In a nutshell
- India values Russia as a defense supplier and counterweight to China
- Historical partnerships and shared platforms bind Russia and India
- More sanctions on Russia may push India closer to the US
Although India is more closely aligned with the United States than ever before, it is maintaining a with Russia that dates back to the Cold War era. An anticipated by Russian President Vladimir Putin to New Delhi this year will reinforce that cooperation. The relationship puzzles Western partners, but for India, Russia remains a major source of weapons and a hedge in its regional position against the vagaries of American politics and Chinese expansionism.
India is part of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and key to minilaterals like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue () 鈥� a grouping of Australia, the U.S., India and Japan 鈥� and the I2U2, comprising Israel, the U.S., India and the United Arab Emirates.
Yet India remains the world鈥檚 largest buyer of Russian-made arms, their leaders meet on a regular basis and the two countries are part of several multilateral bodies including as founding members of BRICS. Areas of cooperation between the two include counter-terrorism cooperation, defense, civil nuclear energy and space exploration.
In recent years, following the Kremlin鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine and Europe significantly reducing its use of Russian energy, India even became a of Russian oil and was exempted by the Biden administration from sanctions targeting Russia. Although that could change under President Donald Trump, India is likely to remain an American partner that avoids public criticism of Russia, just as it avoided criticizing the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Historical, geographical and strategic factors explain New Delhi鈥檚 partnership with Moscow.
Cold War legacy and broad industrial cooperation
The roots of the India-Russia defense partnership date back to India鈥檚 independence and the Cold War. As a post-colonial country whose industrial base was decimated under British rule, India sought economic and military self-sufficiency. Western corporations hesitated in doing business with a semi-socialist, later nationalized, economy and were often unwilling to share their technology. But the erstwhile Soviet Union had no such hesitation.
Soviet public-sector entered India鈥檚 civilian and military sectors with enthusiasm when India refused to join U.S.-led military alliances. They built factories in India, trained labor and transferred technology in government-to-government deals. India鈥檚 civilian and defense industrial base owes its origin to Soviet assistance. Even in the nuclear sector, while India鈥檚 first nuclear reactor was built under the American 鈥溾� program, it was the Soviet Union that helped build most nuclear reactors in India.
Post-Cold War cooperation centered on defense
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberalization of the Indian economy after 1992 changed India鈥檚 relationship with Russia. Over the last three decades, the U.S., Europe, China and the Gulf countries have become India鈥檚 top trading partners. India鈥檚 association with Russia became restricted to the defense realm, with limited energy trade. However, over the last two years, India鈥檚 purchase of cheap Russian oil has resulted in an uptick in trade ties. In 2024, stood at $65.7 billion, with a trade deficit in Russia鈥檚 favor.
Seventy-seven years after Indian independence, Russia remains one of the top defense suppliers to India. Russian-made T-72 and T-90 tanks, SU-30 MKI, MiG-29 and MiG-29K fighter jets, KA-31 helicopters, the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier and Kilo-class submarines remain in the Indian military arsenal. The two countries are AK-230 rifles and the Voronezh radar system, among others.
India is keen to modernize its military, however, budget constraints and strategic factors mean that it has historically preferred cheaper Russian equipment with older technology compared to American state-of-the-art technology. India鈥檚 2018 purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile system is a good example of India purchasing a Russian system primarily for strategic reasons.
Russia has periodically asked India to pay it in Chinese yuan, but for India, that is a tough sell.
However, in recent years, not only French and Israeli but even American defense companies are now willing to share their high-end technology and jointly coproduce and codevelop with their Indian counterparts. This is changing India鈥檚 defense partnership with Russia. According to the , until 2013, around 76 percent of India鈥檚 defense procurement was of Russian origin 鈥� today that is down to 36 percent. Similarly, from a high of 70 percent of India鈥檚 defense equipment being of Russian origin in 1990, that percentage today stands at 59 percent.
Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remained a supplier of defense equipment to India. Russian dockyards completed India鈥檚 orders for submarines and aircraft carriers. This has led some Indian strategists to argue that despite the war with Ukraine, Russia remains a dependable supplier of arms to India.
Since 2022, payments to Russia for purchases have become a challenge for India. With the sanctions against Russia, India is unable to pay using dollars, and unlike during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was often willing to accept payment in Indian rupees, that is no longer the case. Russia has periodically asked India to pay it in Chinese yuan, but for India, that is a . If the Russia-U.S. relationship improves under the second Trump administration, and the sanctions against Russia are lifted, India would once again be able to use dollars to pay Russia. And since India has signed a with Russia for oil at low prices, any fluctuation in prices would not affect it.
Continental balancer
During the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many around the world were surprised by India鈥檚 reluctance to publicly condemn President Putin and Russia. However, this is not surprising if we consider Cold War history. Indian reluctance to condemn Russian actions publicly, whether during the Cold War or later, has partly to do with realpolitik 鈥� India needs Russia on its side of the ledger. There is also an Indian reluctance to be involved in or comment on conflicts in other parts of the world.
Every country鈥檚 geography dictates its foreign and security policies. Ever since the 1950s, India has perceived a continental threat from China, which has, over the decades, developed a maritime aspect. The world鈥檚 two most populous nations, which are, of course, nuclear powers, face each other along a 3,500 kilometer-long border. India鈥檚 presence in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy does not fully assuage Indian concerns about China, as the Indo-Pacific is largely a maritime construct. Russia 鈥� both Soviet and post-Soviet 鈥� has remained India鈥檚 counterbalance to China on the continental Asian landmass.
Limitations of a hope-based strategy
India has long feared Sino-Russian rapprochement, which will negatively impact its security. The nightmare scenario for New Delhi is a close Sino-Russian relationship of the kind that existed prior to the 1966 Sino-Soviet split. The 1962 Sino-Indian war tested the limits of the India-Soviet partnership. Although the Soviets offered military assistance, they also declared neutrality.
In this context, the February 2025 of the Russian Ambassador to India that Russia would again maintain neutrality in the case of an India-China war should have been a reminder to New Delhi of the limitations of its hope-based strategy. This time around it would be a much weaker Russia and a stronger China.
During the Cold War, Soviet aid helped India produce fighter jets on Indian soil, a privilege the Soviets never granted China. However, the 鈥渘o-limits鈥� military relationship between China and Russia, announced just days before Moscow launched its war in Europe, over the last few years and India鈥檚 ability to wean Russia away from the Chinese embrace, even with an improvement in U.S.-Russia ties, is based on hope, not reality.
That Russia would maintain neutrality in an India-China war should remind New Delhi of the limitations of its hope-based strategy.
India has long maintained close ties with Russia, at both multilateral and regional fora. From the 1950s, the Soviet Union provided a dependable veto at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on issues relating to Kashmir. At a time when India felt that Western countries sided with Pakistan, this veto was critical.
Today, however, India has a more dependable UNSC partner, France, and sometimes the U.S., especially when it comes to terrorism, Kashmir and Pakistan. Furthermore, in recent years, Russia鈥檚 veto has not been as dependable, especially if the issue involves China. Nevertheless, India remains reluctant to criticize Russia at the UN, whether over Ukraine or other actions. Similarly, India remains involved in organizations like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, both to prevent Chinese dominance and ensure Russia keeps India鈥檚 interests in mind in these largely non-Western fora.
Scenarios
Modern India鈥檚 foreign policy has followed a realist approach to relations with great powers and other players. Over the last 77 years, New Delhi鈥檚 goals have centered around working toward a global order of its choosing, avoiding joining security alliances, and safeguarding India鈥檚 security and economic interests.
India has always viewed Russia as a key Eurasian power and a key pole of India鈥檚 ideal multipolar world order. Russia may be weaker than the Soviet Union was at the peak of its power, but Moscow retains one of the world鈥檚 largest nuclear arsenals, a UNSC veto, a massive military and a vast arms industry. Also, geography does not change, so even a weakened Russia remains important to Indian strategists and policymakers.
More likely: Indo-Russo relations to persist despite challenges
With the global order in flux, partly because of the uncertainty caused by the second Trump administration, the likely scenario is that India will continue its policy of hedging its bets by maintaining a close relationship with Russia. The residual warm feelings from the Cold War, the view of Russia as a counterbalance to China, the legacy defense equipment India bought from Soviet Russia due to that partnership, and more recently, India鈥檚 need for cheap energy, will play a role.
As of now, it seems likely that U.S.-Russia relations will improve during President Trump鈥檚 second term. India will be in tune with the Trump administration鈥檚 policy on Russia and will see it as a way to wean Russia away from China.
When the was initiated under the first Trump administration, India was given an exemption. If, however, things change with Russia and sanctions are back on the table, then India鈥檚 defense and energy purchases will be hurt, and the country will be faced with a crisis of the kind it faced in 1989-1990 when it had to seek new partners and markets. In this scenario, however, India鈥檚 view of Russia as the balancer against China does not change.
Less likely: India moves closer to the U.S. to counter Russo-Sino axis
In a less likely scenario, India agrees to change its view of Russia to enhance its partnership with the U.S. and the West. This could come to pass should Washington seek to impose sanctions on Russia because of a lack of movement on the Ukraine negotiations. U.S. measures against organizations like BRICS would put pressure on India-Russia relations.
If the Moscow-Beijing axis continues to deepen, despite a potential easing of sanctions and pressure on Russia, it will impinge upon India鈥檚 strategic relationship with Russia. A stronger China, benefiting from a semi-isolationist America and a Russia that is no longer a continental balancer vis-a-vis China, will be India鈥檚 worst nightmare.