which they will agree to dismantle their nuclear program, and he is putting pressure on them saying, “Negotiate or else.�

But John also said that one of the goals of a military operation is not just to have an impact on the enemy, but to offer options to Washington. So Donald Trump right now is just increasing his options. He has an option to negotiate from a better position with the Iranians, and he has a better military option should he choose to take it. I don’t think either decision has been made. They’re going to wait and see how the Iranians respond to their offer or to their demand that Iran negotiate. I mean, Donald Trump campaigned on peace through strength. He wants to go down in history, I think as somebody who brought peace to Ukraine, to the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, to the Middle East, and he would prefer to do that by flexing economic muscle rather than military muscle, but he’s also showing a willingness to use military muscle.

All of that means, whichever path he decides to go down, it means that those in his administration that we here call the Restraintists, the element in his coalition that say, “The Middle East doesn’t matter anymore. We’re not particularly threatened by an Iran with a nuclear weapon. We can manage that. The Israelis are acting as a catapult to throw us into a conflict with Iran that’s really not in our interest,� et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, all those people, they exist in his coalition, but he’s not listening to them clearly. They clearly don’t reflect the policy of the president. I think that’s an objective fact.

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah. John, there is one player we have not talked about, and it’s Russia. I remember when Assad collapsed, I called you and I said, “I think this is really over for Russia.� I mean, there are many ways through which Putin can get back with Hmeimim and have some sort of position and posture there. But military speaking, he relied so much on Iranian proxies. He relied so much on what Prigozhin built that it will be hard for him to replicate. And it’s the same thing with the Houthi’s. It seemed that one of the first thing that happened after United States launched the attack on the Houthi’s is a call from Lavrov to Rubio asking him to stop. So how do you assess the Russian position here?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

So let’s start with talking about what the Russians have lost or may lose in the near term. The military contingents of the Russian Federation, especially the Tartus naval base, which was the only Soviet remnant overseas base of contemporary Russia, was very critical, not only for the Russian operations in the Middle East, but for another part of the world that we are one of the best experts above Africa. So for the Russian operations in Africa, because the Russians didn’t inherit an organic Mediterranean fleet from the Soviet Union, they were using their Black Sea fleet, which is right now caged in the Black Sea because of the Turkish initiation of the Montreux Convention. But during peacetime, it was the Black Sea fleet that was enabling all the operations in the Mediterranean and projecting power to North Africa from there to down south. And the stopover for them was Tartus, and there was no alternative to Tartus to offer a stopover to the Russian operations, but also for the strategic airlift all the way from the Russian principle to Africa, Himaymim air base was yet a critical choke point for the Russian military power projection.

Now, these two, I wouldn’t say structurally because looking at the Syrian new regime, the Syrian new regime treats Iran and Russia very differently. Iran is the number one threat for the Syrian regime. Russia is not number one threat in their geopolitical orientation. It is rather, I would say a bumpy road that they have to engage diplomatically. But for now, we are seeing that the Russians are not able to use their air component and their naval component in Syria. Now, that might change given how their diplomatic engagement will be with Damascus, but it is a major predicament for them. The other factor that you pointed out is the land component. The Russian military really enjoyed their expeditionary operations in Syria. It was very beneficial for them because of two reasons. So 60 percent of Russian strategic aviation took a combat tour in Syria. 90 percent of Russian tactical military operation took a combat tour in Syria.

All the chief military figures of the Russian Federation, including the incumbent military leadership, took combat tours in Syria with rotations of six months. And according to the Russian Minister of Defense, every single Syrian Arab army unit had a Russian liaison starting from the battalion level. So Syria was the place for the Russian military to see actual combat, test their personnel as well as their weapons systems, including the caliber missiles for instance right now that we are seeing in Ukraine. Hundreds of weapons systems that are being in use in Ukraine right now, were tested in Syria, but the Russians didn’t have to repeat their Afghan expedition because the land component was enabled by the Iranians and the Syrians. So it was a very beneficial game for them.

It is also gone and one of their main allies called for remaining allies, the Syrian Arab Army of the Ba’ath regime is also gone. I think it is the season for the Russians to one, detach themselves from the Iranians and develop an independent Syria policy to engage the new regime in Damascus. And second, it is time for the Russians, if they can, to find a place under the sun in Syria by offering some concessions to the Syrian regime. But the good old days that they were aligning with the Iranians, they were running military operations, denying the Syrian airspace to outsiders and having a client in Damascus, I think these are just gone, by the way-

Michael Doran:

They also need the consent of the Turks, don’t you think?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

It is upside down right now because in every single Turkish major campaign in Syria, there was a diplomatic game between Ankara and Damascus that Ankara was testing the waters between Ankara and Moscow, that Turkey was testing the waters in the Kremlin and doing all the engagement according to a tacit or an open consent by the Russians. Now, the entire showdown is upside down. It is the Russians that have to test the waters in Ankara as well as in Israel, as well as in other capitals to see what they can and they cannot do in Syria. It is beautiful to see that, isn’t it?

Zineb Riboua:

So we have a few minutes left. Mike, so what’s your general assessment? We’ve talked about Syria, Iran, US, but what is really the priority? What should be the priority for US foreign policy in this regard?

Michael Doran:

The number one priority is for the United States to broker a deal between the Israelis and the Turks about the rules of the road in Syria, which is going to include the conditions under which the United States will lift the sanctions on the Syrian government. Everything is going to, I think, hinge on two things, the Erdogan Trump negotiations about Northeast Syria and the Turkish-Israeli competition. Because if the Israelis feel that the Turks are developing the new government in Syria to be a launchpad for an Islamist revolution throughout the Arab world, then the Israelis, and not just them alone, but together with their Arab friends and maybe others, are going to look to blow up the whole project and we’ll have the Syrian Civil War reignited. So I think getting the world around Syria stabilized with basic criteria for what is needed from the new Syria, and then engaging the new Syrian government from within that framework, I think that’s the way to proceed.

Zineb Riboua:

John, I mean, apart from your general assessments, what’s also the things we should track going forward

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

As to the Middle Eastern security landscape?

Zineb Riboua:

Sorry?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

As to the general Middle Eastern security landscape and military trends?

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah, especially regarding Syria.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Regarding, yeah. So one thing we should track in Syria, and I would repeat myself because I think this is the essence of building stability in any Arab nations security sector reform. How the new security outlook of Syria will take shape, who will man critical positions in the new Syrian Arab army? How the intelligence structure, the homeland security structure, the key personnel. . . Because this is the first time that we are trying it in Syria after decades. For decades, we knew that it was the Alawite elite hailing from the coastal regions of Syria. It was the Praetorian guard as the very heart of the Syrian regime, the Syrian Ba’ath regime, the Fort mechanized division, the Republican guard. It was rather easy for defense analysts to track military developments. We knew that it was going to be a regime Praetorian commander who should be in charge of weapons of mass destruction.

We knew that the Fort mechanized division, the Republican guard, were the Praetorian guards of the regime, and if necessary, their function was to buffer any coup attempt coming from other parts of the Syrian Arab army, not only as a buffer to external threat, so on, so on. But the security sector reform, number one. Number two, I would say Iran’s destabilization capacity in Syria because every major player that we are talking about are trying to build a game in Syria. The Iranians stand out from the crowd. They are not trying to broker an Iranian game in Syria, they are trying to destabilize every single plan in Syria. By doing that, they have many inroads into the Syrian landscape, which we saw very recently. The Alawite uprising in the coastline was predominantly pioneered by the remnants of the Fort mechanized division, which was headed by Mahir al-Assad, who was the critical conduit of the Iranians, who was number one problem for the Russians, and that was a very sectarian formation that developed special relations with Iran. So the second trend we should monitor is the Iranian destabilization capacity in Syria.

The third trend that we should monitor is the diplomatic engagement capacity of the new regime. I don’t mean only with Turkey, I mean with Saudi Arabia, Gulf, but also the United States. What they can come, if they can come, and offer here in Washington DC because this is how it works right now. This is the main game in Washington as far as I can see. How useful are you to the American interests and how well you can articulate that. This is how you build political capital in United States right now, and we’re going to see the partners of the new regime and the new regime itself can pull it off because looking at their past and present, there is a huge gap. As to the Turkish-Israeli cooperation, I can say that it is hard, but it is doable. I don’t know if it is socially correct to use that frame, but I think Turkey and Israel shouldn’t. . .

Zineb Riboua:

You can be politically incorrect here.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Yeah. So they-

Michael Doran:

I wouldn’t give them a blank check. I got to see-

Zineb Riboua:

Militarily, politically incorrect.

Michael Doran:

. . . where is he going with it? Where is he going with it?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

They shouldn’t. There are two formal relations between Turkey and Israel. One is a marriage, the other one is an affair. The marriage happened in the 1990s when Turkish and Israeli prime ministers were shaking hands before the cameras and when the two presidents were having joint press conferences. The other form of relationship between Turkey and Israel happened back in the late 1950s that there was a security and intelligence dialogue ongoing, but nobody wanted to do that before the cameras, okay?

So looking at the path to rejuvenate and repair Turkish-Israeli relations, why the United States should necessarily focus on saving the marriage? Let’s save their affair. Let’s keep the security and intelligence dialogue not before the cameras, no flamboyant handshakes, but to make sure that Iran is not returning back to Syria, making sure that Iran is destabilizing Syria, making sure that the new Syrian regime won’t have weapons of mass destruction, making sure that if there are any remnants of Syrian strategic weapons, they’re out of the table, making sure that the new Syrian regime behaves and they do not become a fertile ground for Salafi jihadi incubation, so to speak.

For all these critical security agendas that the Turks and the Israelis would agree on, I think we need an American involvement, like a mediation again, to be politically and socially incorrect to save the affair.

Michael Doran:

It doesn’t necessarily have to be a mediation.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

No, just enabling it.

Michael Doran:

It doesn’t have to be the US pulling the Israelis and the Turks together. It can also be the US keeping them apart by agreeing to certain principles that Israeli forces will only be in this area. Turkish forces will only be in this area. We all agree that the Syrian government will not develop the following capabilities. We all agree the Syrian government will get rid of its jihadi element and things like that. So that the US actually becomes itself. Syria is the buffer, but the United States is also the buffer between Israel and Turkey.

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah. If you don’t mind, we’ll go in to take a few questions since we started a bit late.

Michael Doran:

Depends on who we ask, huh?

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah. Any questions?

Speaker 1:

You talked about-

Michael Doran:

You have a microphone coming.

Speaker 1:

Thank you. It’s been very interesting. I get a chance to see a lot of things at Hudson I don’t always learn something. I learn something here, so thank you. You talked about a lot of the other people. What does China see here? What does it want? What can it do? What does it learn from this?

Michael Doran:

I turn to Zineb for the answer to that.

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah. I would say that China actually started really embracing the Houthis, politically speaking. They’re very cautious when it comes to military operations, et cetera. But it was very, very helpful for China to have the Houthis target Western shipments, to target Americans, to also. . . I mean, for China it’s really about the long term. So the perception of the United States being weak of Europeans not being able to protect these shipments since they’re the ones who rely so much on the Red Sea for trade and et cetera. It made them look extremely weak and reliable, which is helpful, especially when we take into consideration the fact that Saudi Arabia and Iran have normalized based on the agreement that China would mediate any issue in regards to the Houthis.

And so China having the upper hand since the Westerners were weak, made it look very, very good. So I think now, China is. . . I think China now, especially after the Operation Grim Beeper found itself in the wrong side. They ruined the relationship with Israel, which they needed because Israel is stopped when it comes to biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, et cetera. They also are now seen very suspiciously by Gulf countries. They have not delivered when it comes to Houthis, not attacking anyone. So I think for China, what we will see is more of a recalibrating approach. I think they will try to save face, if you guys agree.

Michael Doran:

I don’t know anything about the subject, so I’m looking to everyone else except that there are Uyghurs in the Syrian army.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

When you hear a hammer, you tend to see everything as nail. When you’re a defense analyst, you monitor everything through the lens of military affairs. But that’s my job for »ªÌå»á. So only pertaining to military affairs and defense intelligence, I can see three things that the Chinese have stake here.

One, and I would say number one security issue is the Uyghur militancy in Syria. I recall it was, I think, at the very height of the Syrian civil war, the Chinese ambassador to Damascus gave an interview to then pro-regime news outlet, El-Watan, that he had to correct because El-Watan newspaper reported that the Chinese ambassador talked about potential Chinese special forces involvement alongside the Syrian Arab Army in military operations to topple the opposition groups, which involve Turkistan Islamic party, which is the Uyghur contingent in the opposition.

So right now, first of all, there is no Ba’ath regime in Damascus that the Chinese can have that kind of cooperation with. The Chinese ambassador then had to deny that, by the way. But we know that the Chinese were monitoring very closely the Syrian Arab Army and the Ba’ath regime’s military campaign against the opposition through the lens of the Uyghurs and the Uyghur militancy in Syria.

So right now there’s a new regime and Turkistan Islamic Party, and the Uyghur militancy are the allies of this new regime, and China doesn’t have that friend government in Damascus. I think this is number one defense intelligence trend on the Chinese intelligence that they’re tracking every single move they can of the Uyghur militancy there. The second issue I would say that the PLA, the Chinese military is tracking is the shape of the American military in the Middle East because the kind of operations like intercepting anti-ship cruise missiles, intercepting anti-ship ballistic missiles, intercepting drones that are heading to naval platforms are exactly the kind of operations that the Chinese would need to monitor American military performance and combat operations, which so far, the American Navy is doing really well.

I think for the Indo-Pacific Theater, they are keeping an eye on the American performance and the development of these kind of disruptive military trends. The third thing is we should keep an eye on the Chinese naval deployments in the broader Middle East and Red Sea. First of all, they have a maritime security mission that they’re rotating. Ostensible on paper, this is just for maritime security, but actually the PLA navy is rotating its personnel and platforms to overseas missions to gain experience. And the second trend is the trilateral joint operations between the Iranians, the Russians, and the Chinese happening in the Middle East.

We are very close monitoring that as my portfolio for the Middle East center of ours. With these drills, we are seeing that the Chinese are cooperating with their allies and partners in the region and trying to gain capabilities and new experiences. So I would say these three make the top within my portfolio, the military portfolio of the Chinese priorities.

Michael Doran:

What would you imagine, if you were a Chinese naval commander in Beijing and you were looking at the performance of the Americans against the Houthi missiles? What lessons do you think you would learn with respect to China and the American Navy in the event of a conflict over Taiwan?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Straightforward think-tanker fashion answer to that. First of all, the United States Navy has state-of-the-art interception capabilities against mixed strike packages. So far there is no American vessel that was lost or became inoperational in the face of the Houthi. . . in Iran-enabled Houthi attacks. Second of all, we see with the transition to the Trump military policy, the United States have necessary offensive capabilities in place that they’re showcasing right now.

Of course, that being said, any scenario in the Indo-Pacific against China would play out very differently against a very different adversary, but in a smaller scale, not very similar, but have similarities to some extent, situation. We are seeing that the American Navy is potent, American Navy is able and capable right now. If I were Beijing, but still I would say we also have anti-ship ballistic missiles operating and anti-ship ballistic missiles with a combat record. So how to capitalize on that? If I were the Chinese military commander, I would also say-

Michael Doran:

When you say, “we have�, you mean they now can see through the Houthis, they can see the combat record of the Houthi anti-ship ballistic-

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

And I would also say, if I were the Chinese naval commander, there are two things that are proven to work, proven to function, and I can capitalize on that. One, mixed strike packages, combining anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and drone warfare assets. You do not only overwhelm interceptors, you complicate the battle picture, and you overwhelm the sensors. So mixed strike packages are the one offensive capability to invest in, I would say.

And second, I once again saw that drone warfare and missile warfare both separately, but especially when combined is an of offense-dominant regime. Every single dollar spent in offensive capabilities would overtake every single dollar invested in defensive capabilities. One thing to add to the previous question, the Chinese priority in the region, we have a decline in Russian arm sales to the Middle East. The Chinese are waiting to fill that vacuum, just like the Algerian anti-ship missile deal.

The Russians, it was a shooting for the Russians with the Bastion missile. The Chinese came in and they snatched up the Algerian anti-ship missile tender, for instance. It is the Middle East right now with the decline. The Middle East and North Africa right now with the decline of the Russian arm sales because of the hike in the state orders is very lucrative opportunity market for the Chinese arms makers.

Zineb Riboua:

Yeah. Sorry, another question. Maybe Rania, you had a question?

Speaker 2:

Yes.

Zineb Riboua:

They’ll give you the mic.

Speaker 2:

How does Turkey want to handle the, I don’t know. . . How does Turkey want to handle the terrorism designation of Jolani and HTS with the US government?

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

The second half of the question, I’m going to leave to my colleague Mike Doran as to how the United States would handle the situation and how can the United States broker such a shift from terrorist to prison. But first of all, Jolani was not only designated, and HTS was not only designated as a terrorist organization in the United States, but also in Turkey. And you could see that in the. . . Actually during the-

Zineb Riboua:

That’s a very important point.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Because the rebellion, the last campaign that was intended to take Aleppo, not to overthrow the Assad regime, but it was a lucky shot that it overthrew the Assad regime, you should have watched the Turkish TV broadcasting because the opposition started with Aleppo, Aleppo. After that, Hama, Homs. And when it started just to be legally safe, the Turkish news outlets and TV channels that they had to put the caveat that HTS is running this uprising. By the way, it’s a terrorist organization.

It is running that they now captured Humus. By the way, it’s a terrorist organization because according to domestic legal regulations of Turkey, if you praise a terrorist organization, a designated terrorist organization, that is also a felony and that’s a serious felony. So they had to put that caveat, HTS right now is doing that military achievement. By the way, they are a terrorist group that it changed over time.

And then there is a fait accompli. And that fait accompli company changed the, I wouldn’t say the entire legal calculus, entire political legal calculus. Right now HTS and Jolani is as a protocol, top protocol, presidential protocol guest in Turkey. And it is most welcome. But it is the same for the Europeans. The people that are coming to Damascus right now to shake hands with Jolani were designating him as a terrorist, as a wanted terrorist three months ago.

The United States is, I would say a harder case to crack, not only for Turkey, but also for all the friends of the new Syrian regime. And it pertains to, I would say, three different buttons to push here in the United States. First, making sure that the new regime can and will tame all the jihadi elements within its past record. It is easier said than done, but I think this is one prerequisite to operate here with the United States, a nation that sold 9/11 and still the horrors of 9/11 is very vibrant in the United States policymaking.

The second thing is not only that, not enough to pull that off, the new regime should come here and show that it is beneficial for the United States strategic interest in the Middle East and wanting to do that. I think it should showcase that it is both willing and capable of countering Iran in the Middle East. And the third thing I would say, and I’m not sure if Turkey can play a role in that for the new regime to show to the United States that it is not anti-Israel. It is not anti-Semitic.

I’m actually sensing a change in the rhetoric of Jolani himself because he’s not referring to Israel as the Zionist entity or the Zionist project recently saying that project, the state of Israel. And he’s doing that at the expense of major criticisms from his power base, but comparing the HTS wording about Israel before and after, I think this is a telltale indicator.

Now, would that strike the Israelis as pink clouds? Because they can always say that this is Islamism 101. It comes with Taqiyya. It comes with that kind of pragmatism. They’re saying the state of Israel right now and all of a sudden it can change to Zionist entity. It can go to the realm of anti-Semitic. I don’t know. You are better equipped to tell compared to me, but I’m seeing these telltale indicators in the new regime that they’re trying to avoid every single thing to portray themselves as the arch enemies of Israel. Can Turkey help with all these three? I don’t think so. But can Turkey help with item number one and number two? I think yes. Why not?

Michael Doran:

I think there’s also the issue of minorities.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Especially the Christians.

Michael Doran:

There has to be some guarantees that minority rights will be respected and the diversity of Syria will be respected. I don’t know. I suspect that the US government itself hasn’t really formulated a very clear policy about this. I think they have a sense of what the issues are. I could be wrong about that, but I haven’t seen any indication that they really focused on it yet. The arrival of Erdogan next month will probably force them to get greater clarity about all this.

Can KasapoÄŸlu:

Still I would say the first intelligence question I would ask to the president of the United States when formulating his Syria policy would be, there is a new regime in Syria. It is a given reality. Would isolating that regime or engaging that regime help the American strategic interest most in the region? I think that is the line of departure to form a policy. It is not easy in DC. I don’t see an easy way out or way forward for the new Syrian regime, especially in the political machinations of Washington, DC.

Zineb Riboua:

Well, on this note, Can Kasapoğlu, Michael Duran, thank you for joining us today. Thank you all for joining us for this conversation. I’m sorry we are a bit late. But also do not forget to check MENA Defense Intelligence Digest of Can Kasapoğlu, published every month by the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at Hudson. Thank you again.